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Abstract  
This thesis is an interdisciplinary and qualitative meta-synthesis of a diverse body of 
information relevant to the way human and cultural rights intersect with the economic, social 
and environmental pillars of development, and explores the relevance of these issues to 
contemporary cultural institutions. Recognising and responding to these intersections is 
necessary if humans are to rise to the challenges of modernity – rapid change; uncertainty 
about emerging risks; conflicts; moral ambiguities; social, cultural and ecological system 
failures; diminishing energy returns; and increasing complexity, interdependencies and 
fragility.  
I argue that many public policies, governments and private institutions inadequately 
understand the threats and are failing to provide integrated responses. There is often a failure 
to recognise and incorporate principles of human rights, equity, participation, cultural 
diversity and sustainable development into policy and governance, this risks wider policy, 
program and institutional failures. As with many nations, Australia has ‗sold‘ some of its 
freedoms for economic growth. Its democracy remains vulnerable given the inadequacy of its 
human-rights protections, and the expanding dominance of a corporate culture intrudes into 
all aspects of people‘s lives. The neoliberal agenda, adopted by many authoritarian as well as 
liberal states, has extracted heavy tolls on personal freedom, cultural integrity, the physical 
environment and finite resources. The long-predicted limits of growth are being reached, and 
a self-repairing biosphere is severely stressed; yet, institutional barriers (media, globalised 
business and politics) and instinctive human denials continue to allow established 
development-momenta, which are as harmful as they are unstoppable.  
A methodological basis for this thesis was my experience managing a national human-rights 
counter-radicalisation program. This is described and presented as case studies in a separate 
appendix. The studies illustrate how such initiatives can be both culturally sensitive and 
compatible with human-rights principles. The design was novel because it used human-
rights-based population-health models of intervention and applied these approaches to a new 
public-policy setting. The program‘s method was premised on the need to navigate the many 
risks and changes facing civil society and offers a template that may be used by social policy 
agencies and cultural institutions. 
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This thesis describes many of the determinants of future trends and their connections, and it 
links these to human rights and culture. It argues that alternatives to existing public-policy 
models of action in the domains of security, social and cultural inclusion, democratic 
participation and sustainable development require new strategies. Cultural institutions can 
and should be vectors where many of the challenges to civil society are enacted. New 
museology – as an inter-disciplinary practice that intersects with other inter-disciplinary 
methodologies – presents a model for integrated, sustainable and egalitarian approaches to 
natural and built systems.  
To have a viable future on a habitable planet, humanity must make substantial social, 
economic, cultural, environmental, productive, distributive, political and legislative changes. 
Cultural institutions, such as museums, can play important roles in transformative processes: 
recording, educating, interpreting, bearing witness, preserving, re-creating, advocating, 
inventing, organising and leading. In our likely future, humans will have less scope for 
material consumption, but more scope for repairing local communities, ecologies, and social 
and cultural practices. The modern notion of the museum as a civic space – as a living 
institution integrated within the community and the environment it serves or is based – is 
compatible with a future society that is more equitable, sustainable and communal, rather 
than aspirational, materialistic and individualistic. 
In a world of increasing uncertainties, where human societies are entering an unprecedented 
era of global atrophy and risk, museums have a critical role in mediating and supporting the 
transformation to a more sustainable and equitable future – a world of dynamic equilibrium – 
where there are greater opportunities for genuine human flourishing.  
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[1]   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THESIS ISSUES AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis examines national and international concerns which may appear disconnected, 
but as described in coming chapters, are interrelated: social inclusion, human rights, 
security, environmental sustainability, globalisation, market economics and population 
growth. I aim to highlight thematic interdependence and the need to respond to each with 
reference to the others. There are many ways to meet these challenges. One such is within 
the settings of cultural institutions. The infrastructure of museums, libraries, archives, 
galleries, heritage sites and public media offer opportunities to engage civil society in 
debates that educate, entertain and inspire action. Indeed, these institutions have a 
responsibility to hold a mirror to society, reflecting the realities of the past and present. 
Culture and heritage institutions can start the process of musealisation – or transforming 
centres of activity, both human and natural, into a form of museum – where new modes of 
living are interrogated, mediated and enacted.
1
  
These intersecting issues are, in many ways, the experience of contemporary modernity: 
rapid change, conflict, future uncertainty, moral ambiguity and novel forms of 
connectivity. This thesis argues that many public policies fail to understand, or 
inadequately respond to, such challenges. A major concern is that excluding sustainable 
development, human rights, democratic principles and social justice from policy and 
institutional roles will result in continuing, and widening, governance failures. I describe 
the connections between, and determinants of, a number of global trends. Specifically, I 
explore the concepts and current debates about social inclusion (Section 3.3), human rights 
(particularly Sections 1.2.1, 2.5 & 4.2), cultural diversity (Section 1.2.2 & Chapter 4), 
security (Section 2.6), the nature of transformation and risk (Section 1.2.4), market 
economics (Section 2.3), globalisation (Section 2.1), trends such as population growth 
(Section 2.2) and climate change (Section 2.4), and consider Australia‘s experience as a 
multicultural democracy (Section 3.4). No understanding of these issues is possible without 
examining the national and international forces shaping the world; this is discussed with 
reference to how they relate to Australia in Chapter 2. The aspirations, and some threats, to 
civil societies are outlined in Chapter 3. These chapters, with the Introduction which 
explains terms and methodologies, are essentially scoping and contextualising in purpose. 
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Chapter 4 analyses international legal instruments, principles (standard-setting or 
aspirational) and research that reflects many of the issues described in past chapters. I also 
review cultural rights, given these remain an unfinished aspect of the normative human-
rights system and are linked to subsequent discussions. Chapter 5 asserts that cultural 
institutions can be regarded as vectors where new approaches to recording, educating, 
debating and demonstrating challenges to civil society are conducted. Appendix 1 
(accessible on-line) presents case studies illustrating how a cultural-rights approach to 
complex issues provided linked-up responses and helped achieve multiple goals. These 
studies are projects from a national initiative that were culturally sensitive and compatible 
with human rights. The program design was novel because it used rights-based, 
population-health models, applying them to an atypical public-policy setting. The program 
also demonstrates connection to wider issues and provides examples for cultural 
institutions facing challenges to their future relevance. 
In summary, this thesis provides answers to four big questions: what is happening to our 
world, why is it happening, how can we think about these first two questions, and what are 
some solutions to the threats they present? 
1.2 CRITICAL THEMES | LITERATURE REVIEW 
I deliberately use the term themes, rather than theory, to refer to the ideas informing this 
thesis. The goal is to analyse circumstances facing humanity and to reflect on how many 
threats and uncertainties can be understood, and navigated, in the decades ahead. My 
purpose is to combine didacticism with pragmatism. Of course, a rich and complex body of 
theory surrounds the issues discussed. My choice, however, was not to assess selectively a 
body of contesting theories but to use pieces of information and widely accepted principles 
as the foundation upon which to construct my arguments. Although theorising was a path I 
might have chosen, such an approach, I believe, is of less value. My defence of this 
approach is that the philosophical bases for systems of human ethics or social construction 
are generally idealised (a common objection to Rawls‘ theory of justice2) and, in the ‗real‘ 
world, practicalities mean that plans must be iterative and achievable. Humans will never 
live in Utopia. My hope for the future is that they can live. In one sense, this argument is 
that the ends can justify the means so long as action occurs within the general frameworks 
of global ethics and human rights, which I briefly describe in the following pages. 
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Three principles – as distinct from theories – informing this thesis are global ethics, human 
rights and the capabilities approach. The capabilities approach is closely linked to human 
rights, and it establishes a guiding framework for human flourishing, which, in turn, is 
compatible with sustainable development. Another important theme is that of culture: its 
nature, influence and importance to human functionings. Although there are numerous 
theories associated with culture, particularly how it pertains to global ethics and free will, I 
tend to mention these in passing, and concentrate on the effect of culture and the right to 
cultural identity. 
I refer to the theme of health. This is significant for several reasons, especially its role as a 
litmus test for humanity. Health is a resource for living, a determinant of quality of life, 
and population-level measurements can be used to assess various forms of access and 
equity. Health promotion provides a holistic model for sustainable development and, when 
understood as encompassing physical, social, emotional and collective well-being,
3
 health 
is the most important denominator for assessing whether development goals are achieved. 
In our era of economic-growth fetishism, where wealth is equated with human happiness, 
health-related notions of flourishing in a sustainable world offer an alternative existential 
model. 
I also include other critical themes that relate more to the sciences, particularly physics. 
The technical details are complex; nevertheless, general systems, thermodynamics, chaos 
and network science are regularly described in texts about threats to the biosphere and 
humanity‘s role in the processes of change and, as such, require explanation with this 
scoping of the literature. 
1.2.1 GLOBAL ETHICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 
1.2.1.1  GLOBAL ETHICS 
The first of these principles – global ethics – may inspire ambivalence from some quarters. 
These are not an exact set of beliefs, but values shaped by a range of influences, both 
religious and secular. Global ethics is a term that has been used in many ways, adding to 
confusion; for example, several non-government organisations (NGOs) talk of ‗global 
ethics principles‘ inspiring human-development activities, but it has two formal definitions. 
The first was adopted by the interfaith movement. Theologian Hans Küng has been 
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instrumental in this process, helping to draft the declaration Towards a Global Ethic, which 
was endorsed (although not authorised) by representatives of numerous religions at the 
1993 Parliament of the World‘s Religions.4 The declaration‘s drafters aimed to highlight 
the concordance of values at the centre of religious belief systems: the moral equality of all 
humans and the desire for reciprocity of treatment. These values find explicit and implicit 
mention in most faiths. The declaration highlights the interconnectedness of life, stating all 
people are ‗interdependent‘ and ‗each of us depends on the well-being of the whole, and so 
we have respect for the community of living beings, for people, animals, and plants, and 
for the preservation of earth, the air, water and soil‘.5 It argues for universal (moral) 
standards associated with equality, liberty, truthfulness, and non-violence, which are 
elaborated in a set of accompanying principles.
6
 Highly idealistic, the declaration has been 
criticised for being unrealistic and culturally hegemonic.
7
 
A second definition of the term ‗global ethics‘ by an international body is found in a 
cultural statement by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). Released shortly after Towards a Global Ethic, UNESCO‘s Our Creative 
Diversity (1995) lists five core elements that reflect a universal value system.
8
 These 
elements are equity, or recognition of the equality of all people regardless of class, race, 
gender, community or age. Equity applies to individuals and groups; for example, it 
includes preservation of the natural environment for use and enjoyment by future 
generations. The second element is human rights, with the qualification that rights are 
accompanied by duties and ‗bonds without options are oppressive; options without bonds 
are anarchy‘.9 The third, democracy, is essential to give voice to the marginalised. The 
fourth is protection of minorities, who may face violence or exclusion on multiple levels, 
such as the denial of political rights. The fifth element is peaceful conflict resolution and 
fair negotiation: justice and fairness can be achieved only through negotiation not by 
imposed preconceived moral principles. UNESCO‘s global ethics is a framework that aims 
to promote peaceful solutions to disputes. Despite sharing many similarities with the 1993 
declaration of the interfaith community, they are more thoroughly described
10
 and draw on 
the commonality of ethical principles that form the basis of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and related covenants on civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as the UN Millennium Declaration, which recommitted all nations 
to human rights in 2000.
11
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A form of global ethics is also reflected in The Earth Charter, which describes the values 
necessary for a sustainable future. Prepared by a consortium of civil society advocates, 
NGOs and academics, the Earth Charter Initiative is lobbying for its adoption by UNESCO 
as a soft-law agreement.
12
 It consolidates principles of human rights, democracy, 
sustainable development, ecological protection, peace-building, respect and dialogue into a 
single document.
13
   
These closely related expressions of global ethics – inspired variously by faith, human 
rights and environmentalism – are each consistent with the themes and values discussed in 
this thesis. 
1.2.1.2  HUMAN CAPABILITIES 
The capabilities approach was developed by Amartya Sen and expanded by the political 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum as a way of assessing human development. It emphasises 
the capabilities humans should value – rather than economics – to achieve progress and 
well-being. As its name implies, this is an ‗approach‘: there is no definitive understanding 
of capabilities, nor is it regarded as a universal framework for social justice. Rather, it is a 
way of examining quality of life. Ingrid Robeyns describes it, not as ‗a theory that will 
explain poverty, inequality, or well-being but as a theory that helps us to conceptualize 
these notions‘.14 She argues it is ‗a broad normative framework for the evaluation of 
individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies and proposals about 
social change in society‘.15 The capabilities approach has now suffused much of the 
language about progressive notions of human flourishing.
16
 As such, it is typically 
regarded as a less theoretical, more practical tool, hence used in public policy by NGOs 
and activists for social transformation. The following are its main concepts. 
First, functionings, or ‗beings and doings‘ which are elementary things somebody can self-
evaluate. A person may ‗be‘ by achieving or aspiring to a condition; for example, they may 
be adequately nourished, literate and educated, happy, sad, or be a member of a group. 
What somebody may ‗do‘ includes their choices and activities, such as growing vegetables, 
reducing the energy used to heat their home or voting in an election. Some functionings 
involve both being and doing (e.g. driving one‘s children to school every day so they can 
be educated). Functionings are morally neutral and, although they may be ‗good‘ (e.g. 
being generous) or ‗bad‘ (e.g. being selfish), how this is understood depends upon the 
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normative context, or the ideological, ethical, religious, cultural or other perspective from 
which the function is viewed. 
The second concept: capabilities, are opportunities available to a person with which they 
can (or cannot) achieve life-goals, given available resources. Capabilities include freedoms 
that are options and exist formally (such as legal protections) as well as freedoms that are 
conceived as opportunities. There are various areas where a person may fully achieve their 
capabilities; these range across elementary physical aspects of living, the more intangible 
(i.e. philosophical), as well as those that reach beyond the individual to their wider world. 
Nussbaum has promoted a range of central capabilities, which she considers essential to 
being human, claiming they are superior to the system of human rights.
17
 
Resources – the third concept in the model – are those things that help a person to achieve 
functionings (what they can be and do) and include elements such as income, liberty, 
goods, and access to natural services.
18
 The value of any given resource may be determined 
by a ‗conversion factor‘, which helps assess the quantum of functioning that can be 
extracted from it. These conversion factors are categorised in three ways: as personal (such 
as an individual‘s strength, gender, or intelligence), social (the setting where they live, such 
as the rule of law, gender equality and non-discrimination) and environmental (the physical 
setting, such as the quality of infrastructure, aridity, pollution, and climate). To estimate 
the extent to which a person can achieve well-being it is insufficient to know what 
resources are at their disposal; rather, the extent to which their personal, social and 
environmental circumstances may help them convert capabilities into flourishing.
19
 
Sen‘s ideas are drawn from the philosophical notion of the means–end distinction, or 
whether something is valued for itself or as the means to an alternative, preferred result. 
Under the capabilities approach, assessments of quality of life and outcomes are based on 
people‘s access to freedom and life chances. The ends (‘flourishing‘) are more important 
than the means (getting there); therefore, there is flexibility in how to achieve goals. It 
should not be assumed that income is the only pathway; rather, other means may help 
somebody reach their desired end. For example, if the aspiration is to live in society 
without discrimination based on sexuality, faith or race, then capability-supporting policies 
or laws may help achieve this goal. 
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One of the purported strengths of the capabilities approach is its accommodation of 
diversities. On the basis that humans are ontologically and physiologically similar, 
functionings, capabilities, resources (and their conversions) are non-prescriptive and may 
be adapted to a range of settings specific to personal circumstances. This claim has been 
contested on the grounds that all beliefs and values are shaped in the public sphere 
(communitarianism) and no single methodology can be both ‗thick‘ (specific to behaviour 
and context) and sufficiently ‗thin‘ (embracing universal norms20).  The capabilities 
approach is regarded as thin because it applies to all. Communitarian criticism of liberal 
moral and political philosophy is largely premised on the belief that (because the individual 
is so embedded in context) no general system can be acceptable to everybody.
21
  
Universal theories of justice are extensive and complex; my intention is not to analyse 
them here. As noted, the capabilities approach – as a framework to achieve good life-
chances for human flourishing – is widely accepted, and has been applied both practically 
(as in the design of development or happiness indices
22
) and theoretically (such as 
informing social policy principles
23
). In this thesis, I use the capabilities approach to set a 
context and as a normative method to help determine whether human flourishing is 
achievable in the future. 
1.2.1.3  HUMAN RIGHTS 
Established in the years after the Great War of 1914–18, the League of Nations was the 
first attempt in the modern era to build some form of global governance to help prevent a 
similar, dreadful carnage from recurring.
24
 However, the League failed, and the Second 
World War led to an even higher death toll, paid especially by civilian populations due to 
systematic crimes against humanity. The next venture in international governance saw the 
formation of the United Nations (UN) and a system of human rights, again born of an 
attempt to preserve peace and introduce a framework for global justice. Australia had a 
prominent role in the UN‘s formation. ‗Doc‘ Herbert Evatt, the president of the General 
Assembly during its third session, helped shape the newly established body and led mid-
power nations against attempts by more powerful states to structure the UN to serve their 
own interests.
25
 For most of the UN‘s history, Australia has been a cooperative member, 
benefiting from close engagement with the UN
26
 although, under the Howard government, 
Australia moved away from multilateralism due to the government‘s allegiance with the 
   19 | Page  
 
Bush administration on issues such as the Iraq invasion, preventative warfare and carbon 
emission targets.
27
 A change of government in 2007 saw Australia return to a more 
participatory approach. 
Human rights are perhaps the UN‘s greatest cooperative achievement. They can be seen in 
two broad ways: first, as a set of mutually dependent rights and responsibilities, values by 
which humans should aspire to live within communities and societies and, second, as a 
system of agreements, internationally recognised, subject to international law and often 
enshrined in national and regional legislation. The UDHR is the foundation document for 
the ethical and legal framework of human rights. Promulgated in December 1948,
28
 the 
UDHR has been described as ‗arguably the most important document ever reduced to 
writing, whether on paper, papyrus, velum or tablets of stone‘.29 The declaration states that 
human rights are inalienable (they cannot be repudiated or given away to another person) 
and indivisible, meaning humans are entitled to all the rights set out in the UDHR, not only 
those politically or economically convenient to grant. These are the rights of all people, no 
matter an individual‘s political views, culture, sexual preferences, faith or racial group – or 
any other of the multiple determinants of human difference. 
The UDHR lists fundamental human rights. These include, but are not limited to, the right 
to life, safety and security, leisure and cultural practice, adequate education, housing and 
health, to practice and adhere to a religious faith or hold to secular beliefs. However, they 
are restricted to what are often described as outer freedoms. Inner freedoms, conversely, 
describe self-created or relinquished freedoms – these distinctions are discussed in Section 
3.2. Despite the clarity of the UDHR, it was soon realised that to declare all people have 
certain rights was inadequate: each right required detailed contextualising to be fully 
developed. For example, the notion of the right to security and safety is vague and relative. 
Therefore, in 1984, a more comprehensive treaty, the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, was adopted to more fully 
describe these rights and better protect people at risk. Similarly, the need to protect the 
rights of people, seeking legitimate refuge from persecution, was outlined in the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. 
One way of regarding UN treaties is to understand in what ways they are either hard law or 
soft law. Soft law, sometimes known as pre-law, refers to non-binding agreements between 
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state parties; these are resolutions and declarations passed by the General Assembly (often 
without unanimity) that are neither represented in international law nor enforceable by 
courts. Soft laws tend to be aspirational, have moral authority, and be useful guides for 
state policies.
30
 Conversely, hard law encompasses international agreements, such as UN 
conventions that become binding once a defined number of state parties commit to their 
ratification.
31
 When states accede to a UN convention, they are required to reflect its 
principles in domestic legislation and, hence, are bound to international law.
32
 The UDHR 
is a soft law and offers no protections. For its defined rights to have any effect, they 
required international normative expression through two conventions: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR).
33
 It is through the formal 
endorsement of these two conventions that nations participate in human-rights standards. 
However, states may choose to agree only to those rights they wish to support, and many 
have refused to ratify ICCPR and ICESCR. Some have done so, but have failed to protect 
human rights with local laws. Ideally, a nation will both ratify the conventions and 
maintain an independent human rights institution with sufficient authority to scrutinize 
compliance.
34
 
Because human rights can be complex, to make them easier to understand, they are often 
categorised as being either positive or negative. Rights are understood as negative when 
denying certain freedoms would negatively affect the individual, for example, freedom of 
speech and freedom from violence or slavery. Alternatively, the rights to do, access, or 
receive things that one wants are considered positive rights, such as the right to adequate 
healthcare, education, or a minimum standard of living. Although this is a useful 
distinction, it is rather crude. Some rights can be positive and negative, or incompatible, 
especially when a choice must be made between competing rights. 
Another rights-taxonomy is that of generations, although some have criticised this 
approach.
35
 First- generation rights are civil and political and include such rights as the 
right to the franchise, freedom from discrimination, freedom of speech and assembly;
36
 
they encompass the negative rights as outlined in ICCPR. When first-generation human 
rights are restricted, second-generation rights are directly affected; these are the economic, 
social and cultural rights, such as the rights to education and to adequate housing, and the 
right to manifest a religion or belief.
37
 These tend to be positive rights and are included in 
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ICESCR.
38
 Third-generation human rights go beyond the social and political rights of 
individuals and consider the rights of groups over time; they may include the right to an 
environmentally sustainable future, the right of groups to collectively bargain, or for a 
culture to survive.
39
 Although each rights-generation is important, and all rights are 
indivisible, some rights conflict while others can be eroded by pressure, such as political 
interference. Two examples can illustrate these challenges. The first is the right to life 
(article 3, UDHR), which the state has responsibility to protect. During a period of security 
alert, such as the threat of a terrorist attack, ‗lesser‘ rights may need to be sacrificed to 
protect other rights; however, such an argument could lead, after some permutations, to the 
authoritarian regime which asserts that the protection of life requires the withdrawal of 
other rights. This scenario is relevant to whether certain rights are non-derogable, meaning 
they can never be surrendered, or derogable, meaning they may be suspended. The right to 
life is considered non-derogable, but the right to a fair trial may be derogable if it is 
believed (at a time of crisis) not withholding this right might place the life or safety of 
others in jeopardy.
40
 In Australia, there was concern that security-related legislation, 
enacted during the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, unnecessarily infringe on a non-
derogable human rights.
41
 Further, it has been argued such trade-offs not only are 
unnecessary and harmful but can also be counterproductive.
42
  
The second example concerns the freedom of religion and belief (article 18, UDHR, 
ICCPR), which has conflicted with a 2008 Victorian law concerning the rights to abortion. 
In this case, a well- intentioned decision to ensure rights of women conflicted with the 
right to conscientious objection.
43
 The law states that if a woman seeks a termination from 
a medical practitioner who opposes abortion, it is mandatory she be referred to another 
who is known to have no such objection. The Catholic Church criticised this requirement 
because practicing Catholics will not conduct abortions, but the legal requirement they do 
so, or at least provide a referral for a woman seeking a termination, places them in a 
position of conflict where they must break either the law or their personal convictions.
44
 
This contentious issue, triggered by a single section (s.8) of the legislation,
45
 does not 
invalidate human rights. Ethical dilemmas will always arise around social and cultural 
contests; human rights do not necessarily make intractable moral problems more or less 
easy to solve. The Victorian abortion law highlights that, unless the drafting process 
considers all rights-implications, legislation may be difficult to implement or may require 
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amendments to correct unintended (or deliberately inciting) clauses that infringe competing 
rights. 
On the 60th anniversary of its adoption, Kevin Rudd, then Australian prime minister, 
eulogised the UDHR as ‗one of the most defining documents on the protection of rights 
and freedoms in the history of humankind‘.46 While this support is commendable, its 
sincerity is questionable. In Australia, human rights continue to be protected more by 
tradition than by law – freedom is something citizens take for granted. Although enjoyment 
of personal liberty is considered typically Australian, Australia does not have a strong 
rights culture. Nor is it commonly realised that freedoms believed to be rights are 
unprotected by the Constitution and Australia is the only democracy that has failed to enact 
a national charter of rights consistent with ICCPR and ICESCR. 
This thesis makes repeated references to democratic processes as integral to human rights 
and development. I do not discuss this at length, given democracy is a widely understood 
concept, certainly in the sense it is a set of ‗institutional arrangements characterized by free 
elections with universal adult suffrage, principles of liberty (freedom of information and 
expression), the right to oppose government, the right of associational autonomy, a system 
with legal rules, and a notion of justice and fairness‘.47 Nevertheless, democracy is an 
elastic term that is even used as an oxymoron, for example, in the official title of the 
government of North Korea.
48
 Democracy is understood and applied in many ways,
49
 and 
is a complex and flawed system. This leaves it vulnerable to abuse.
50
 As Winston Churchill 
remarked, ‗[it] is the worst form of government – except all those other forms that have 
been tried from time to time‘.51 
I briefly introduce two notions: cultural democracy and deep democracy. The first, which 
was common 40 or more years ago, is now used infrequently. It has been explained as 
comprising several related concepts: the protection and promotion of cultural diversity 
(effectively, cultural rights), active participation in community cultural life, citizen 
enablement in decisions affecting the quality of their cultural lives, and fair and accessible 
access to cultural resources.
52
 For these reasons, it became closely associated with 
multiculturalism.
53
 Essentially, the approach aimed to better recognise and enable cultural 
identities. This became lost in debates about whether culture should be imposed (by benign 
but inevitably biased elites) or determined by popular preferences (dictatorship of majority 
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taste shaped by corporate interests). Although cultural democracy is still regarded 
positively, it has been overtaken by the influence of neoliberalism.
54
   
Deep democracy, a term that has gained currency more recently, has its origins in the 
1990s. It takes the ideas implicit in cultural democracy and reinterprets them, providing 
opportunities to understand the structures and values of new forms of empowerment and 
expression. Democratic governance should include all individuals in the political process, 
but deep democracy goes further in both inclusion and dialogue. Deep democracy is a way 
of negotiating multiple layers of diversity, not only diversity in cultural or other identity-
markers but also in opinions, conflicts, forms of communication, and levels of power and 
privilege. It is ‗the experience of a process of flow in which all actors on the stage are 
needed to create the play that is being watched‘.55 
Scholars such as Arjun Appadurai argue that principles of deep democracy describe and 
explain significant social movements where local actions mediate global trends, especially 
when there is erosion of national authority: the level at which democratic governance is 
typically managed. It is through the work of civil-society organisations that new forms of 
valid, democratic actions are created and where new groupings are able to contest forms of 
(especially corporate) authority that are undermining individual freedoms, opportunities for 
collective development and the empowerment of communities.
56
 
1.2.1.4   HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
While human rights are achieved across civil, political, social and cultural activities, 
human rights also relate to economic equity, sustainability and quality of life. Because 
these issues are intertwined, they are difficult to disaggregate or discuss in isolation. 
Human rights, especially, are integral to the concept of human development. This is 
reflected in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report and agreed under the 
Millennium Declaration (both date from 2000), which list important human development 
goals.
57
 These documents recognise that wealth, education, health, and cultural practice (as 
key areas of public policy) improve living standards and help build sustainable, free 
societies. UNDP‘s advocacy is compatible with Sen‘s capabilities approach and the notion 
that self-determination is both a principle and means to achieve development. Although 
development enlarges the choices available to people, by increasing their functionings and 
capabilities, it extends further into forms of value (such as the right to participate or to 
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safety) which are necessary to be creative, productive, to enjoy self-respect, empowerment 
and a sense of community belonging.
58
 
However, development has been criticised for inherent contradictions, both as applied in 
anthropological sciences and as a tool of political dominance. It has been questioned 
whether development means improvements in the areas of material well-being, technology 
and economics, and (if equated with ‗progress‘) whether this entails the substitution of 
traditional methods with alternative technologies, given ‗old ways‘ inhibit development as 
defined by culturally dominant and imposed measurement tools. If so, will development 
affect lifestyles, knowledge and cultural practices? Development and humanitarian 
initiatives may actually represent a form of cultural hegemony or misplaced, albeit well-
intentioned, interference.
59
 
Another criticism is that human development is often reduced to ‗development‘, which 
equates to measuring prosperity through the economic instrument of national per capita 
wealth.
60
 In the context of globalisation, strong development proponents argue for 
economic growth on the basis that resource exploitation yields benefits to the poor in 
developing countries.
61
 As discussed at Section 2.3, such assertions inconveniently fly in 
the face of contrary evidence. The problem for humanity, given population growth and the 
planet‘s ecological capacity, is that unlimited growth is an unsatisfactory paradigm. It can 
be argued that material satisfaction for the wealthier populations might never reach a fixed 
point and the secondary effects for poorer populations are likely to be only marginal: 
humanity needs several earths before any point of wealth-equity is achievable. According 
to the Working Group on Climate Change and Development, research shows that global 
economic growth is an extremely inefficient way to achieve poverty reduction.
62
 Other 
models are needed if prosperity is to be achieved for humanity as a whole. The dilemma is 
that most governments in most countries have no visions that offer alternatives to the old 
development models. The Working Group argues that, faced with critical flaws such as 
climate change and redistributive failure, the official response has been persistence: 
[C]hanging course for a different sea or safe harbour is not considered an option. We must 
steam ahead, holed below the water line, through iceberg-infested waters, simply because 
that is the course originally set, and now no one feels able to change it.
63 
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Some commentators on development aid have gone further. Raj Patel argues that global 
food production, supply and marketing has unseen and unknown histories, which have 
consistently been about exploitation of producers. In the past and present, these have been 
the rural poor across the world, but, particularly in the period following the Second World 
War, when food aid became a component of United States (US)-endorsed human 
development, they joined the armoury of global capitalism‘s strategy to expand profits and 
dominate world markets.
64
 
Human development is often believed to apply only to the world‘s poor; this is inaccurate. 
It is ‗development of the people, for the people and by the people‘.65 Human development, 
therefore, can be attained through policies of social inclusion: a social justice approach to 
lower barriers to education, health, wealth and self-realisation. As a principle, particularly 
when married to capabilities and human rights, and expanded with notions of sustainability 
and distributive equity, human development also becomes a model for hypothetical options 
in social, cultural and economic reinvention. Because human rights and community 
empowerment set the ethical and legal framework for the protection of groups who may be 
marginalised or exploited by those in dominant positions, these principles should be 
determinants of public policy and planning that have human development objectives, such 
as social inclusion and multiculturalism. This leads to the issue of culture: what it is, its 
significance, and its potential as a driver of social transformation. 
1.2.2 DEFINING CULTURE 
The word ‗culture‘ has been described as one of the most complex in the English 
language.
66
 It has been used to refer to prized moveable and immoveable iconic creations 
of the arts, such as works of literature, classical music, paintings or sculptures by famed 
artists – although these are also equated with an equally ambivalent term: civilization.67 
This definition may be valid, but it is partial. Three concepts of culture have influenced the 
social sciences. One concept regards culture as a quality differentiating humans from 
animals, another defines culture as something a person acquires, which infers some 
cultures and some people are able to acquire more or ‗better‘ culture than are others. The 
third concept regards culture as a form of relativist expression: all humans are products of 
their culture, and human diversity is explained by culture, not by other determinants, such 
as race.
68
 This last notion is focused on here. 
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Culture was defined by Edward Tylor in the late nineteenth century as a ‗complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society‘.69 However, this does not adequately 
account for its complexity. Medical anthropologist Cecil Helman provides an expansive 
explanation. He argues that, in every human group, there are three levels of culture. First, 
there is a tertiary level, which is visible to the outsider; it is what most people consider as 
culture: rituals, dress, cuisine and festivals. However, this is a façade beneath which is a 
range of implicit beliefs and rules that are a cultural ‗grammar‘. These form the secondary 
level of culture: assumptions known to members, or some members, which are rarely 
shared with outsiders. The primary level of culture, the deepest form, is where rules are 
intuitively known and taken for granted; they may be impossible to articulate because they 
are beyond awareness. Helman also argues that culture forms a ‗lens‘ through which the 
world is seen, and people classified. All cultures separate humans into categories (gender, 
age, wellness, abilities and belongingness) and the ways people may move across and 
within such categories. This inevitably involves forms of stratification, for example, along 
lines of class, wealth, caste or professional status. Every stratum will possess various 
cultural attributes, such as manners, dress, communication, domestic arrangements, even 
diet: ‗rich and poor, powerful and powerless – each will have their own inherited cultural 
perspective … in each case these people form a group apart with their own concepts, rules 
and social organisation‘.70 Culture is also relative and is best understood within its 
historical, economic, geographical and other contexts. This means a group‘s culture will be 
shaped by many factors; indeed, it is largely impossible to describe a culture so rarefied 
that it is untouched by others. 
If Helman‘s definition is accepted, culture is omnipresent. It determines how humans live, 
behave, and think. It is so ubiquitous it may take on a form of transparency. People often 
accept what ‗is‘ (being, or reality as it appears to be), simply ‗is‘, without contemplating 
potential relativity, alternative meanings or interpretations. However, this transparency 
(known as ‗emic‘ perception) tends to apply only to those who belong to the ‗unseeing‘ 
cultural group. Cultural markers may be highly visible to those who are viewing what ‗is‘ 
from outside (or ‗etic‘ to) the cultural group.71 This explains much exclusion, 
discrimination and culturally based reasoning. 
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Two examples may help illustrate this issue of cultural relativity. First, in the realm of 
contemporary fashion, Western society has many cultural norms for modes of dress, but 
the woman who wears a burqa may be highly visible although hidden behind heavy 
veiling; conversely, she may have low visibility in a Muslim country or within certain 
Muslim communities. Similarly, a woman who wears a bikini at an Australian beach may 
be perceived as the norm, whereas in other countries or different cultural contexts she may 
be inappropriately (and dangerously) visible. The second example draws on assumptions of 
neoliberal economics about the behaviour of ‗the rational man‘. These may seem self-
evident to the Western-trained economist but inexplicable to a person who is not, 
especially if they come from a culture that does not preference self-interest over communal 
obligations, or does not consider human volition to be quantitatively measurable. Simply 
because a particular Western paradigm of political economy has international primacy does 
not make it objectively valid, as global conflict and exploitation bears continuing 
testimony.
72
 Patel interprets the etic–emic divide a little differently, claiming that 
misperceptions are like a form of clinical delusion (known as anosognosia) where the blind 
actually believe they have sight.
73
 He argues contemporary global economics has humanity 
captive in a political and cultural belief system that is ‗not only delusional – it also distorts 
the way we see other people. Seeing fellow human beings as mere co-consumers blinds us 
to the deeper connections between us, and distorts our political choices‘.74 
Another way of viewing the complex pull of culture, and the way culture is negotiated by 
each person, is optimal distinctiveness. In this explanation, offered by Marilynn Brewer, 
people tend to locate a balance between the need to belong and to identify with a social 
group (this may be cultural, racial, or another identity-marker) and the need to express 
uniqueness, or individuation. This social-self helps to explain the paradox of the person 
who simultaneously seeks sameness and difference.
75
 Yet another facet of cultural 
perception is, literally, what people see. Richard Nisbett experimented with Western 
(American) and Eastern (Chinese) subjects, who viewed complex images then interpreted 
and recalled them, to determine how images were imprinted on memory. The Asian 
culturally mediated way of looking is integrated and incipient, anticipating change and 
broadening connections. Western vision is linear: ‗direct confrontation with problems is 
more a habit of Western culture; in many ways it is a defining trait‘.76 
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Because it is deeply embedded in human consciousness and unconsciousness, the 
significance of culture is easily overlooked. So, too, is culture‘s relationship with human 
rights and development. Because culture is a strong determinant of how people live, the 
quality and meaning of their lives, and how they participate in society and the economy, 
human rights can provide the architecture that enables a language of cultural empowerment 
and equality. Culture rights are reinforced through the promotion of cultural liberty
77
 and, 
as such, culturally, linguistically and religiously distinct groups are able to realise, as 
rights, their human and social development. These concerns have helped shaped concepts 
such as cultural democracy and multiculturalism.   
1.2.3 POPULATION-HEALTH METHODOLOGY 
Health is described in the 1946 World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution as ‗a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity‘.78 Linking this definition to the international standard of human rights being 
established at the time, the WHO Constitution states that the ‗enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is a fundamental right of every human being without 
distinction‘.79 This is consistent with the UDHR, which affirms all people have a right ‗to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services‘.80 
The purpose of a population-health approach is to understand and respond to a society‘s 
health status by examining all the issues affecting a population, rather than individual 
health or medical problems. This approach recognises important meta-effects, for example, 
how social stratification, wealth distribution, the physical environment, educational 
opportunity and other life-chances can shape the overall health of a population or sub-
population (a large and identifiable group, such as an age-specific cohort). In this 
understanding, other factors are considered as equally vital as medical care, although, 
clearly, public health initiatives (such as mass immunisation) are crucial to good outcomes. 
WHO‘s definition is consistent with the notion of population health, where health includes 
the ability of people to respond and adapt to the challenges they experience in their lives.
81
 
Various life-quality, life-chance and behavioural factors may improve or diminish health. 
In addition, ‗social determinants‘ are critical to the status of both individual and 
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community well-being. WHO describes these determinants as the conditions under which 
people are born, live, work and age. They are: 
shaped by the distribution of money, power and resources at global, national and local 
levels … The social determinants of health are mostly responsible for health inequities – 
the unfair and avoidable differences in health status seen within and between countries.
82
 
This grounds the social determinants of health as those shaped by societies (including 
economic, cultural, political and environmental conditions), rather than those determined 
by increased individual risk, such as inherited predisposition to illness, disability, acquired 
injuries or diseases. One notable report on social determinants observed that health policy 
was once thought ‗to be about little more than the provision and funding of medical care … 
more important for the health of the population as a whole are the social and economic 
conditions that make people ill and in need of medical care in the first place‘.83 One report 
author, Michael Marmot, played a prominent role in developing an evidence-base for the 
social determinants of health. Leading the Whitehall studies of civil servants over many 
years, Marmot examined the correlation between chronic illness, mortality and status 
within the stratified English public service. This ongoing research has definitively proven 
that the richer one is and the higher the social status one enjoys, the healthier one will be 
and the longer one will live.
84
 The data, collected since 1967, illustrates that the lower the 
employment-grade of staff, the higher their probable burden of illness. This is reflected in 
mortality rates that are three times as high for junior staff as for the upper-echelon 
bureaucrats. These findings are a benchmark illustrating health disparities based on wealth 
and power. However, they have not provided all the answers about why social 
determinants are so important and there is continuing speculation about poor health among 
socially disadvantaged populations. These reasons may include stress, social exclusion, and 
limited self-determination. 
Dennis Raphael argues social determinants of health primarily decide whether individuals 
will remain well or become unwell, claiming illness is a narrow definition of health. Social 
determinants also shape ‗the extent to which a person possesses the physical, social, and 
personal resources to identify and achieve personal aspirations, satisfy needs, and cope 
with the environment‘.85 Raphael believes these provide a broader definition of health, 
with social determinants principally about the quality and quantity of resources available to 
members in any given society. This links population-health approaches to human 
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development. The WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health released a report 
on health equity in 2008 validating this view, claiming the ‗conditions in which people live 
and die are ... shaped by political, social, and economic forces ... [at a global level] social 
injustice is killing people on a grand scale‘.86 
One way of addressing many problems of population health is through health promotion, 
which WHO defines as the process of enabling people to increase control over their lives to 
improve their health. The Ottawa Charter explains that to ‗reach a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be able to realise 
aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the environment‘.87 Because health 
is a positive concept, it relies on various group and personal resources and, therefore, is a 
wider responsibility than that of the health sector and it encompasses notions of well-being. 
Many principles in the Ottawa Charter mirror the UDHR, with barriers to good health 
primarily human-rights barriers.
88
 The experience in health promotion has shown many 
illnesses are located on a spectrum (from good to poor health, or, at high-risk to low-risk of 
illness) and, along this continuum, health conditions can stabilise, improve or worsen. In 
addition, partnerships, whole-of-government, whole-of-community, and intersectoral 
interventions at multiple points along this good–bad health spectrum can change attitudes, 
influence behaviours, increase knowledge, and lower risk. The Ottawa Charter and 
subsequent WHO health promotion statements are global calls to action using this 
approach.
89
 Lowering the use of tobacco is an example of how these strategies work over 
time.
90
 Health promotion, although not necessarily financially costly, is a long-term 
process. Changing attitudes, knowledge and behaviour across populations takes time, 
education, and requires complementary strategies. It is a generational agenda requiring 
institutional commitments and adequate funding to achieve measurable results. 
Population health and health promotion methodologies influence this thesis for two 
reasons. The first reason is their link to quality of life and their part in informing 
discussions about well-being, freedom and prosperity – issues critical to debates about 
sustainability and growth. This can be generically summarised: good individual physical 
and psychological health requires that minimum standards of built and human-services 
infrastructure are available (the material necessities of life); human rights, justice and 
democracy are maintained (civil, political and legal necessities); there are opportunities for 
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the enjoyment of creative and cultural expressions (emotional and spiritual necessities); 
and these conditions exist in socially and environmentally conducive settings. At the 
population level, such requirements are necessary for human flourishing.
91
 Based on 
principles of distributive equity and substantive equality, human flourishing is achievable 
through multiple strategies across many fields of action.
92
 With this approach, the social, 
cultural, economic, health and political dimensions of well-being are considered together 
and valued equally. By addressing them simultaneously, planners can move towards the 
higher aspirations of human development. 
The second reason for the influence of health-based methodologies is they describe how 
health-enhancing activities can be understood and applied holistically. Appendix 1 
describes the way these methodologies informed several case studies, how the approach 
can be applied to social policy settings, including to cultural institutions, and ways they 
might engage with communities in times of rapid and disconcerting change. 
1.2.4 NETWORKS, MOMENTUM, COMPLEXITY AND SYNCHRONOUS FAILURE 
To understand the congruence of factors threatening sustainability and development, it is 
necessary to understand a confusing and interconnected world. Not only what these factors 
are, the drivers of change and emerging trends, but the nature of complexity itself: what it 
is and how it functions. Humans must deal with uncertainty and risk; today, they are doing 
so in a setting where transfers, communication and knowledge creation occurs faster than 
ever before.
93
 This poses many questions for people administering government programs, 
conducting business or simply trying to survive: how can they negotiate ever-increasing 
complexity, what decisions should they make in a transformative world, why have past 
measures failed, and what thinking is needed in the future?  
The assumptions of many of those who lead debates about culture, society and economics 
are often deterministic. Determinism holds that some cultures, faiths and races possess 
traits that will determine their future behaviours, for example, that some religions are 
innately anti-democratic or prone to violence.
94
 Cultural determinism has influenced many 
claims about Islam, such as asserted by Samuel Huntington
95
 or Robert Kaplan,
96
 although 
the bias of these assumptions has been rigorously contested.
97
 Religious and cultural 
differences do shape worldviews, are diverse, may not be conducive to peace and justice, 
and can be used in negative ways.
98
 However, determinism – like those systems it criticises 
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for rigidity – is itself inflexible: it attempts to explain complexity in uncomplicated, causal 
ways. This may reflect an innate human need for binary forms of categorisation and 
understanding. 
The risks associated with this thinking are described by Bob Hodge and John O‘Carroll, 
who argue that multiculturalism, globalisation, intercultural and interreligious conflicts are 
dynamic, complex and rapidly transforming.
99
 This creates many challenges. They propose 
that understanding chaos theory has practical applications for those struggling to 
understand an unpredictable world, warning typical responses to complexity involves 
resorting to conventional or reflexive actions. This response is due to the authority of linear 
thinking, a type of ‗crisp‘ thought, modelled on scientific inductivism. In modern Western 
societies this is intuitively considered the way to analyse a difficulty: separate a problem 
into distinct parts, determine causes, effects, and keep concepts precise. This approach may 
work in stable conditions, nevertheless, ‗in far from equilibrium conditions, processes can 
accelerate rapidly or change direction abruptly, producing contradictions and unexpected 
outcomes‘.100 In such conditions, ‗fuzzy‘ or imprecise categories may work better than 
defined approaches. Quoting Lotfi Zadeh, Hodge and O‘Carroll say the more complex and 
dynamic a condition, the less: 
meaningful are precise (―crisp‖) categories … if things are very complicated, you will 
struggle to understand them if you fall back on rigid, precise categories. Indeed, such rigid 
thinking can cause unforeseen problems, making a difficult situation worse. Simple, crisp 
thinking in these circumstances is not only useless, it is dangerous.
101
 
Complexity and instability are also examined by Thomas Homer-Dixon who assesses the 
long-term viability of activities based on energy consumption and entropy. He argues that 
contemporary systems – due to the growth models driving globalisation – are far from 
thermodynamic-equilibrium and, as these systems continue, humanity pushes its conditions 
of living ever further from balance. The more this occurs, the more violent will be the 
eventual, but inevitable, return to equilibrium.
102
 His view is echoed in a 2010 report from 
a United Kingdom (UK) think tank, the New Economics Foundation (nef), which 
expresses concern about widespread failures to understand the laws of thermodynamics. 
This, claims nef, is because politicians and civil servants are drawn from a narrow range of 
disciplines that afford them little comprehension about the limits of earth‘s resources and 
potential efficiency gains.
103
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Defenders of the status quo tend to dismiss claims humanity is collectively moving away 
from equilibrium and that global risks are real (or if they are, then exaggerated), or they 
believe human inventiveness will find ways to overcome problems. Such views are 
consistent with an intuitive recourse to linear thinking. Complacency can, however, be 
questioned simply because norms are best applied to conventional circumstances: the 
further circumstances move from conventionality and sustainability, the more 
unconventional approaches to change are needed.
104
 
Reflexive responses to complexity sound a number of salutary warnings. For example, it 
may be counterproductive to enforce social and cultural norms, or that rigid responses to 
the asymmetry of terrorism pose a threat to national security. Unfortunately, when 
experiencing stress, humans will often seek authoritative figures who provide comfort 
through certainty, decisiveness, and who articulate their visions (or paranoias) in absolute 
terms.
105
 If this is intuitive, and demonstrates how and why decisions are made in times of 
flux, it also illustrates why such approaches have often been disastrous or have led to 
endemic conflict. This dilemma is pertinent to contemporary problems – a time of entropy, 
change, risk and system-stress – even if it is perennial. Understandably, many people 
cocoon themselves in beliefs that offer straightforward answers to complex problems at the 
very time creative, fuzzy responses should be embraced. These reactions are typical of 
societies in denial, rendering impossible the forms of change required.
106
 It reflects a 
problem anticipated by Hegel who believed civilizations collapsed due to ‗morbid 
intensification of their own first principles‘.107 Under the prevailing political economy, 
where it is accepted that only competitive markets allocate resources efficiently, this has 
become an unassailable truth despite contrary evidence markets are typically unstable, 
unfair and inefficient.
108
 
Another evolving discipline that helps explain transformation and risk also belongs to the 
realm of higher mathematics. Network science explores several processes including 
interconnectedness, or how everything (whether human or not) relates to larger systems; 
the paradox of small and big worlds, or the idea all humans function within small and often 
like-minded circles yet are only six degrees of separation from everybody else on earth; 
and vectors (or hubs) that amplify and build connectivity.
109
 Network science explains, for 
example, how systems work at the cellular level and how diseases spread, how human 
societies operate and how technical infrastructure (such as the internet or electricity grids) 
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functions. The paradox of the similar-but-different, distant-but-close, separate-but-
connected of the human condition becomes coherent once networks are understood. 
Network science can also help to manage risk and reduce threats, especially because many 
technology-based systems have become so connected and efficient they have become 
fragile and lack resiliency.
110
 
A reason for the importance of networks is due to the momentum of human activities. This 
more speculative field draws on physics and applies it to social theory. It has been used to 
describe mass, velocity and the affect this creates over time, particularly on how systems 
build, self-perpetuate and (partly through networks) gather force.
111
 These processes can be 
used in positive ways; for example, psychologists apply momentum to help teams perform 
better in competitive sports,
112
 and it has helped drive positive political change, such as the 
Arab Spring movement of early 2011. More commonly, however, it has negative effects 
and can help account for the seemingly irreversible drift to events such as wars or the 
development of seductive ideas like radical ideologies. While people are in the grip of a 
momentum-experience they become blinded; this can explain why events occur that seem 
(with hindsight) perverse and destructive.
113
 The metaphor of a wave has been used to 
describe momentum, with participants, like surfers, riding the wave‘s power;114 this is akin 
to emic or insider perspectives of an event. Being part of events deprives people of 
objectivity; it enforces collective assent, or interpretation of events is rationalised so as to 
be defensible.
115
 In public discourse about the factors threatening contemporary livelihoods 
– for example, climate change or inadequately regulated international banking – the array 
of voices arguing for rational or precautionary measures are persistently overwhelmed by 
the momentum of denial or self-interest marshalled against them. 
Joseph Tainter‘s study The Collapse of Complex Societies confronts the nagging fear about 
these trends. Reviewing a number of past civilizations (with particular focus on the Roman 
Empire), he analyses the reasons for their demise.
116
 Tainter‘s explains why the areas of 
risk, outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, may be harbingers of failure in the pillars 
supporting contemporary civilization.
117
 If we understand risk and processes of change, it 
follows we can also recognise and exploit opportunities to avoid threats or, if a threat is so 
imminent as to be unavoidable, at least prepare. In Chapter 5, I explore how cultural 
institutions can play critical roles of memory, mediation and mobilisation in future 
societies fractured by multiple system reformations. This may appear to be a pessimistic 
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diagnosis. As already suggested, scholars who have explored these threats explain the 
process of collapse by drawing on network and complexity theory, as well as energy 
thermodynamics. 
The laws of thermodynamics explain that energy can never be destroyed or created, only 
change form, and, when used, a proportion is lost for productive use. Because of 
progressive loss, in any given system energy tends to become less available over time; this 
leads to increasing randomness or entropy. These laws are true materially (the physical use 
of available energy sources) as well as in principle (in natural or invented systems, even 
where energy forms are not used). They can also be applied to understand the nature of 
complexity itself. For example, as systems become increasingly complex, the benefits that 
accrue will diminish in inverse proportion to the energy input. The case of medical science 
can illustrate this process. Early gains in public health (such as extending life expectancy 
and reducing the incidence of preventable illness) were relatively ‗easy wins‘ with high-
yielding results from low levels of investment. Over time advances have become less 
pronounced despite increasing investment (energy). Now, life expectancy and physical 
quality of life advances in micro-steps; this is a form of entropy. Figure 1.1 demonstrates 
how the benefits of complexity decline as a falling return on complexity investment.
118
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Declining benefits of complexity against complexity investments 
over time 
Thermodynamics also applies to social progress. All civilizations are powered by energy. 
Today, the primary sources are fossil fuels. In the early phase of the modern industrial era, 
petroleum virtually bubbled out of the ground; in the early twenty-first century we face the 
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threat of peak oil, or the point at which more than half of all reserves will be exhausted and 
demand will outpace supply. When this occurs (as it inevitably will given it is a finite 
resource) energy derived from petroleum will become increasingly expensive. 
Additionally, discovering new reserves, extracting and processing them will be highly 
energy-demanding.
119
 This will result in a declining benefit. When the point is reached 
where it costs more to access, or more energy is used in its extraction than produced in its 
conversion to power, it ceases to be a viable form of energy (see Figure 1.2). This is known 
as the energy return on investment and is another way of describing diminishing marginal 
returns (the difference between cost and benefit) but applied to energy rather than finance. 
This gloomy truth will have profound effects on the future of human societies and 
threatens the contemporary world order. According to Tainter, when there are too few 
gains from investment in energy production, it is futile to continue the effort. At this point, 
there is a return to radical simplicity, or the collapse of a civilization, because there is 
inadequate energy to sustain it. In some cases, such as in Rome, the empire simply stopped 
expanding, and people moved from cities to an agrarian subsistence – the collapse was 
largely one of progressive decay.
120
 Not all are so benign. Drawing from the evidence of 
collective behaviours, Ronald Wright illustrates how civilizations as varied as the 
Sumerian, Mayan and Rapa Nui (Easter Island) have been obliterated because they failed 
to understand sustainability. These recurring failures, Wright suggests, are a salutary 
warning against hubris. Contemporary civilizations are equally at risk, not only because of 
planetary limits but also because humans are ‗predictable creatures, driven everywhere by 
similar needs, lusts, hopes and follies‘.121 
As well as diminishing marginal returns from globalisation, parallel processes of efficiency 
are compounding adaptive problems. Neoliberalism asserts that free markets are the best 
way to ensure efficiency. Competitive, profit-maximising firms, through processes of 
‗creative destruction‘,122 constantly improve methods of production: inputs (e.g. labour and 
resources) and distribution.
123
 Many of these efficiencies are achieved by limiting quality 
assurance during manufacture, by economies of scale achieved through mass production 
and materials acquisition, and by replacing labour with technology. The purpose of these 
activities is to remove redundancy or drag, and the momentum of design-innovation 
increasingly does so. However, a frictionless world is ‗brittle‘, or one with little 
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resilience.
124
 Maximising efficiency may bring benefits, such as improved amenities (for 
some) and economic savings, but it creates problems seldom acknowledged or discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Diminishing marginal returns where the gains of energy 
production are exceeded by the costs 
The way networks help reduce friction represents one of their risks. Homer-Dixon 
describes how the electricity grid, when interrupted, can trigger a sequence of supply 
failures.
125
 Mark Roeder, Satyajit Das and Kevin Phillips (for instance) describe how the 
global economy was threatened by the international banking system‘s trading of 
collateralised debt obligations.
126
 These examples refer to the way mass-networks, 
structured to optimise efficiency, can easily be disrupted. Small failures in a complicated, 
interconnected and reliant system leave it vulnerable. Global trade, communications and 
knowledge-transfer networks will continue indefinitely, it is assumed. However, these rely 
on specific conditions: existing resource and energy supplies (the materials needed to keep 
the system expanding), and the belief this can be maintained into the future (an imagined 
momentum). However, many stresses threaten to shake the foundations of these networks. 
This can lead to what is known as synchronous collapse or hysteresis.
127
 
Tainter‘s theories about the collapse of civilizations are consistent with the panarchy 
hypothesis. Panarchy describes how systems function holistically, in particular economic, 
ecological and social models of change and stability. Crawford Holling has advocated the 
notion of panarchy (although the term dates from the mid-nineteenth century) and his work 
is drawn from systems theory and analysis of natural ecologies. This approach examines 
the degree of resilience within any given system and its flows in and out. How effectively a 
   38 | Page  
 
system handles change determines its level of resilience. Examples from nature help to 
illustrate this. An ecology that has evolved over a long period may be highly complex; this 
complexity will be based on the way it is networked within a closed system. The web of 
life – plants, animals, microorganisms, climatic patterns – sustains a rich, balanced 
ecosystem. However, this is largely an endogenous survival. An exogenous event, such as 
climate variation or the arrival of new predatory species may trigger a failure of the total 
ecology. The web, or network, cannot cope with the stress of change and it collapses: the 
complexity, which had sustained it, is abruptly returned to simplicity. Multiple disruptions 
to a system amplifies the risks of failure. This is explained by four adaptive cycles, 
illustrated in Figure 1.3. The first cycle is exploitation (r), during which time a population 
expands and establishes itself; the next cycle (conservation: K) is the phase where the 
population reaches carrying capacity and stabilises; the third cycle (release: Ω) is one of 
sudden change that occurs when the population declines due to changed circumstances; the 
fourth and final cycle (reorganisation: α) describes natural selection where survivors adapt 
to new and altered conditions. These cycles can be seen as paralleling life cycles – birth, 
growth, maturity and death – but are also marked, at each stage, by dynamics of potential, 
connectivity and resilience. 
 
Figure 1.3:  The adaptive cycle within systems 
128
 
Holling describes resilience as ‗the ability of a system to absorb change and variation 
without flipping into a different state where the variables and processes controlling 
structure and behaviour suddenly change‘.129 He argues this has general significance. 
Because resiliency represents the property that sustains ecosystems, when lost, ‗or when its 
limits are exceeded, unpredictability becomes dramatically increased ... If resilience 
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represents the sustaining foundation for ecosystems, then useful and usable knowledge and 
the social trust to apply that knowledge represents the sustaining foundations for social 
development‘.130 Panarchy is compatible with Ludwig von Bertalanffy‘s general systems 
theory, which holds that systems, while appearing different from each other, share common 
behaviours. This is known as ‗isomorphism‘, or having similar structures or appearance 
across species or epiorganism (an interaction of individuals comprising a functional entity, 
such as a human society) despite different ancestry or form. Because natural systems are 
open, they cannot be predicted in the same way as closed systems.
131
 As a result, their 
paths will be equifinal, or shaped by multiple factors interplaying in an open setting.
132
 
These mechanisms describe the strengths and weaknesses of complex adaptive systems, of 
which our current global civilization is an example. The efficiencies that make this vast, 
technologically sophisticated edifice function depend on hyper-specialisation: skills which 
have increasingly replaced those of generalists. Although jacks-of-all-trades are adaptable 
and flexible, they are often made obsolete, expendable to gains in expert efficiency. 
Specialisation can be a weakness if it fails to see the big picture, connections, or has lost 
the skill to understand how total systems work, a problem acknowledged by even the well-
known advocate of globalisation, Thomas Friedman.
133
 There seems to be a syllogistic 
fallacy of specialism: that an expert in one thing is, ipso facto, an expert in others. 
Governments are dominated by certain sorts of specialists – lawyers, unionists, 
businesspeople, economists – but the art of government is (or should be) based on iteration, 
adaptation and generalism. Politicians are easily influenced by specialists who apply 
remedies seen through the narrow prism of their field of expertise and reinforced by super-
specialist advice commissioned by departments, which compound the problem of narrow 
and rigid responses to change. Specialisation has, therefore, robbed many industries of 
their resilience and left them vulnerable.
134
 Equally, community resilience is regarded by 
emergency-service planners as protective: a characteristic that can be mobilised to help 
recover after a disaster, and concerns have been raised about the widespread loss of 
resilience due to the gains, and specialisations, of modernity.
135
 In this setting, when 
collapse occurs, it may do so painfully and spectacularly.
136
 
These are complex theories and describing them so briefly does not do them justice. My 
purpose is to explain the basis for many predictions about the trajectory of global 
civilization. A concern about synchronous collapse is grounded on legitimate science and a 
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solid evidence-base about systems. In our anthropogenic world, we tend to see everything 
through the lens of human primacy – particularly a Western-paradigm scientific lens. This 
obscures another picture. In geological time, our constructed world is no more than a burst 
of energy on a living planet. The immediacy of being makes us blind to the existential long 
view. This failure is why some writers, such as Clive Hamilton, have pessimistically 
alluded to humanity‘s requiem, a view based on the momentum of the existing political 
economy, environmental science and human fallibility.
137
 As Homer-Dixon, Stuart Sim 
and others argue, because we live in a hyper-networked world, and so many systems that 
support human functionings are vulnerable, this raises the risks that, as a species, we now 
face far-reaching synchronous-collapse events. 
1.2.5 OTHER THEMATIC INFLUENCES 
Many writers have influenced the analysis in this thesis; for example, Tim Jackson on 
redefining the notion of economic growth and Resa Aslan on globalisation and terrorism. I 
discuss these where appropriate in coming chapters. However, most influences can be 
clustered into three categories. First, because I am concerned with human well-being and 
adaptation, I locate human development within a reality setting that includes existential 
facts, such as a finite biosphere, limited resources and the laws of physics. Humans cannot 
influence these factors; they are simply the way things are. Second, other factors relate to 
the world as we have shaped it and are the conditions of contemporary life: economics, 
globalisation, pollution, security risks and the like – forces that make change difficult but 
which humans can influence if they so choose. The third category includes factors I see as 
‗normative‘; they are largely subjective understandings, albeit with an accepted validity; 
they include notions of human rights and sustainable development. These distinctions 
between existing conditions, scientific facts and normative standards are vague and 
overlap; it is an imprecise description, merely a taxonomy intended to explain context.  
Much of the literature seems to be of three types and deal with: (1) synchronous threats, (2) 
sustainable development and well-being, and (3) the analyses of human activities. Again, 
this categorisation is somewhat arbitrary; clearly concerns and approaches are shared, but 
there remain thematic purposes consistent with these descriptions. For example, books by 
Roeder, Sim, Wright, Homer-Dixon, Brendan Gleeson, Clive Hamilton, David Korten and 
Joshua Ramo deal with synchronous threats.
138
 The methodology used by most writers is to 
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discuss the range of factors affecting society and the constraints on long-term growth, 
security and stability. They conclude there are unavoidable threats that challenge human 
survival. Most (Hamilton and Wright excepted) draw conclusions that seem almost naïve, 
avoiding discussion of the potential conclusions. Their works are like richly orchestrated 
and darkly thematic symphonies that end with short, unconvincingly cheerful codas. On 
the connection between prevailing crises and the role of cultural institutions, Robert Janes‘ 
Museums in a Troubled World can also be categorised as synchronous-threats literature. 
His approach is to raise wide-ranging challenges about the role museums could and should 
play, arguing their future relevance is contingent upon how they help audiences interpret 
and negotiate uncertainties. His analysis tends to focus on ‗bricks and mortar‘ institutions 
that collect, rather than on living, embedded museums that are part of a social fabric and 
place.
139
 
Other approaches include sustainable development and capabilities; they can also be seen 
as human-rights based. These address issues that relate to both the ‗purpose‘ and quality of 
life. Some have already been quoted, such as Sen‘s work and the multi-authored reports of 
UNESCO, UNDP and other international agencies. These influences are raised further in 
Section 3.2 although reference to earlier writers on this issue are selective, given that 
scholarship about rights, freedom, agency and the effects of state and social control are so 
extensive. 
The third group of writings I have mentioned is the human-activity-based approach to 
issues. This rather clumsily describes the rapidly growing body of literature on sustainable 
economics, consumption, anthropogenic climate change and – given a diminishing and 
damaging energy-base –the links between them. Some of the authors writing about these 
issues include Jackson, Patel, Geoffrey Miller, Clive Hamilton (he crosses both groups), 
Jane Jacobs and various nef publications. nef also advocates the notion of a world in 
dynamic-equilibrium, which it prefers to the ‗steady state‘.140 The term dynamic-
equilibrium is most commonly used in physics and biology, referring to proportionate loss 
and gain in a reaction. However, nef uses it as an antidote to claims that sustainability 
equals stagnation; they argue human societies can be healthy, functional and vibrant, yet 
still function within planetary constraints. Dynamic-equilibrium is where: 
within ecosystem limits, there is constant change, shifting balances and, evolution. 
‗Dynamic‘ in the sense that little is steady or stationary, but ‗equilibrium‘ in that the 
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vibrant, chaotic kerfuffle of life, economics and society must organise its affairs within 
the parent-company boundaries of available biocapacity.
141
 
As societies have become more secular, complex and technologically adept, their members 
have become progressively more stressed and confused, but also more specialised and 
segmented by their skills and socio-economic or cultural status. This atomisation has 
advantages. Networked specialists have improved technology and expand scientific 
knowledge at an astonishing rate, with the period between the development and mass 
commercialisation of new inventions (e.g. the iPhone and digital cameras) remarkably 
short. Such time-compression is accelerating the momentum of change, which has the 
added effect of aggravating emotional, spiritual, behavioural and psychic dislocation. This 
trend has other disadvantages; as well as the risks associated with a frictionless world, 
there are vulnerabilities due to myopia. Because people have an understandably limited 
capacity to comprehend multiple processes, externalities and hypotheses about global 
change, they are more prone to denial or recourse to simplistic explanations of events. 
It was not always so. For much of history, the way most people gained a coherent 
explanation of events was through a religious belief system. Religions help explain what is 
and what it means to be (ontology); what we do, can and cannot know, and how to think to 
gain knowledge (epistemology); and how to act according to a moral code (axiology). 
Political ideologies and science-based ethics have attempted to outline alternative codified 
beliefs, constructing knowledge-systems around being, doing and behaving, but never so 
thoroughly as the major faiths or spiritual traditions. It could be claimed ideology and 
religion merely provide prefabricated worldviews and people remain intellectually 
indolent. But all – politics, faith and science – struggle to form viable existential 
explanations in the twenty-first century; all are challenged by the complex mix of 
functionings and reformations of contemporary life. 
A goal of this thesis is to explore those conditions where capabilities are sufficient for 
flourishing at a level most people would consider satisfactory for a life worth living.
142
 
This involves exploring current events and processes as well as methodological 
understandings and normative ethical systems. Whatever the future holds, elemental 
aspects of being human will shape the quality of life and viability of civil society. Human 
determinants – such as culture and identity – are critical, and institutions that help 
negotiate, sustain and build well-being around identity, values and beliefs are particularly 
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important. Another thesis goal is to hypothesise what types of institutions may fulfil these 
roles. They may take many forms. They could be repressive agents of an authoritarian 
state, or they could be local, democratically managed cultural institutions. This may seem a 
surprising claim about a future path for organisations such as museums; I explain and 
elaborate on this hypothesis in Chapter 5. 
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[2]   THE WORLD AT A PRECIPICE 
In the Introduction I presented some ways to think about well-being, equity and humanity‘s 
relationship with our planetary home. In this chapter I review six areas that form the 
crucible of change and pose major threats.
1
 These divisions, however, are artificial because 
they intersect: globalisation has cultural, distributive and environmental effects; faith-based 
activism may be motivated by political, economic or social injustices; security threats may 
affect capital flows, investment and finances. Civil societies are built locally and, in an 
integrated and networked world, all people can help reconcile religious, racial and other 
divides. Understanding the collisions between trends is necessary if we are to respond.
2
 
Failure to do so is no longer a viable option. 
2.1 GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is a significant force in the modern world, both its influence on society and 
how, in turn, this affects the planet‘s ecology. Although often assumed a recent 
phenomenon, globalisation is not new; indeed, it has been occurring for millennia. The 
Roman Empire was a globalising force across Europe, North Africa and the Middle East 
2,000 years ago, and the establishment of trading routes along the Silk Road helped forge 
trade exchanges between the eastern and western reaches of the Eurasian continent.
3
 The 
cultures of colonial powers are also testament to globalising forces, taking elements from 
diverse, dead or militarily subordinate cultures and hybridising them.
4
 The interior of the 
English country home, so often seen as a quintessential expression of Englishness, 
provides an illustration: Chinoiserie on the mantelpiece, oriental rugs on the floor, 
Italianate artworks on the walls, Egyptian or classical motifs decorating the furniture, 
Bordeaux in a decanter, Latin texts printed in Venice lining bookshelves, stuffed heads of 
African game over the mantelpiece. Few cultural expressions could be more multicultural, 
more global. 
WHAT IS GLOBALISATION? 
Globalisation refers to processes affecting people, societies, economies and ecologies 
across the world. It is, nevertheless, a contested term with some arguing that alternatives 
such as ‗global change‘ might be a better description.5 Geoffrey Stokes, Roderic Pitty and 
Gary Smith argue that social and political commentators have used the term since the 
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1970s to refer to extensive changes that are in motion, but agree constructing a precise 
definition is difficult. They note, it ‗signifies the growing interdependence and 
interconnectedness of states, peoples, economies and cultures, as well as public 
consciousness of that process‘.6 This consciousness of global change is a useful way of 
understanding not only historical and current trends, but potential futures.  
Globalisation has had many effects, with philosophical and cultural consequences. As 
described by Frank Lechner, these effects have resulted in a compressed world that is 
increasingly seen as a single place. This means the issue of how the world should be 
ordered becomes a universal question. The answers to do so, however, come from an array 
of perspectives.
7
 Lechner says that people must become reconciled to living in one world 
and, because contending views are frequently in sharp focus, world order is now a 
‗problem‘. Not only do views conflict but the process itself is understood in different ways: 
[S]ome portray the world as an assembly of distinct communities, highlighting the virtues 
of particularism, while others view it as developing toward a single overarching 
organization, representing the presumed interests of humanity as a whole. In a 
compressed world, the comparison and confrontation of world views are bound to 
produce new cultural conflict … A globalised world is thus integrated but not 
harmonious, a single place but also diverse, a construct of shared consciousness but prone 
to fragmentation.
8
 
Globalisation has had two modern iterations. The first era began as a result of European 
imperial missions but collapsed during the gold standard crisis in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. The next era emerged after the Second World War and rapidly accelerated, largely 
as the result of planning by economists and politicians who feared protectionism had 
prolonged the Great Depression. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 helped build the 
postwar international finance system and institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank were established at that time; this put globalisation on a path 
associated with economic development.
9
 
Four forms of flow are commonly seen to characterise globalisation: capital (investments 
by businesses or countries into the economies of other nations); labour (migration within 
and across countries); goods and services (such as exports and imports) and technological 
exchanges. As documented in Robert Reich‘s critique of what he calls ‗supercapitalism‘ 
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(with its reference to Fascism
10
) globalisation is both the product and driver of an 
integrated world economy with industrial, political, technological, environmental, social 
and ethical dimensions. Reich does not ascribe the process as driven by institutional 
reforms, such as postwar financial planning, or to liberalism of Western economies during 
the 1980s, such as Reaganomics.
11
 Rather, he sees globalisation as the consequence of the 
international power struggle between the USA, its democratic allies and the Communist 
block. From the late 1940s to the 1970s, during what Reich calls the ‗not quite golden 
age‘,12 there were vast investments in the transfer of goods (for military mobilisations), 
technological advances (again, in military-related communications, surveillance, space 
exploration and weapon design) and production (to support strategic alliances). These 
efforts built a momentum around speed, efficiency and the demand economy which let 
loose unrestricted corporate expansion, the results of which are commonly seen as 
globalisation.
13
 The influence of globalisation in economics and the environment are 
discussed in 2.3 and 2.4; the remainder of this section focuses on a fifth and often-
overlooked set of global flows – ideas, values and tastes – and the effect of these flows on 
culture. 
THE EFFECT OF GLOBALISATION ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
There are numerous cultural dimensions to globalisation, including a rapid increase in 
cross-cultural contact; the desire to improve living standards; demands for new 
commodities (which can involve cultural exploitation or theft); cultural colonisation and 
decline (such as language loss); increasing population mobility and the evolution of new 
identities resulting from attempts to maintain links to ‗home‘ cultures and communities.14 
Cultural globalisation has had both positive and negative effects, although such binary 
distinctions can be questioned. For example, it has been argued that globalisation has a 
generally good multicultural effect because it exposes peoples to new experiences and 
popularises novel cultural product, such as Bollywood movies.
15
 These trends can 
sometimes challenge the dominance of Western cultural hegemony by demonstrating that 
not all influences on popular culture are derived from Europe or USA.
16
 However, 
exposure to cultural diversity can encourage destructive consumption. Because of 
globalisation‘s integrational effects, it has brought into relief the frictions between culture, 
the environment and human rights. Populations in affluent Western countries are so 
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familiar with consumerism these behaviours are now culturally embedded. This has led to 
assumptions about ‗rights‘ to certain lifestyles and purchasing patterns – without 
considering the wider effects. Indeed, neoliberalism has helped drive the concept of culture 
as commodity, with the citizen reshaped as consumer.
17
 Some societies are so materially 
oriented, their ‗culture‘ has morphed into little more than consumer preference; this is in 
ironic contrast with economically impoverished but culturally rich societies. Increasingly, 
as hitherto poor nations develop economically, consumption – proselytised through 
corporate marketing – is rapidly changing the behaviours of the new rich in those 
countries.
18
 
This global division reflects the largely inequitable relationship between rich and poor 
nations. Exploitative trade and debt agreements often place impoverished communities and 
states in cycles of poverty where they are compelled to deplete the natural resources that 
represent their sole opportunity to build a more prosperous future.
19
 Resource-usage often 
degrades an environment that has shaped local identity and provided scarce forms of 
capital. The demise of cultural distinctiveness in such communities represents the loss of 
an asset that connects and reinforces good health, self-esteem, belonging and social 
infrastructure.
20
 Sen argues, although the international market culture is one manifestation 
of economic globalisation, those who find: 
the values and priorities of market-related cultures to be vulgar and impoverishing 
[equally] ... tend to find economic globalization itself to be quite objectionable. And yet 
often enough, they also see market-based globalization as hard to resist, given the reach 
and strength of the market economy and the sheer volume of resources it can bring to bear 
on reshaping the world.
21
 
While this presents one moral conundrum, another is the problem: 
[of] the asymmetry of power between the West and other countries and the likelihood that 
this asymmetry will translate into destruction of local cultures … Such a loss, it is 
plausibly argued, would culturally impoverish non-Western societies. Given the constant 
cultural bombardment that tends to come from the Western metropolis … there are 
genuine fears that native traditions may be overwhelmed by the fusillade.
22
 
Although recognising these threats, Sen disagrees that the solution lies in halting global 
trade, which often benefits developing economies. Asymmetries may be addressed by 
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strengthening local cultures, helping them resist ‗forces of cultural invasion‘.23 Sim agrees, 
concerned a retreat from globalisation by countries fearing climate change will compound 
poverty in the Global South.
24
  
Although wealth disequilibria are a problem at the national level, it is not solely a 
distinction between developed and developing states but within those already wealthy: the 
divide between rich and poor is expanding at a similar rate in the Global North as in the 
South (see Section 2.3). 
Forms of exploitation recur around the world and relationships between capital and 
governance often impede development, human rights and sustainability in regions where 
this occurs. For example, as in Cambodia with farming communities evicted from 
traditional lands sold to tourist-resort developers;
25
 in Africa where people are forced to 
live in permanently contaminated lands after completed mining operations;
26
 and in 
Australia where dealers skim unreasonable profits from Indigenous central-desert artists.
27
 
It is particularly likely to happen where the interests of powerful businesses conflict with 
traditional or marginalised communities, as in the case of distant-water trawling, which has 
disrupted marine ecologies by over-harvesting small fry to manufacture pelletised food for 
the eponymous, ‗sustainably-farmed‘ carnivorous-fish industry.28  
Equally, the trade in antiquities and cultural artefacts to satisfy the dilettantism of the 
wealthy, often results in the desecration of sites, theft, and the denuding of context in 
fragile communities.
29
 Intellectual property and culturally significant knowledge, 
especially of indigenous peoples, is frequently replicated, causing irreparable damage by 
revealing secret or ritual meaning, denuding cultural values, and leaving knowledge-
systems hollow and bereft of mystique.
30
 As an alternative, sustainable heritage 
development offers opportunities to maintain cultural identity and practices as a means of 
livelihood. If managed ethically – often within new museological settings – such 
development models allow for an equitable balance between tourism, economic 
independence and cultural maintenance.
31
 UNESCO, in particular, has highlighted the need 
to maintain cultural diversity as the living heritage of all humanity, essential for cultural 
rejuvenation, a means of humanising globalisation and as a human right that strengthen 
communities.
32
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Globalisation has another consequence that is often overlooked. Putting aside 
postcolonialism and an unequal capacity to negotiate trade, the notion of human 
development that emerged in the postwar era was largely shaped by the Global North‘s 
rhetoric of benevolence regarding food and agricultural aid.
33
 Food security has long been 
associated with politics. Patel traces these links from the Haitian slave rebellion of the 
eighteenth century (which left Haiti the poorest Caribbean nation) to the way Britain fed its 
restive domestic working classes with subsidised goods, transported from its imperial 
holdings, at the expense of the colonial inhabitants.
34
 However, from the late 1940s, food 
took on new political dimensions and the distribution of food-aid became a central plank in 
the US global strategy to combat Communism, where any ‗US-aligned government that 
found itself battling worker-led organising or, indeed, any plausibly left-wing political 
opposition could gain access to the US strategic grain reserve‘.35  
In this way, aid was linked to political favouritism. Because the international wheat trade 
was dominated by US production, the Americans kept prices low (with tariffs), hurting 
other producers while establishing reliance on its aid. In following decades grain was 
replaced by other but potentially more dangerous forms of assistance such as chemical 
fertilisers and genetically modified crops. These propelled the agrarian ‗green revolutions‘ 
in countries such as India. Although the long-term consequences of these innovations in 
food production are still to be determined (it is increasingly likely they will be grim
36
), 
there were immediate benefits to US and European businesses directly supplying materials 
for these initiatives.
37
 Treating aid as a proxy for corporate subsidies is not only a Cold 
War phenomenon. For example, the Howard government (which maintained the headline 
figure of international aid at 0.26%, well below the level set by the UN of 0.7% in 1970
38
) 
had a policy that most foreign aid would be delivered by, or purchased from, Australian 
companies. This effectively reduced an insubstantial aid budget even further, maintaining 
dependencies, and compromising most development goals.
39
  
Despite the harm that consumption can inflict on cultural maintenance trade, in itself, is not 
necessarily damaging. When mutually benefiting both parties in an agreement, trade is 
inherently good, especially when it provides development pathways for poor 
communities.
40
 Market failures are more likely when there is an unequal relationship 
between trading partners, one party exploits exclusive knowledge, or when unfair terms of 
contract are negotiated.
41
 As noted by UNDP, the neoliberal model of efficient markets 
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may have enabled efficiencies but not equity; liberalisation has encouraged competition but 
not competitiveness; globalisation has not resolved inequities but often exacerbates them. 
Furthermore, many goods essential for human development are not provided by markets, 
even though subject to international competition. This has resulted in a ‗fiscal squeeze on 
public goods, a time squeeze on care activities and an incentive squeeze on the 
environment‘.42 When markets dominate social and political processes, the benefits of 
globalisation are unevenly distributed, concentrating ‗power and wealth in a select group of 
people, nations and corporations, marginalizing the others‘.43 Imbalances in economic 
power can trigger secondary effects such as financial instability, and, because they present 
opportunities for corruption, they may challenge people‘s ethics, resulting in the sacrifice 
of equity for profit.
44
 
UNDP argues that the challenge of globalisation is not about halting market processes but 
strengthening local and international governance so as to preserve the advantages of global 
markets while continuing to offer ‗enough space for human, community and environmental 
resources to ensure that globalization works for people – not just for profits‘.45 This 
describes globalisation that respects ethics (fewer human rights violations), equity 
(between and within nations), sustainability (environmental protection) and development 
(less poverty).
46
 Certainly, the total disequilibria in wealth are diminishing in some nations, 
as evidenced by the increasing influence of China, India and new soft powers, such as 
Brazil.
47 
Globalisation is not solely a matter of economic and power disparities or cultural erosion, it 
shapes the total ecology, often permanently. Garnaut wryly observes, if economic 
principles establish that ‗doing something would give lots of benefits now but would cause 
the extinction of our species in half a century, the calculation would tell us to do it‘.48 
Because climate change is a global problem, questions of equity and accountability are 
important. The poorest of nations and peoples will be most affected by climate change 
despite having contributed the least to the problem (see Section 2.4). This should present a 
moral imperative to the Global North, not only to decarbonise their economies urgently, 
but to maintain the positive effects of globalisation and avoid abandoning the poorest 
peoples to the exigencies of an irreparably damaged climate. If not, this could lead to what 
Sim describes as a ‗carbon footprint war‘. He argues the international community must 
find new ways to conduct, or find substitutes for, existing forms of world trade. The Global 
   60 | Page  
 
South needs its own culturally appropriate markets. Continuing as a cheap source of 
production for the North is little more than new colonialism, even if a move in this 
direction requires ‗a radical change in mind-set as globalisation is currently envisaged‘.49 
Such transformations are not solely a matter of governance, they mean business can no 
longer act independently of ethical responsibilities towards a global public good, where 
‗putting profits to shareholders before maintenance of the environment amounts to a form 
of violence against humanity‘.50  
Cultural globalisation is often seen as an outcome of successfully promoted Western 
cultural products. The material lifestyles depicted in this marketing promotes 
homogenisation and American culture (especially) at the cost of traditional cultures.
51
 One 
effect has been increasing resentment towards, and the cultivation of, an anti-Western 
mood that often leads to more extreme responses.
52
 The backlash against globalisation 
sometimes involves the creation of alternative – and extreme –visions of global order and 
world culture. The reaction to the influence of cultural colonisation has involved new 
protests throughout the world, including in Western nations.
53
   
The very technologies that are a platform for Western marketing, such as the internet, are 
often used by communities to promote local identity, protect cultural integrity, and build 
global networks of people with shared culture, values and aspirations. Ironically, these 
technologies, which were seen as a way of opening minds have also helped reinforce 
worldviews that are closed and parochial. Online virtual communities offer as many 
positive opportunities to expose people to the constructive aspects of diversity as they do 
negative opportunities to sustain bigotry, or worse.
54
 In recent years, terrorist organisations 
have often been active in countries where tensions between business, religion, 
undemocratic government and introduced ‗liberal‘ (Western) culture are most acute. This, 
as an extreme reaction to globalisation, has frequently affected civilian populations who, 
ironically, are often opposed to it radical agendas (see Section 2.6).
55
 However, rather than 
interpreting this as a response to threatened cultural identities, globalisation may have the 
opposite effect. John Tomlinson argues that, occasionally, it produces: 
too much identity ... in so far as [it] distributes the institutional features of modernity 
across all cultures, globalization produces ―identity‖ where none existed – where before 
there were perhaps more particular, more inchoate, less socially policed belongings. This, 
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rather than the sheer obliteration of identities, is the most significant cultural impact of 
globalization.
56
 
As an integrating process, globalisation is not solely one-sided and Westernising: 
homogenisation and colonialism do occur but are not uni-dimensional or uni-directional. 
Culture is dynamic and evolving and, although it may be vulnerable to globalising forces 
or misguided development initiatives, new and hybridised cultures emerge and global 
exchanges can shift the locus of cultural power-bases or redefine meaning.
57
 Additionally, 
some iconic commodities that exemplify and amplify globalisation have been appropriated 
in surprising ways. For example, mobile phones are the most rapidly and widely diffused 
new technology in history; indeed, the mobile phone is the first telecommunications device 
with more users in the developing than developed world, and they are used in creative 
ways, helping to increase productivity and raise people from poverty. Given increases in 
connectivity, humans may now be even less than six degrees of separation from everybody 
else on the planet.
58
 This experience is somewhat at odds with the commonly expressed 
concern that globalisation has increased the divide between the material and knowledge 
rich and the material and knowledge poor, with the latter victims of globalisation.
59
 
Stokes, Pitty and Smith argue there have been three broad responses to the challenges 
posed by globalisation in Australia: neoliberalism, populist nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. They believe many people regard globalisation and neoliberalism as 
identical – perhaps due to bipartisan political endorsement of macro- and micro-economic 
reforms, defended strongly in the media. The authors consider this a limited understanding 
of globalisation. Popular nationalists, like the One Nation Party, opposed the changes that 
opened Australia to international trade, condemned immigration policy because it failed to 
filter out those they saw as ‗undesirable‘, and regarded globalisation as an assault on 
Australian identity and interests. Such narrow views have little chance of contesting 
neoliberalism because they do not provide a vision of how Australia should respond to a 
rapidly transforming world. Stokes, Pitty and Smith endorse the third response: 
cosmopolitanism, which acknowledges global challenges while respecting principles such 
as social justice and human rights: 
[U]niversalism espoused by global citizens does not imply any diminished commitment to 
Australia and its peoples. Instead, it involves a redefinition of Australian patriotism that 
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reaches beyond the limits of what the state or the dominant political elites or their popular 
protagonists, may deem appropriate.
60
 
Those with a cosmopolitan outlook are sceptical of nationalism yet have a strong national 
allegiance. Interest in the country to which they primarily relate allows cosmopolitans to 
engage as global citizens and advocate for universal ideals. This perspective – which 
shares much with global citizenship
61
 – is, however, a paradox. Global engagement 
involves both universalism (recognising those things common to humanity) and the 
specific, or particularism (the diversity within it). These two elements are part of a single 
nexus, united ‗in terms of the universality of the experience and, increasingly, the 
expectation of particularity, on the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, the 
expectation of universality of the other‘.62 This makes globalisation a ‗form of 
institutionalisation of the two-fold process involving the universalisation of particularism 
and the particularisation of universalism‘.63 
Globalisation, then, describes a spectrum of processes from local to international, meshing 
people, ideas, organisations and nations in new relationships. It challenges self-
determination, distributive equity, civil liberties and security while simultaneously 
reforming identities and forging novel cultural forms. Understanding these far-from-
equilibrium conditions now presents one of the biggest challenges to future sustainability 
and well-being.
64
 
2.2 POPULATION 
‗Populate or perish‘ was a catchcry in postwar Australia, a response to the way the country 
had been threatened by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War.
65
 In the 
decades following, Australia embarked on a strong immigration policy to increase its 
population. The concerns may have long since shifted from strategic defence to economic 
prosperity, but the issues associated with population, in Australia and internationally, are 
significant.
66
  
Over the last 250 years, or approximately 10 generations, the growth in population – along 
with technological and communication capacity – has been the most remarkable feature of 
our species. It has caused what is known as the ‗Great Acceleration‘, or explosion in 
human numbers and activities from circa 1800.
67
 It is estimated that, in 1750, humans 
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numbered 791 million. By 1850, this had grown to 1.26 billion (an increase of about 50%). 
Over the following century, the population doubled to 2.52 billion, ballooning, by 1999, to 
5.98 billion, an increase over two generations of more that 250%. On 31 October 2011, it 
was estimated there were 7 billion humans; this is projected to expand to 9.3 billion by 
2050.
68
 These increases are not globally even. Generally, wealthier nations, where 
populations are better educated and there are good-quality healthcare services and 
standards of living, birth rates are static or declining. Most growth continues in the poorest 
of nations. This is best seen by examining population distribution across the world over 
time. For example, 24.7% of the world‘s population lived in Europe in 1900. At the same 
time, 8.1% lived in Africa, and 57.4% lived in Asia. By 1999 – almost one century later – 
Europe‘s share of the world‘s population had halved to 12.2%, Africa had increased to 
12.8% and Asia to 60.8%. These trends are likely to continue. By 2050, Europe‘s share 
will be down to 7% (only about 28% the size of its global population proportion of 150 
years earlier), Asia will be relatively stable at approximately 59%, and Africa will expand 
to nearly 20% (see Figure 2.1). 
The significance of global population growth can be summarised in four ways. First, more 
humans means greater competition between groups. This is essentially a supply and 
demand issue; as crowding increases, so does conflict over the declining availability of 
resources, living space and arable land. Given that such a large percentage of humans 
continue to struggle to meet Millennium Development Goals, aspiring to achieve basic 
material standards is inevitably related to this competition.
69
 The global security 
implications of population growth are also recognised in recent strategic assessments.
70
 
Second, more humans means more pollution and a greater impact on the environment 
through deforestation, depleted natural assets and climate change. Over the next three 
decades as equatorial regions warm, flooding increases due to siltation, sea levels rise and 
monsoonal patterns shift towards the poles, conflicts over resources can only escalate.
71
 
Third, the more humans, the more culture. Cultural diversity increases with population 
increases, even if this is partly offset by cultural homogenisation, loss of cultural heritage 
and languages. Combined with declining space (and opportunities) for population 
expansion, this means greater cross-cultural and cross-religious contact. Fourth, the more 
humans the more difficult it will be to produce sufficient food to feed them.
72
 While 
agricultural science has helped to increase yields in recent decades, there is limited 
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capacity to maintain ever-expanding harvests, especially as fertile land declines in acreage 
and water supplies diminish, as is predicted by many climate-change models.
73
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: human population growth since 1750 
74
    
As early as 1798, Thomas Malthus speculated that exponential population growth would 
outstrip human food production capacity:
75
  
[The] power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence 
for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices 
of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the 
great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves.
76
 
Although Malthus‘s calculations, and the warnings of recent scientists such as Paul 
Ehrlich,
77
 have not been realised due to changes not considered in their calculus, there 
must be a point in a finite space (our planet) at which populations become unsustainable or 
so large as to represent significant risk. This is especially so if the balance of survival is so 
finely calibrated that an unexpected event (such as a natural disaster) reduces agricultural 
production or the ability to access or transport food supplies. This fear is supported by the 
improbability that a complex adaptive system (i.e. global food production and distribution) 
will continue managing at the point of maximum connectivity and efficiency.
78
  
As well as natural increases and decreases in populations (the number of births minus the 
number of deaths), other factors affecting global population distribution are the demand 
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and supply of labour and domestic crises (e.g. poverty or conflicts) which drive both 
voluntary and involuntary movements.
79
 In 2009, approximately 25 million refugees were 
being assisted by the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) with 
many temporarily supported in neighbouring countries that are, typically, poorly equipped 
to accommodate refugees due to inadequate infrastructure and opportunities.
80
 When 
refugees return to their home-nations, if the reason for their flight has been resolved, such a 
return is optimal; if they cannot, few countries provide humanitarian programs for 
displaced peoples. Based on the size of its population, Australia is relatively generous, 
although the in-take meets only a fraction of demand.
81
  
Since federation, natural increase has contributed more to Australia‘s annual population 
growth than migration. Nevertheless, due to ageing and declining female fertility, this has 
changed and immigration is now the main factor growing Australia‘s population.82 As 
noted in a 2008 report,
83
 female fertility has fallen over the last five decades, although rates 
may have stabilised in recent years. In 1961, Australian female fertility was 3.55; this fell 
to 1.73 by 2001, but (in 2007) had risen to 1.93. Compared with other developed 
economies, this is relatively high, although below the replacement rate of 2.1 (the level at 
which a population remains stable over time). For example, fertility rates are 1.4 in Italy 
and Germany, 1.3 in Japan, 1.8 in the UK, and 1.5 in Canada. An exception is the USA, 
where it is 2.1. 
The reasons for change in Australian female fertility are likely to be due to several factors. 
Many adults delay establishing a family due to fears about the economic costs;
84
 this has 
meant the average age of primigravidas has increased and, the older a woman of child-
bearing age the lower her likely level of fertility. For example, in 2003, 41% of all first 
births were to women aged over 30 years, compared with 28% in 1993; typically, fertility 
rates are higher (and mothers are younger) among lower socio-economic status families 
than wealthy families.
85
 Another important statistic is the working to non-working ratio. In 
2007, there were five people in the workforce for every person 65 years or older; by 2045, 
this could be as low as 2.4:1. Australia‘s ageing population is a trend repeated in most 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). What this means for future prosperity, productive capacity and the services sector 
is concerning for governments,
86
 hence the attention on research that suggests migration 
will help counter the effects of ageing by increasing the size of the labour force.
87
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Global population increase challenges conventional thinking about economics and its 
relationship with environmental and social policies. Planning for growth is based on 
assumptions of ever-expanding markets, production, consumption, and growing taxation 
receipts.
88
 Increasingly, the long-term sustainability of these assumptions are being 
questioned and many economists, even if a schismatic minority, are suggesting growth 
could be measured in other ways and a new system of modelling must be developed that 
deals with the finite carrying capacity of land, risks to the biosphere, and realistic 
expectations of business.
89
  
Population growth also poses ethical dilemmas for many environmentalists, who are 
sometimes ambivalent about humanitarian approaches to refugees. This dilemma prompts 
the question: Does the environment hold more importance than human life? Some groups, 
particularly those with covert racist agendas, have used concern for the environment and 
Australia‘s population carrying capacity as reasons for arguing against immigration and 
refugee programs.
90
 In mid-2010, businessman Dick Smith fuelled often ill-informed 
public debate along these lines by sponsoring a documentary film about what he portrayed 
as an overpopulated Australia. The underlying premise of Smith‘s analysis is the direct link 
between human numbers, pollution output and environmental damage. However, not all 
human activities produce an equal effect on the environment. Some countries have, per 
capita, a small human footprint (the combined effects of pollution and resource depletion) 
and, as a result, their arable acreage carries large populations: the more polluting and 
consuming a society the fewer people its land can sustain. Australia‘s energy consumption 
(measured as kilograms of oil-equivalent per capita per annum) was estimated at 5,732 in 
2000. This compared with 896 in China, 507 in Kenya and 135 in Bangladesh (where, in 
comparison, Australian consumption is 42.5 times larger).
91
  
Smith‘s argument is not only exclusionist but simplifies the issue. Australia's 
environmental woes will not disappear with a smaller population. Damage is caused by 
other factors such as wasteful consumption and poor management of natural resources.
92
 
Ironically, despite the factually and morally questionable claims of Smith and others that a 
‗big Australia‘ of 36 million by 2050 (as predicted in the government‘s population report93) 
is too big, it is likely to be somewhat bigger. There is a 95% probability it will be as high 
as 43 million, driven by factors including ‗major crises which generate refugee flows‘.94 In 
the postwar period, many of Australia‘s immigration source countries were European. This 
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meant the diaspora communities were largely ‗white‘, Christian, and relatively easy to 
include into a conservative monoculture. Given global changes in fertility, northern 
Mediterranean rim countries are no longer feasible migration sources. The data, showing 
the growth of Africa and the continuing dominance of Asia, indicates Australia‘s 
demographic and economic future will inevitably be more diverse: culturally, racially and 
religiously.
95
  
Generally, the consensus between multicultural and environmental civil-society 
organisations recognises that population growth can accommodate both humanitarian and 
economic concerns, provided the total ecological footprint is reduced or stable.
96
 
Interestingly, some intractable problems associated with population growth may offer 
opportunities. Until recent years, Homo sapiens was a nomadic or rural species; now, 
however, more people live in urban than in rural settings, a trend set to continue.
97
 There is 
considerable research interest in urbanisation and – despite problems such as inadequate 
infrastructure and crime posed by urban drift, especially to slums – this trend may have 
positive effects.
98
 Some of the benefits include better life-chances and equity for women, 
including the likelihood they will have fewer children, be better educated, wealthier, and 
able to escape more repressive domestic circumstances.
99
 This trend raises two issues 
relevant to this thesis: the link to ecological and cultural sustainability through urban 
transformation, and the management of social stability and protection of civil rights in 
cities. 
The first of these issues excites both environmentalists and urban planners.
100
 A complex 
topic and difficult to summarise; one attempt is with the notion of ‗lifeboat cities‘, a term 
used for environmentally sympathetic planning advocated by Australian scholar, Brendan 
Gleeson. Gleeson, describes ‗greener‘, more self-sufficient and sustainable cities, 
supported by excellent transport infrastructure and where public amenities, human services 
and experiences (e.g. in education, health and entertainment) contribute significantly to 
employment and the economy; where food security is improved through local production 
in community gardens; and critical resources are gathered and used at their source (e.g. 
solar panels on roofs, water tanks in gardens). Gleeson believes that in the uncertain and 
volatile period ahead – triggered by climate change and related shocks – only by living in 
such cities will humans achieve quality of life, preserve cultural and moral values and 
maintain social civility.
101
 Brand, from the environmental perspective, argues that nature 
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rejuvenates itself in surprising and rapid ways. Humans can best serve the environment, 
barring limited custodianship roles, by leaving most of it alone. A continuing concentration 
of humans into energy-and-food-sustainable mega-cities is good for both people and the 
planet.
102
  
Brand‘s assertion leads to the second issue about population growth and urbanisation. 
Cities are already concentrated zones of diversity. Escalating human numbers, increasing 
mobility, transformations in city configurations – combined with civil, political and 
consumption-restraints – all pose questions for governance: how can the physical forms of 
cities be understood and designed, and how should they be envisaged and secured in terms 
of human capital?  The first part of this question largely requires technical solutions to be 
explored by engineers, financiers, designers and similar experts. The second part requires 
moral debate and legislative remedies and is of more concern to (among others) civil-
society organisations, lawyers, human-rights advocates, political scientists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, police services and security institutions. I make these points 
here, but elaborate on them further in Section 4.3. 
This discussion has not yet addressed an important and related issue. As Fred Pearce 
argues, if demographics are destiny,
103
 then the future may involve far fewer humans. 
Although global population will peak at over nine billion mid-century, from that point 
there may be a steady decline. Female fertility is falling almost everywhere and in some 
regions there are too few women to sustain populations. Pearce cites the Punjab, Korea, 
China, and old Eastern Germany in particular.
104
 He warns, by the end of the current 
century, there will be fewer people on the planet and those remaining will be older than 
current averages.
105
 This decline should help lower the total human footprint, providing 
there is a concurrent reduction in carbon emissions and consumption. 
Will populations fall naturally, with declining fertility, or abruptly through the probable 
consequences of climate change: more conflicts, disease and starvation? It is said history 
often repeats itself. Some actions recur because human behaviours are universal traits and 
therefore predictable drivers of events. However, the consequences of repetition are seldom 
the same because contexts constantly change. The risks of damaging behaviours are 
present, as always, but the result of errors are likely to be amplified due to our globally 
networked world, with more severe effects than previously. Until the current era, the total 
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ecosystem could accommodate mistakes: there were fewer of us, and when we destroyed a 
landscape we moved and started exploiting new territories. Now the options are exhausted. 
Humanity utilises almost 150% of the stock of what the planet can naturally produce and 
absorb of our pollutants.
106
 Few unspoilt natural reserves remain; climate is changing, 
reorienting where and how food is produced. This is our ‗perfect storm‘ and there is little 
cushioning remaining to absorb coming shocks. 
2.3 GLOBAL ECONOMICS: RISKS AND DIRECTIONS 
Although Australia avoided many of the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) – 
largely due to Chinese demand for Australian commodities – the structural, debt and 
growth problems suggest this is the greatest threat to international capital markets since the 
Great Depression and the beginning of a protracted period of instability with many 
predictive uncertainties.
107
 In early 2009, Kevin Rudd (then prime minister of Australia) 
wrote an article arguing, that after 30 years, the neoliberal experiment had failed and, as a 
long-standing orthodoxy, it would be replaced by another: the social democratic pursuit of 
social justice based on equality and human-centred governance. He said neoliberalism and 
the free-market fundamentalism it produced ‗has been revealed as little more than personal 
greed dressed up as an economic philosophy … ironically, it now falls to social democracy 
to prevent liberal capitalism from cannibalising itself‘. Social justice is integral to social 
democracy, which, when functioning properly, is protected by government, which is not 
‗the intrinsic evil that neoliberals have argued it is‘.108  
At much the same time, Keynesian economist Robert Skidelsky more stridently echoed 
Rudd‘s views, claiming the GFC represented a moral and intellectual crisis. At heart, there 
were failures due to ‗worship of growth for its own sake, rather than as a way to achieve 
the ―good life‖. As a result, economic efficiency ... has been given absolute priority in our 
thinking and policy‘, leaving a ‗moral lacuna ... [that] explains uncritical acceptance of 
globalisation and financial innovation‘.109 Such a system, which has orchestrated the fall of 
median incomes, ‗the off-shoring of millions of jobs, the undermining of national 
communities, and the rape of nature‘, needs to be extraordinarily successful to command 
allegiance. Neoliberalism – that benefited a small financial plutocracy and resulted in 
egregious, even obscene, rewards for the privileged few – has triggered a backlash: 
economic conservatism‘s spectacular failures have profoundly discredited it.110 Skidelsky 
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and Rudd both predicted that politicians would search for remedies that once seemed 
exotic. Hereafter, remedies would be based on ‗radical‘ notions, such as economic growth 
‗does not, beyond a certain point, make people happier‘. Indeed, stepping back from 
market-based globalisation, especially if this involves a reassertion of democracy, will 
probably increase people‘s quality of life.111 
Four years later, despite the fragility of the world‘s economy and continuing threats of 
sovereign-debt defaults, such predictions appear almost naïve. It is therefore legitimate to 
ask whether neoliberalism is in retreat, is social-democracy reasserting social justice and 
progressive economics for the public good, or is moral panic and self-interest continuing 
because change is too difficult? 
For more than 40 years after the Second World War, global geo-politics was divided 
between the capitalist camp, communism, and everybody else (then collectively described 
as ‗the Third World‘). With the collapse of the Communist block, and building on 
escalating processes of globalisation, neoliberalism became the dominant influence on 
economic and social policy.
112
 Space precludes a detailed analysis of neoliberal theory, but 
three pertinent issues are noted. 
The first is that neoliberalism, indeed any ideology, will be culturally grounded and 
therefore determined. This means theories of economic liberalism are based on 
assumptions about societies, economies and humans, particularly about how people in 
affluent European and North American countries appear to function and make lifestyle 
decisions. Fundamental to classical economics are the principles of rational choice and 
market equilibrium.
113
 Rational choice is the guiding explanation for human decision-
making and, hence, explains such things as spending behaviours.
114
 Rationality suggests an 
ethical basis for self-interest; this drives the collective actions of business to maximise 
profits and therefore establish demand–supply equilibria115 (the basis of the efficient 
market theory of Milton Friedman).
116
 Although a cursory, or emic, assessment might 
bequeath this hypothesis with apparent logic, it is the logic of a specific culture: that of 
English-speaking, privileged, imperial and empirical traditions of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, subsequently re-interpolated by (equally privileged, culturally 
confined) conservative English and Chicago-school academics.
117
 Intellectually, this theory 
espoused its superiority, and excoriated, the alternatives such as Keynesian and socialist 
   71 | Page  
 
economics. However, the premise that equilibrium is a natural condition is a cultural 
opinion appropriated by neoliberalism, certainly not one universally accepted. For 
example, Jean Baudrillard argues the ‗world is not dialectical – it is sworn to extremes, not 
to equilibrium, sworn to radical antagonism, not to reconciliation or synthesis‘.118 
Although the likes of Friedman had been ideological novelties, once given credibility (first 
by Ronald Reagan in the USA, then by Thatcher in the UK) the radicalism of fringe 
economics moved into the mainstream of international finance, fuelling corporatist 
expansion and changing the world.
119
 Nevertheless, not all cultures share neoliberal logic, 
consider the behaviour of the rational man to be rational, nor that economic efficiency must 
override civic or social values.
120
 Indeed, recent science discredits the notion of 
‗rationality‘.121 Enforcing an ideological world-view on those culturally, ethically, socially, 
religiously, philosophically or otherwise unwilling to embrace it is a recipe for conflict. As 
observed by Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio da Silva, the GFC was caused by ‗the 
irrational behaviour of white people with blue eyes, who ... appeared to know everything, 
but are now showing that they know nothing‘.122 Cultural bias in economics has been 
illustrated by the attempt to impose a market-economy ‗shock and awe‘ policy on post-
Ba‘athist Iraq in 2003.123 It has also been argued that Western neoliberal banking practices 
have been fundamentally flawed and alternative models, such as Islamic banking, may 
have helped avoid the GFC: such views help contest at least some cultural myopia.
124
 
The second issue is that global wealth and health disparities have led to conflicts.
125
 
Historically, these disparities may have been due to physical colonialism; such excuses for 
exploitation are no longer tenable. The justification of free markets and the opportunities 
afforded to global businesses to compete unfairly have replaced more overt forms of 
control. This has often kept developing economies indebted, degraded environments, 
impoverished populations, and encouraged government corruption when this served 
corporate interests
126
 (see Section 2.6). More recently, multinational businesses have 
recolonised the world‘s poor through diet, with increasingly dire consequences.127 
The third issue is that neoliberalism has been both a direct and indirect agent for human-
rights abuses and, consequently, growing antagonism between competing nations, cultures 
and value systems. Global insecurity and the causes of intercultural and inter-religious 
violence are many. Nevertheless, injustices – resulting from intergenerational poverty, 
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labour exploitation, cultural misappropriation and displacement – often leads to violence. 
Terrorism, masquerading as a means to address such wrongs, is able to draw new recruits 
in settings of resentment. The opposite – cultures of peace, dialogue and respect – 
combined with a reduction in unfairness and exploitation, are likely to help reduce the 
threat of violence.
128
  
These observations aside, trade and market-based economies, when fair and sustainable, 
can improve human development. Even some of the toughest critics of neoliberalism 
support free enterprise.
129
 Market failures are due to several factors, including poor 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), unethical business practices (e.g. circumventing 
international or national laws), ignoring negative externalities
130
 and exploiting unequal 
trade relationships.
131
 As noted by Skidelsky, although benefits of globalisation are real, 
they have been exaggerated. Improvements are largely offset, such as by volatility, and 
globalisation has raised major issues of ‗political accountability and social cohesion that 
are scarcely considered by economists, and only lazily by politicians‘.132  
The potential of CSR has been described in the UN Global Compact. Under this 
agreement, corporate signatories commit to 10 principles in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption. By 2011, more than 6,000 
companies in 135 countries had agreed to support the compact, demonstrating that some 
businesses are capable of marrying profit-making with ethics
133
 on environmental 
protection, sustainable farming, and the negotiation of fair contracts with primary 
producers in developing economies.
134
 Similarly, many Australian businesses recognise the 
benefits of immigration and cultural diversity.
135
 Although CSR can be positive there are 
critics; for example, Reich and Guy Pearse question the intent and effect of such corporate 
commitments. They argue many companies fail to deliver any change but merely use CSR 
to promote themselves or ‗green-wash‘ failure.136 Further, Reich says CSR is a strategy 
often espoused by governments to avoid their job: governing.
137
 Solving problems of 
pollution, inequity and exploitation, and regulating business conduct, does not simply 
‗happen‘, despite neoliberal claims. This role is the responsibility of governments, which 
they should exercise as a public good. 
Several trends triggered the GFC while simultaneously inspiring scepticism about 
mainstream economics. Contested, are beliefs that high levels of growth are sustainable 
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over the long term; quality of life should be measured solely by quantitative data; 
economic efficiency must be the primary goal of policy (including social policy); personal 
and business choice should not be subject to government impediment, and the highest 
attainable goal of individuals – as citizens – is to maximise utility by maximising wealth. 
These assumptions have been questioned;
138
 below, I note some of the criticisms associated 
with each. 
The first, that high levels of growth can be sustained, was wryly answered by Kenneth 
Boulding: ‗anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is 
either a madman or economist‘,139 and by Edward Abbey who observed, ‗growth for the 
sake of growth is the ideology of a cancer cell‘.140 In the late 1960s a group of scientists, 
bureaucrats, politicians and influential thinkers formed a NGO, the Club of Rome, which 
published Limits of Growth in 1972. This report was immediately recognised for its 
analysis of the potential for economic growth, given the finite availability of natural 
resources.
141
 Ironically, neoliberalism was soon elevated to its incontrovertible status and, 
by the late 1970s, an era of unprecedented economic, technological and production 
expansion had begun. Science, logic and (often) morality were relegated to the status of 
irrelevance. With the ideological war against Communism won by the late 1980s, the 
victors treated any political ‗pinkness‘ expressed in democratic societies with contempt: a 
persisting attitude.
142
 This age of expansion was accompanied by commensurate financial, 
service and industrial deregulation across most democracies. It was the short-lived era of 
belief in the perfect mechanism of self-correcting markets. However, history had not 
ended.
143
 Rather, driven by market-myopia, capitalism was profoundly injuring itself. 
Increasingly distressed voices from environmental NGOs and scientists might still be 
dismissed as the fear-mongering of ‗watermelons‘ (green outside, red inside144) had not the 
GFC so dramatically exposed the limitations of extreme money.
145
  
It is still rare to question conventional economic theories without incurring reflexive 
disdain from most politicians and economic commentators, but the discussions are more 
frequent and gaining wider audiences. Indeed, there is an increasing body of analysis 
which argues against the growth paradigm‘s reliance on material production, fuelled by 
finite and harmful energy sources.
146
 For example, modelling demonstrates that because of 
the compounding effect, each doubling of an economy‘s growth exceeds all previous 
energy-resource usage. Even a modest annual growth rate of 2.5% will have this result 
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within only 29 years.
147
 This illustrates the risky assumptions of much conventional 
economics, given the planet‘s carrying capacity (natural production and natural absorption) 
has passed. An increasing number of economists argue these old models are unreliable. 
They do not claim growth is impossible in a dynamic-equilibrium world, rather, growth 
must be understood differently; for example, through ecological decoupling, or by 
producing services or experiences rather than gratuitous ‗stuff‘.148 
The second belief is that the efficient market theory works. The immediate response, based 
on the evidence since 2008, is ‗no‘. According to Skidelsky, the GFC exposed the truth 
that behind ‗the efficient market idea lay the intellectual failure of mainstream economics. 
It could neither predict nor explain the meltdown because nearly all economists believed 
that markets were self-correcting‘.149 Skidelsky, like other commentators on the crisis, 
remarks on the admission by Alan Greenspan (former Chair of the US Federal Reserve) 
that the entire regime of monetary management had been based on a flaw – this resulted in 
the collapse of the intellectual edifice of mainstream economics.
150
 Rob Vos argues that 
since the 1776 treatise by Adam Smith (known as the father of liberal economics), it has 
been understood that markets are not self-regulating or correcting. Instead, they: 
depend on an array of institutions, rules, regulations and norms that help moderate their 
more destructive impulses ... The pioneers of the post-1945 mixed economy were 
persuaded by the experience of the inter-war years that unregulated markets were more 
prone to self-destruction ... Idle tools, wasted wealth, wretchedness and, ultimately, 
political strife proved too high a price to pay for stable money and flexible markets.
151
  
Unshackled from the social-welfare state that dominated government policy in Global 
North countries, from the 1940s to late 1970s, followed approximately 30 years of free-
market economics culminating, after an excess of debt-profiteering, with the GFC. Because 
financial institutions became so powerful during this period, their failure threatened to 
destroy the entire system of global capitalism.
152
 As evidence of this failure, international 
banking (which had squandered trillions of dollars) required those previously despised 
entities –governments – to guarantee their debts. In this way, ‗the profit was privatised, but 
the risk was socialised‘.153 Despite institutional share values collapsing, and their unethical 
conduct and incompetence revealed, senior banking executives continued to award 
themselves inflated performance bonuses each year; most of the world‘s multi-billionaires 
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have become rich from financial speculation, not from designing or producing things.
154
 
This scenario has been noted by many critics of the finance sector.
155
  
Measures of wealth are also being increasingly questioned. This is normally evaluated 
through GDP performance: the measure of a nation‘s economic activity. GDP includes all 
financial goods and services produced in any given year; it is estimated by dividing the 
number of citizens to calculate an average standard of living. However, GDP does not 
measure many of the activities, good and bad, that are carried out. For example, household 
work, caring and volunteering make substantial economic contributions but are not 
measured; the costs of negative externalities (that make none), are counted.
156
 Under the 
mainstream macro-economic model human progress, or well-being, is therefore equated 
with wealth (average per capita, based on GDP) but happiness and prosperity (as distinct 
from wealth) are not measured.
157
 However, GDP modelling serves the current economic 
system well; although, with its focus on expenditure and unsustainable rates of production, 
it will not do so in the long term.  
Faith in the viability of efficient market theory is shaken by the fact that it would have been 
swept aside by crises of its own creation had not state intervention, funded by pay-tax-as-
you-earn citizens, preserved it from extinction. On grounds of resource limitations, it is 
equally questionable. Additionally, as expanded below, it fails the test of providing 
alternative forms of benefit. 
The next belief, that happiness is largely determined by wealth, has a number of related 
philosophical issues: the purpose of living, what constitutes a ‗good life‘, and economics as 
a public good. This last point encompasses the concern that the dominance of 
neoliberalism has seen its status evolve from being one approach to economic 
management, to an ideology and praxis that is an end in itself, where the primacy of 
markets, growth and consumption are so privileged that people, society, governments – 
indeed planetary survival – are subsumed by a market-efficiency zeitgeist that ‗amounts to 
a pseudo-religion‘.158 The much-derided notion of gross domestic happiness, invented in 
the 1970s in the Buddhist Kingdom of Bhutan as a means of measuring and preserving its 
unique culture, has since been subject to scrutiny, and there have been concerted attempts 
to explore links between wealth and happiness to determine whether material accumulation 
results in greater life-satisfaction.
159
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Tim Jackson argues that what matters to humans is prosperity, not wealth. He quotes 
research identifying how most people describe those things that give them a sense of 
subjective well-being: only 7% mention money or their financial circumstances, whereas 
most value more collective or cooperative endeavours.
160
 Jackson, influenced by Sen, 
divides prosperity into three broad categories: opulence (having many material goods), 
utility (the extent that satisfaction is gained from available commodities) and capabilities 
for functioning.
161
 Jackson draws on Richard Easterlin‘s ‗paradox‘, or research that 
demonstrated ‗once a country had moved beyond a level of income where basic needs for 
housing, food, water and energy could be met, average happiness did not increase‘.162 
These views are echoed by Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss who present evidence 
that, beyond certain threshold points, happiness is not determined by wealth.
163
  
The causes are not surprising. Societies oriented to high growth are on a kind of ‗hedonic 
treadmill‘ where everybody is driven to compete with their peers.164 Ironically, there is an 
inversely proportionate ability to do so with increasing commercial media promotion of 
acquisitiveness as the path to happiness. nef’s Happy Planet Index provides a framework to 
measure what truly matters, or ‗well-being in terms of long, happy and meaningful lives – 
and what matters to the planet – our rate of resource consumption‘.165 Nations assessed 
under nef’s index are loosely grouped according to life expectancy, life satisfaction and per 
capita ecological footprint. Many small, relatively low-GDP nations score well across all 
these domains, but not those nations that embrace extreme free-market economics. Under 
the index of 143 nations, Costa Rica ranks most highly in terms of happiness, followed by 
various Central American, Middle Eastern, Central Asian and East Asian nations before 
the Netherlands (ranked 43), which is listed as the most ‗happy‘ Global North country. 
Australia is ranked 102, its national pride intact by outranking New Zealand at 103 and the 
USA at 114.
166
 The evidence, repeated across the literature, is that wealth does not make 
people happy; rather, it tends to increase stress, and the happiness-gains can be measured 
in diminishing marginal returns.
167
 This demonstrates that the efficient market theory is 
flawed. It not only fails to deliver at the macro-economic level, it is falsely premised on an 
infinite resource base and is grounded on mistaken assumptions about what it means to be 
a human. This is unsurprising. As discussed in Section 3.1, being human is not about being 
homo economicus – or an individual, rationalising, self-maximising unit – it is about 
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finding contentment by having the resources and capabilities to flourish. This contentment 
is typically achieved through communal endeavours. 
Social researcher Hugh MacKay describes the extended phase of narcissism and civic 
withdrawal that marked much of the Howard government‘s tenure of office, as Australia‘s 
‗dreamy period‘.168 MacKay believes this was due to several factors including reform 
fatigue, fear of exogenous threat and a media-fuelled culture of consumption.
169
 Despite 
subsequent trends towards better saving behaviour, a National Centre for Social and 
Economic Modelling report notes the continuing misalignment in public understanding of 
‗cost of living‘ and ‗cost of consumption‘, and many believe they are ‗doing it tough‘ 
despite their stress being largely due to spending on discretionary items, not necessities.
170
 
While poverty continues to be the norm for much of humanity, many Australians seem 
cocooned in a mood of resentment combined with a belief that wealth is an entitlement.
171
 
These perceptions are denials of human vulnerability, mortality, thoughts and instincts;
172
 
they are a form of existential disconnection and an example of how siren songs of a 
neoliberal utopia threaten our future. 
The final issue is whether protracted neoliberal reforms have hindered or helped social 
policy. Given a principle axiom of neoliberalism is the excision of government from most 
affairs (barring national defence), this question should be redundant. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be overlooked because of its effect on important policy issues, such as welfare, 
health, education and the administration of justice. Essentially, neoliberalism relies on the 
invisible hand of market supply and demand to shape social affairs; altruism and safety 
nets for the disadvantaged (such as the ill or disabled) are generally eschewed. Rather, it 
applies a form of neo-Darwinism where individuals, in the competition to survive, become 
either prosperous or marginalised. Human detritus, however, is not without value. When 
markets are unhindered, this creates demand for services or goods, which absorb available 
labour. Thus, there is a ‗trickle-down‘ effect where, by making the very rich richer, the 
poor will also enjoy some benefits – in time, hypothetically.  
Another way of examining the issue is to consider the socio-economic effects of 
neoliberalism: it has been spectacularly successful at transferring wealth to the world‘s 
rich, enriching them further. This has occurred at both national and international levels. For 
example, in the USA between 1979 and 2005, the top 1% of income earners enjoyed 
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almost a 200% increase in the value of their incomes while the poorest 20% increased their 
incomes by only 6%.
173
 A similar pattern has been repeated in Australia
174
 with wealth 
inadequately shared and redistributed. Over the same period, most developed nations 
embarked on programs of industrial labour reforms that undermined the conditions and 
security of employment for workers while strengthening the position of employers; this has 
had serious effects on the quality of family life and social capital.
175
 Similarly, the belief 
that demand from globally rich nations for commodities will provide benefits for the global 
poor, are also deceptive. In relative and absolute terms, this has not happened; there has 
simply been more neo-colonialism, and existing elites in the Global South have enjoyed 
the same gains as the hyper-rich in the North.
176
 Simultaneously, the impoverished 
everywhere, most acutely in poor nations, have been cruelly affected by spikes in the cost 
of basic foodstuffs. This has not always been driven by shortages due to crop failures or 
increasing demand for bio-fuel, but to currency speculation by financial institutions located 
in the wealthiest nations.
177
  
Given neoliberalism has no interest in social policy, nor in government other than its 
marginal roles, the social contributions of neoliberalism must be judged on the benefits it 
has offered the majority of people in the majority of nations. These benefits, including the 
trickle-down effect, are largely illusory, or perverse, barring for a tiny minority who are 
already wealthy. However, even if gains had been tangible, this would not absolve 
neoliberalism because its ultimate reliance on growth is irrevocably destroying ‗the nursery 
of civilization‘.178 This cannot be perceived, in any manner, as helping social policy. As 
Manfred Max-Neef summarises it, our current world is: 
accustomed to the fact that there is never enough for those who have nothing, but there is 
always enough for those who have everything. There are never enough resources to 
overcome poverty, but there are more than enough resources to satisfy superficial 
wants.
179 
 
Functioning within the biosphere‘s capacity, or recognising the limits of growth, is not a 
new idea. John Stuart Mill called this the stationary state,
180
 a notion now more commonly 
described as the steady-state economy, or a society in dynamic-equilibrium. The ‗great 
transition‘ to this form of flourishing,181 both socially and economically, represents an 
alternative model of development, one that is consistent with potential roles for cultural 
institutions as described in Chapter 5.  
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The most significant planning uncertainty affecting the long-term macro-economic outlook 
is climate change. If capitalism is to have a future, it will need to work in new ways, 
reinventing itself and accepting that profitability must be based on low ecological-impact 
decisions, carbon-based economies are unsustainable, and business decisions have social, 
cultural, security, human-rights and political consequences.
182
 These priorities are reflected 
in the UN Global Compact and discussed in the avalanche of reports summarising 
knowledge about human-induced climate change, its economic effects and the investments 
needed to decarbonise.
183
 Energy transitions require economic transitions. This will lead to 
the obsolescence of infrastructure; it will require a rethink of business models and a 
workforce with new knowledge, expertise and attitudes. It will also create new industries, 
technologies, new forms of growth and business opportunities – a view endorsed by the 
UN.
184
 As such, it is fair to assume global workforce mobility will continue apace.
185
 There 
will also be population mobility, although its extent may depend on the success of future 
climate-change mitigation.
186
  
These issues demand responses from government and business; both need to cooperate to 
support each other‘s interests. This cooperation requires better understanding of the 
conditions that promote affluent economies. For example, Richard Florida describes a 
‗creative class‘: skilled, mobile, educated and clustering in communities that are 
innovative, affluent and multicultural.
187
 In a complex world – one negotiating ever-greater 
challenges of climate, social, technological, and cultural transformation and integration – 
new models of business, third-sector and government collaboration are crucial. This is 
asking businesses to be good corporate ‗citizens‘ and to take more cosmopolitan 
approaches to enterprise management. Although CSR should be treated with scepticism, 
many businesses accept that profitability – although essential for their viability – must 
accommodate potential externalities and be reconfigured within longer cycles. Indeed, 
communities and businesses may be more willing to embrace change than governments, 
which often struggle to keep abreast of trends. In many democracies, inflexibility reflects 
political fears about public opinion and inspires public dismay; this is a serious threat to the 
health of democratic governance. 
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2.4 CLIMATE CHANGE 
Inevitable climate change is a prominent subject of public discussions, policy development 
and political action. Despite this, the intersections between climate and cultural and human 
rights, population health, transnational diasporas and security – while closely connected – 
are still less prominent than economic issues.
188
 The debate about climate change risk is 
regularly highjacked by political commentators and public figures on the basis that 
adaptation costs are too high, the evidence too limited and the probability too uncertain to 
justify the expenses associated with mitigation activities.
189
 
Climate change can be of two sorts. First, anthropogenic, or human-made; typically, this is 
related to the release of carbon into the atmosphere caused by burning fossil fuels. It is also 
influenced by removal of natural carbon sinks (forests) to produce building materials or 
agricultural land-clearance (for example, to produce soy in the Amazon or palm oil in 
Borneo).
190
 Often, forests have been replaced with grazing land for ruminants bred for 
food, which release vast quantities of methane thus worsening greenhouse effects.
191
 As 
already noted, the consequences are now severe, rapidly increasing over the last two 
centuries. ‗Never mind terra-forming Mars; we already live on a terra-formed Earth. We‘ve 
been inadvertently adroit at it for ten millennia, even heading off an ice age‘ observes 
Brand,
192
 hence our era‘s new palaeontological descriptor: the Anthropocene.   
The second form of climate change has causes unrelated to human activities. This has 
always occurred for various reasons. Non-anthropogenic climatic variations can be both 
endogenous (coming from within the planet‘s boundaries) and exogenous (caused by 
events beyond). For example, endogenous changes could result from major shifts in the 
tectonic plates and subsequent release of gases and ash, cooling the atmosphere, or they 
may occur due to cyclic changes, the reasons for which science is still largely uncertain. 
Additionally, an exogenous event could include a large meteorite strike leading to 
catastrophic changes to the earth‘s atmosphere and, consequently, species extinctions as 
has been speculated occurred at the end of the Cretaceous period 65 million years ago. 
Non-anthropogenic causes are largely outside human prediction or capacity to influence. 
They also tend to be measured in geological time – over millennia or millions of years – 
and less relevant to concerns about human survival over the next few generations or 
hundreds of years. As such, the domain of action focuses primarily on anthropogenic 
   81 | Page  
 
effects on the biosphere. Humanity‘s actions over the next generation will inevitably affect 
subsequent generations and, while geologically insignificant, in anthropocentric terms are 
critical. James Havelock has predicted human extinction within a century, and the views of 
many other climate scientists reflect similar concerns.
193
 Along with consequences for 
humans, climate change is linked to the loss of biodiversity; this is widely regarded as an 
environmental risk as well as a further ethical issue.
194
  
Using a human-rights lens to examine the relationships between climate change and human 
societies is helpful. However, climate change will affect the total human-rights landscape, 
having two broad effects, which can be described as primary and secondary effects. It will 
have a direct (or primary) effect on individual rights, for example to health, livelihood, 
social systems, cultural practice, how and where people live.
195
 The way governments 
tackle climate change will also have particular (secondary) effects on human rights, such as 
those described below.
196
 Although Australia makes a relatively minor contribution to 
global warming, it is part of the wider world.
197
 It is demographically small, but 
collectively its actions are incommensurate with those of many other countries.
198
 
Additionally, Australia is vulnerable to condemnation if it fails to meet a reasonable 
standard of conduct as a national global citizen. It is also, among developed nations, 
especially likely to be severely affected by climate changes.
199
 
Orderly movements of people, managed transnational migrations, basic human 
infrastructure – these will disintegrate if some of the predicted climate change proves to be 
accurate. In 2007, John von Doussa
200
 outlined his concerns, lamenting that discussions 
were monopolised by economic, trade and security issues, while the social and human-
rights implications of climate change seldom rate a mention. Von Doussa argued, when 
climate change is regarded as a human-rights issue, a picture emerges that differs from the 
quantitative analysis presented in scientific and economic statistics. This picture reveals 
increasing vulnerability to poverty, social deprivation, infectious and vector-borne 
diseases, conflict over diminishing supplies of water and arable land, and with the world‘s 
poor – notably women and children – disproportionately affected.201  
These concerns are echoed by Mary Robinson
202
 who warns that climate change is one of 
the greatest challenges ever to face humanity. Current trends of increasing drought, floods, 
severe storms and lower agricultural yields will worsen: both environmental and human-
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rights issues. She is also concerned the poorest, who contribute the least to climate change, 
will endure most of its effects. 97% of deaths related to natural disasters occur in the 
Global South where, because they rarely receive media headlines, their stories are seldom 
heard.
203
 Generally, says Robinson, people already impoverished and vulnerable will 
continue to be disproportionately affected by desertification, the degradation of once-fertile 
agricultural lands,
204
 rising sea levels, spoilt freshwater reserves and lost livelihoods. The 
environmental consequences of carbon emissions released by industrialised and 
industrialising nations are therefore already undermining the:  
basic human rights of millions of the world‘s poorest people to life, security, food, health 
and shelter [and which] will continue to be violated … A human rights lens reminds us 
there are reasons beyond economics and enlightened self-interest for states to act on 
climate change.
205
 
Over the years, there has been debate about whether environmental protection is a sub-set 
of human rights (given they are intended to improve human life) or the environment is of 
such importance that it subsumes them.
206
 The proposition that the environment lacks 
intrinsic value is generally rejected and the consensus, now, is environmental protection 
and human rights are different but overlapping societal values.
207
 If the world successfully 
moves away from carbon-based economies, to slow the speed of climate change, this will 
considerably affect how people will live. However, without this transition, the future is 
bleak. Already, some lands are so threatened, entire communities will need to resettle. 
Examples include some Pacific islands where, the World Bank reports, low-lying countries 
such as Kiribati could lose up to 80% of their land mass.
208
 There will also be increasingly 
frequent and extreme cyclonic events, spread of diseases, falls in population-level health 
outcomes, and drastic cuts to agricultural yields in other Pacific states. It is likely that 
whole islander nations will resettle in other regions, such as in Queensland or New 
Zealand. These diasporas will quickly change and, without the source lands and societies to 
maintain, reinforce and replenish their cultures, they will eventually vanish. Climate 
change is therefore a cultural as well as human right. Although the connection is 
increasingly recognised,
209
 those examining climate issues broadly treat culture as 
tangential to their interests or incorporated within a wider rights approach. Integrated 
planning, from local through to international levels, is essential to avoid the potentially 
catastrophic effect of climate change on human lives, rights and heritage. 
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If the predictions of many climate scientists eventuate, over the coming century what we 
may see with Pacific Island cultures (represented by numerically small populations) may 
happen on a vast scale affecting hundreds of millions of people. One reason for this bleak 
outlook is the projected changes to equatorial monsoons. If Tibetan glaciers continue to 
melt, and significant rainfall reductions combined with on-going down-catchment 
deforestation, the region faces a scenario where not only will delta countries such as 
Bangladesh risk inundation from the combined effects of rising sea levels and increasing 
siltation, but rivers, such as the Mekong, Indus and Yangtze, may have drastically reduced 
water flows.
210
 If this occurs, regions such as southern China, Vietnam and India will not 
only face agricultural failure but also cultural extinction. To destroy a physical 
environment shared by humans is to destroy their cultures. To disrupt the hitherto largely 
predictable weather patterns in this part of the world is to create a scenario where almost a 
third of the world‘s population is on the move and some of its richest cultural heritage 
threatened. 
This is a potential tale of unparalleled misery, but also one with inescapable global 
consequences. Existing deterrents and security arrangements will not prevent millions of 
climate refugees from pouring over national borders; nothing could halt such a myriad of 
desperation. As Wright observes, where societies have progressively lost their resilience 
and capacity for adaptive change, and circumstances lead to a sudden shift in global 
climatic patterns, ‗the great experiment of civilization will come to a catastrophic end ... 
we have grown as specialised and therefore as vulnerable, as a sabre-toothed cat‘.211 In 
such settings, climate change would threaten not the higher aspirations of human rights and 
development, but their very survival. How will future governments respond under such 
circumstances? Will closed borders involve privileging some lives over others, if so, on 
what basis? Will laws suspend derogable rights to protect the general ‗good‘ in a period of 
heightened security, if so, for how long? Will this include non-derogable rights? How will 
choice be made between the values of environmental protection and the preservation of 
human life? 
The right to life, and the essentials that make life bearable, are first-generation human 
rights. However, given the high-probability of severe climate change, there will be little 
capacity to plan for second- and third-generation rights. Indeed, the whole concept of 
human rights will come under extraordinary pressure. In this situation – when norms of 
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social functioning and international relations are suspended – humanising frameworks will 
be lost in the tumult. Furthermore, extreme climate events are likely to be only one of 
several causes of systemic failure leading to synchronous collapses. While hypothetical 
climate effects in the Pacific and South East Asia refer to Australia‘s region, there are 
equally severe risks in other parts of the world. It is already known that desertification and 
mass starvation in Africa is linked to climate change, particularly changing rainfall 
patterns, caused by industrial activities in Europe.
212
 In a world entering a period of 
unpredictability, during which accepted beliefs will be challenged, what are regarded as 
norms in many countries – democracy, freedom and a civil society – will be eroded. 
Fundamental human rights therefore need institutionalising,  now more than ever, to help 
protect peoples‘ capabilities to function and flourish in a coming era of more change, not 
less – an era of greater threats to personal, national and global security.  
This makes climate change a pressing ethical issue. However, the ethics extend beyond 
those related to humanity and other species (as in biodiversity loss) to global 
custodianship. This is not only about how humans are indirectly altering our planet, but 
how we are now speculating about doing so through intentional geo-engineering. Some 
geo-engineering ideas are about exogenous interventions (e.g. erecting huge shade ‗space 
umbrellas‘), but most are endogenous, such as seeding the sea and sky with sulphates and 
other minerals to restructure ocean acidity and atmospheric chemistry.
213
 Humanity has a 
poor record of deliberate environmental manipulation (introducing species to new habitats, 
like the cane toad to Queensland, have been disastrous), and the notion of planetary-level 
tinkering terrifies as many scientists as it thrills. The topical issue of geo-engineering poses 
many moral questions, and it collectively indicts humanity for its hubris, indolence and 
incapacity for adaptive change (such as willingness to recalibrate aspects of our economic 
system) that something so profoundly risky and irrevocable is increasingly advocated as 
inevitable.
214
  
Over the last 30 years, market remedies have dictated most policy and programs across all 
tiers of government. Today, the effects of climate change, questions about the equity of the 
current economic paradigm
215
 and fears of ongoing global financial instability have led to 
widespread resentment that this deterioration has occurred under the sway of 
neoliberalism. Environmental activist, Paul Kingsnorth, has warned:  
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Take a civilisation built on the myth of human exceptionalism and a deeply embedded 
cultural attitude to ‗nature‘; add a blind belief in technological and material progress; then 
fuel the whole thing with a power source that is discovered to be disastrously destructive 
only after we have used it to inflate our numbers and appetites beyond the point of no 
return. What do you get? We are starting to find out.
216
 
If nothing else, the looming crisis of environmental degradation and resource sustainability 
illustrates the failure of unfettered markets to regulate planetary-level development.
217
 This 
conspicuous failure is driving a new economics where long-term planning, lower growth, 
CSR
218
 and sustainable development are increasingly recognised in business and 
government planning.
219
 It is also reflected in consumer preferences, purchasing and 
market behaviours, with growing awareness of the relationship between individual acts and 
their wider effects. It can be debated whether this shall genuinely make a difference or help 
address disequilibria of wealth between populations, but such awareness at least marks out 
shift in attitude.
220
 Many of these issues are discussed in a 2011 report by the UN‘s 
environment program, which argues there is increasing awareness that a new paradigm, 
that does not destroy the environment or aggravate social disparities, is required. 
Increasing support for a green economy has been driven:  
by widespread disillusionment with the prevailing economic paradigm, a sense of fatigue 
emanating from the many concurrent crises and market failures experienced during the 
very first decade of the new millennium, including especially the financial and economic 
crisis of 2008.
221
  
Given the intersections between culture, rights and the environment, these issues represent 
more than threats or sources of guilt. They can be opportunities for justice, creativity and 
productivity which offer dividends for many more people than those directly involved. 
Transforming the local through collective and rights-based actions to build flourishing, 
sustainable communities is a goal where new museology can play important roles. 
2.5 HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY  
Nietzsche apocalyptically pronounced ‗God is dead‘ in 1882.222 Since then, there have 
been many attempts to bury religious belief. However, the predictions of God‘s demise and 
religion‘s inevitable decline have proved premature. As a 2004 report on religion in 
Australia observes, although Nazism, Communism and other secular ideologies have been 
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consigned to the ‗dustbin of history‘, a remarkable feature of the twentieth century was the 
endurance of religions and their institutions.
223
 So much so, 120 years after Nietzsche‘s 
proclamation, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge undertook an extensive study of 
faith and concluded: God is clearly back. In answering why, they argue many causes are 
driven by globalisation. Secularists failed to recognise that those things they believed 
would erode religiosity have had an opposite effect: 
the surge of religion is being driven by the same two things that have driven the success 
of market capitalism: competition and choice ... The very things that were supposed to 
destroy religion – democracy and markets, technology and reason – are combining to 
make it stronger.
224
  
The global resurgence of religion is a distinctive feature of the new century, with social, 
political, cultural, economic, and security ramifications. This has prompted considerable 
pejorative analysis over the last decade or so, for example, by Daniel Dennett, Christopher 
Hitchens and Richard Dawkins, who have focused on what they see as the harm and 
irrationality of religious belief.
225
 Nevertheless, religion continues to dominate the lives of 
the majority of humanity, with scepticism claiming a relatively small proportion of 
affiliation.
226
  
Religious experience is universal.
227
 Although not all individuals have religious 
experiences, religion occurs across all cultures, races and epochs and inspires passionate 
commitments. As such, it continues to be a common driver of tensions between states as 
well as between, and within, communities. Indeed, since the late twentieth century, most 
conflict has decreasingly been manifested through conventional warfare (such as military 
conflict between combatants on behalf of a sovereign authority) instead, largely occurring 
between ethnic, tribal, political and religious groups, and in ways often anarchic and 
outside state controls.
228
 Some claimants say there is no role for the state when it comes to 
matters of faith; although religion‘s enduring appeal often poses challenges to national 
authority.
229
 When it does, this may demand intervention to protect national security, 
especially when the religious impulse becomes destructive, is harnessed to other agendas 
such as political activism, or is influenced by factors such as cultural conflict, economic 
disparity, or the denial of justice.
230
 The current literature on terrorism frequently links its 
causes and appeal to religious extremism, particularly the distorting effects of ‗perverted‘ 
religion.
231
 In previous decades, the motives for extremist violence were often associated 
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with political, ideological or nationalist causes. These motives continue, but religiously 
inspired terrorism may also evolve into illicit businesses, especially if a terrorist group 
relies on the black economy to finance their activities.
232
 Nevertheless, religion continues 
to be a critical ingredient in the complex mix driving local and global terrorist recruitment 
as well as some nationalist (even secular) political agendas.
233
  
The effect of religion on global security has been described as driving either a clash or an 
alliance of civilizations. These bi-polar views see the international setting as one where 
either cultural incompatibility and competition (expressed through religion) leads to 
inevitable conflict, or where it is recognised there is sufficient consensus for constructive 
dialogue. The first of these propositions is famously argued by Huntington, initially in a 
short article and subsequently in his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order. Huntington certainly acknowledges cultural influences – at 
individual and collective levels – but his response to a multipolar, multi-civilization world 
(as he describes it) is rigid. He approvingly quotes, unless ‗we hate what we are not, we 
cannot love what we are. These are old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century 
... of sentimental cant‘.234 There is, Huntington claims, ‗unfortunate truth in these old truths 
... for people seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential‘.235 
Huntington sees ancient rivalries between Christianity and Islam as the main source of 
conflict, arguing, ‗Islam‘s borders are bloody, and so are its innards‘236 and incredibly, 
given the USA is the most militarised and arguably most belligerent nation in recent 
history
237
, that the Muslim propensity ‗towards violent conflict is also suggested by the 
degree to which Muslim societies are militarised‘.238 His views have been contested by 
scholars such as Edward Said who criticised the advisory and academic infrastructure 
‗devoted to legitimizing and maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically 
unchanging ideas about Islam, the Orient, and the Arabs‘.239 In his 2003 preface to 
Orientalism, Said lamented that ignorance about the oriental ‗Other‘ persists, saying: 
debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings 
must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate ... 
Western exceptionalism, denigrates the relevance of context, and regards other cultures 
with derisive contempt.
240
  
More recently, the UN Alliance of Civilizations was established to counter notions that 
civilizations reflexively clash and that promoting such notions risks increasing the 
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likelihood of identity-based conflict. The report of the High-Level Group argues the history 
of relations between groups from different cultural backgrounds had not always been one 
of violent confrontations but of constructive cross-fertilisation of ideas and peaceful 
coexistence. The clash theory is also criticised for being simplistic. Societies are often 
internally fluid and diverse; to describe them as collectively ‗rigid‘ ignores more 
illuminating ways to understand identity and behaviours. The Alliance of Civilizations 
report counters the way stereotyping compounds misconceptions and entrenches patterns 
of hostility. It states that rifts: 
between the powerful and the powerless or the rich and the poor or between different 
political groups, classes, occupations and nationalities have greater explanatory power 
than such cultural categories. Indeed, the latter stereotypes only serve to entrench already 
polarized opinions (1.3).
241
 
The report recalls that the UDHR covers rights to religious and cultural belief, expression 
and practice (2.1)
242
 and warns that polarisation and conflict occur when rights are believed 
to be selectively protected (5.12).
243
 This means ‗establishing genuine dialogue among 
nations requires a common understanding of international human rights principles and a 
universal commitment to their full and consistent application‘.244 The report paints a 
complex picture about the rights, risks, influences and challenges of cross-cultural 
dialogue, from local to global levels. These issues have been noted by other authors who 
are concerned about the causes and effects of disparities in wealth, health and freedom, as 
well as the exercise of political, cultural and social self-determination.
245
 Their analyses, 
when stripped of subjective content, are essentially about conflicts arising around small 
and large worlds, of universal versus particular projects: the dynamics of far-from-
equilibrium change in a world catalysed by new technologies, new forms of engagement, 
new global risks and forms of compliance.
246
  
God may not be dead, nor history ended; but neither has ideology. In all probability, the 
twenty-first century will be marked by global cultural politics involving global ideologies. 
Some ideologies will promote a tightly integrated and networked world; others will 
advocate diversity and cosmopolitanism; yet others will promote conformity to a religion 
and its associated values. In sociological terms, this has been described as a spectrum of 
views between gesellschaft (where rational order, neutral involvement and obligations to 
institutions are dominant) to gemeinschaft (where self-serving individuals and groups are 
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linked by impersonal but interdependent ties).
247
 The concept of the post-secular city is one 
attempt to describe the role of faith-based organisations and the effect of religion in 
contemporary urban settings. For civil societies, the boundaries between science and faith, 
modernity and tradition, public ethics and private values, governance and free choice will 
continue to demand intra- and intergroup mediations.
248
  
The world‘s major faith traditions share many concepts about the world and human 
agency. Much of this concordance is reflected in UN principles, global ethics, human 
rights and related secular inventions. However, the faiths also have many differences, and 
religion is likely to remain a site where morality in a globalised world is contested.
249
 Not 
only will this contestation occur between different faiths, but internally: between 
progressive and conservative branches, between differing sects or churches, between 
members of different nations, cultural traditions and political views.
250
 Contests may not be 
solely about scripture or tradition, but how these intersect with worldly debates, such as 
environmental custodianship or the legitimacy of declarations of war.
251
 This will lead to 
conflicts between those whose faith-based ideologies drive political agendas as well as 
those who use faith to justify political objectives. This future will be one of continuing 
rather than diminishing complexity.
252
   
Religion and its effects on international security are easily illustrated. The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide occurred in ‗the most Christian of African nations‘;253 here, the ethnic-minority 
Tutsis were massacred by their Hutu co-religionists, with Catholic nuns and Anglican 
bishops colluding in the killing of almost one million fellow Christians.
254
 Conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia – such as the siege of Sarajevo, the Srebrenica and Kosovo genocides – 
were committed by Bosnian Serb Christian militias against Muslim civilians. The crisis in 
Darfur has been aggravated by Janjaweed militia attacks on Christian communities. Until 
their defeat in 2009, the (largely) Hindu Tamils were in protracted conflict with the 
Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka. This list can easily be extended. Recent histories – in 
Ireland, Kashmir, the Philippines, Chechnya, Palestine and numerous other countries – 
have involved faith-based violence. However, crimes of genocide can be committed as 
easily by Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists, socialists and fascists as well as by 
Europeans, Africans and Asians.
255
 This is a potential all humans possess and, with a 
growing population, contacts increase and with it the probability of tension. Terrorism can 
be associated with geo-politics, history, wealth inequalities, and invasive cultural and 
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technological trends. At the local level, continuing inter-religious conflict may help fuel 
the radicalisation of alienated youth.
256
 
As the Alliance of Civilizations report argues, global efforts to maintain security should be 
undertaken within a democratic and human-rights framework that simultaneously aims to 
address injustice and poverty, especially as they affect civil, political, economic and 
cultural life: a view echoed in Civil Paths to Peace, among other reports.
257
 Although 
intercultural and inter-religious conflicts do cause violence, to assume religious beliefs are 
the only cause of terrorism (no matter what faith inspires it), is simplistic given the role of 
religion in peacemaking and peacekeeping.
258
 Scott Appleby describes how discourse on 
the role of religion in deadly conflict tends to gravitate towards two interpretations. 
Religion is either despised for inspiring atrocities and dwelling in a modern dark age, or it 
is interpreted liberally where acts of violence – committed in the name of a religion – are 
dismissed as unrepresentative of the faith on whose behalf it was purportedly done. This is 
because the sanctity of human life is a key tenet of all major religions. However, behind 
this either–or method of interpreting religion and the acts of its adherents, is the 
assumption one must: 
decide whether religion is essentially a creative and ―civilizing‖ force or a destructive and 
inhumane spectre from a benighted past … [this] is no less prevalent for being patently 
absurd … The cynics fail to appreciate the profoundly humane and humanizing attributes 
of religion and the moral constraints it imposes on intolerant and violent behaviour. The 
advocates of ‗liberalized‘ religion fail to consider that an authentic religious precept  … 
may end in subordinating human life to a higher good.
259
  
Appleby believes religion can play a significant peace-building role, and its leaders must 
pursue three human-rights goals. These – especially for religions with traditions of 
misology – are first: promote human-rights norms, including the right to religious freedom 
as well as tolerance of religious outsiders within the faith. Second, religious leaders should 
give priority to inter-religious, ecumenical and interfaith dialogue to help avoid culturally 
or religiously grounded conflicts. Third, religious communities should engage in normative 
processes, especially in building cultures of dialogue consistent with human-rights 
standards and support peaceful conflict resolutions.
260
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Human-rights systems, however, can fall victim to religious or political extremists, both of 
whom could argue they are tools of control used by capitalist, secular or Western interests. 
The hypocritical or misleading use of human-rights language to camouflage exploitative or 
culturally insensitive actions help demonstrate that such claims are informed by empirical 
evidence.
261
 Similarly, many European nations have not fully developed multicultural 
policies and – when race or faith-based conflicts arise – multiculturalism is blamed instead 
of ill-formed or competing government policies, or the under-resourcing of multicultural 
strategies. So too for other human-rights approaches established to fail.
262
 Declarations 
may contextualise the principles of specific human-rights challenges, and conventions 
provide a framework for state-parties‘ action but, if nations choose to selectively ratify 
conventions, do not adequately interpret them in domestic legislation, and omit to properly 
monitor, report and implement these measures, it is unfair to criticise the normative 
instruments as a failure of human-rights principles.  
In this system religion has a fraught status, particularly around the ambiguous areas of 
cultural rights and racism (see Sections 3.4.3, 4.1 & 4.2). The omission of discrimination 
on the grounds of religion and belief in the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (ICERD) is problematic and, arguably, 
significant problems have arisen.
263
 Article 1 defines racial discrimination as ‗any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin‘ and is the basis for UN deliberations on action plans to address racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
264
 At the time of drafting 
ICERD, in the early 1960s, Arab states were reluctant to include religion because they did 
not want mention of anti-Semitism.
265
 This is ironic because, in recent years, concern about 
Islamophobia has undermined ICERD‘s credibility as an effective instrument. 
Subsequently, the issue of religious discrimination has been addressed more by proxy than 
in tangible ways; this means there is no international legal remedy that applies to religious 
discrimination.
266
 
Attempts to fill this gap have been linked to the idea of ‗combating the defamation of 
religion‘ (CDR). Appendix A2.2 provides a brief outline of the international controversy 
associated with religious freedom: a digression from the thesis, analyses of these issues do, 
however, provide a wider picture of complexity that is relevant. Tensions associated with 
faith-hate, and discrimination against religious diasporas, are associated with an often-
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shaky global security setting and add to risks. For example, at a critical time – when the 
world should have mobilized to address climate change – the events of 9/11 subsumed 
other pressing concerns. In the years following, many governments focused their energies 
and financial resources on fighting unwinnable ‗cosmic‘ battles,267 often making 
questionable strategic decisions. One such was the invasion of Iraq, falsely linked to 
Islamist terrorism.
268
 Whether the Second Gulf War was about securing oil reserves for the 
Global North or a new form of crusade is, in a sense, irrelevant. Relevant is the high death 
toll, eroded trust, and lost opportunities. The accumulated costs to the US government of 
the Iraq venture was approximately $3 trillion by 2007.
269
 Taking into account the 
continuing costs since – and the costs for participating allies, such as the UK, Australia, 
Italy, Netherlands and Poland – the total costs are substantially higher.  
With hindsight, the effects of 9/11 (Al-Qaida‘s aspiration to dismantle the Global North‘s 
power-base) are still unfolding.
270
 The 2001 attacks triggered a decade-long diversion. Vast 
outlays on security, aimed at curtailing the activities of numerically-small terrorist groups, 
distracted the international community from energetically addressing the long-term effects 
of climate change.
271
 Now, given the parlous state of finances in many countries, there are 
scant reserves remaining to invest in the structural transitions needed for the survival of 
democratic free-market economies.
272
 
2.6 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The Australian Government‘s 2008 security statement argues there are numerous threats to 
the safety of the state and its citizens, including risks from pandemics and natural 
disasters.
273
 Nevertheless, fears associated with Islamist terrorism dominate the national 
and international security environment. Although this concern existed before 2001, it was 
amplified by the events of 9/11 and has remained a fear in popular and political 
consciousness, sustained by continuing terrorist activities around the world such as the 7/7 
attacks in the UK which demonstrated ‗home grown terrorism‘ is a novel and real threat.274 
Although not limited to a single community or religion, in recent years intelligence 
attention has principally focused on Muslims.
275
  Since it is (widely) believed that the path 
to peace involves human rights,
276
 and (conditionally) accepted that security infrastructure 
is an essential defence against terrorism,
277
 it is reasonable to ask whether human rights 
and security are compatible, how they support social inclusion, and whether policies (such 
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as multiculturalism) help or hinder the well-being and protection of citizens: questions that 
become more acute when there are perceived security threats from within the state.  
Debates about Islamist terrorism are frequently premised on the belief that violence is 
intrinsic to Islam. This view, promoted by Huntington, was largely ignored until 2001. 
After 9/11, it gained attention and was popularised and simplified by the media where 
generalisations and stereotyping aggravated reciprocal suspicions between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. The roots of Islamist terrorism – indeed the motivations of any terrorist 
organisation – are complex.278 Some acts are committed by those opposed to the freedoms 
of democratic societies; others are born of anger at global injustice, cultural hegemony, 
political repression or unequal wealth and opportunity. It should not be assumed terrorists 
are ‗insane‘ or live in an amoral vacuum, no matter how immoral their rationale and the 
results of their violence may be.
279
 Reza Aslan argues that recent waves of terrorism, 
especially those associated with radical religion, are driven by ‗cosmic‘ motivations: the 
players are engaged in an eternal war of righteousness, with God an active and present 
agent.
280
 This makes contemporary terrorist threats less linear and harder to predict than in 
the past. It is a war – as interpreted from the radical perspective – about truth, justice, 
equity and freedom.
281
 
Although there is no standardised definition of the term ‗terrorism‘ it is generally 
understood to refer to the use of violence (such as the slaughter of innocents or the 
destruction of iconic symbols) to trigger psychic fear and garner publicity through media 
exposure; this allows otherwise excluded opinions to be considered in an asymmetrical 
conflict.
282
 It is often the angry, marginalised, or those vulnerable to manipulation by self-
interested or extreme groups, who turn to terrorism.
283
 
Governments have the task of ensuring legislative responses to this threat are effective and 
proportionate. This can be a difficult balancing-act: strengthening security while avoiding 
the isolation of minorities where few of their number are likely to contemplate acts of 
violence.
284
 As with many responses to ‗wicked problems‘, remedies that assure some 
groups may alienate others.
285
 Legal systems in liberal democracies are designed for open 
justice. The requirement that confidential information be protected for security purposes is 
a challenge to this well-established norm; this makes human right protections particularly 
important, even as they are threatened by continuing fears of terrorism.
286
 Under the 
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common-law traditions of the UK, Australia and other Commonwealth countries, 
defendants are accorded various rights. The first of these is the presumption of innocence: 
prosecutors must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the crime 
with which they are charged. Despite circumstantial evidence or popular resentments, all 
defendants are entitled to a fair trial. There must be evidence of committing, or planning to 
commit, a crime for the accused to be found guilty of an offence. Second, whether guilt is 
proven or not, the rights of the accused must be upheld. Third, preventative detention must 
be limited in scope and surveillance restricted. This helps to protect the privacy of all 
citizens
287
 – granting unfettered rights to policing agencies can be a short cut to 
dictatorship.  
These rights make the Australian legal system generally fair and transparent. However, at 
times they need to be balanced by actions to reduce society‘s vulnerability to destabilising 
threats. These threats are summarised in a UK discussion paper, which agrees that 
responses to terrorism challenge democracy. The dislocations accompanying successfully 
executed terrorist violence threaten democracy itself – one reason why terrorism is a 
chosen strategy. The challenge for free societies is to preserve hard-gained civil rights 
against arbitrary uses of protective powers, wielded to protect citizenry, while ensuring the:  
rule of law are not used as a cover by those who seek its overthrow … [and] for whom 
prosecution and punishment hold no fear, and who are prepared to take their own lives in 
destroying others, do not recognise normal processes of law or fear the consequences of 
detection.
288
  
This paper highlights a paradox. Human rights are essential to a free society yet, in extreme 
circumstances, retaining them can leave a state vulnerable. Freedoms may provide the 
cover that allows terrorists to plan attacks against an open system. Ironically, injustice – a 
reason terrorists give for their actions – may best be addressed through human-rights 
approaches. 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1373, which 
called on states to take whatever steps necessary to limit the capacity of global networks to 
organise and execute acts of terrorism.
289
 Later resolutions (1456 and 1566) noted that 
religion – perverted and extreme forms of Islam in particular – represents the primary 
threat. Resolution 1373 provided a mandate for the Australian Government to make many, 
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often controversial, changes to surveillance and detention laws.
290
 Subsequently, other UN 
reports and statements, such as the CDR resolution,
291
 were attempts to ameliorate the 
more reactive responses to 9/11 and emphasise that the actions of extremists, which are 
associated with ideological or other forms of struggle, do not represent mainstream 
religious opinions.
292
   
In Australia, many security measures continue along the course established by the Howard 
government. These can be divided into three broad types. The first is hard security (such as 
border protection, enhanced customs and defence capability) where billions of dollars have 
been invested since 2001. While important, many hard-security measures are expensive 
and fail to address the actual causes of resentment and alienation.
293
 The second type is 
security-related law legitimised by Resolution 1373. This response involved approximately 
40 pieces of legislation that strengthened surveillance, detention and policing powers, a 
move criticised by human-rights groups and Muslim communities who felt it unfairly 
targeted them.
294
 The third type is soft security, this was primarily pursued through the 
National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security (NAP), a whole-
of-government approach to build more cohesive communities (see Appendix A1.1). A 
review of relative investments indicate that soft security outlays represent less than 0.4% of 
the security budget addressing the Australian terrorist threat since 9/11.
295
  
Public discussion about hard-security responses to the threat of Islamist terrorism may 
aggravate fears in the general population, marginalise many Muslims, create a sense of 
limited options and increase resentment among those at risk of becoming radicalised. In 
particular, between 2001 and 2006, there was a sense of crisis and that Australia was at risk 
of being overrun by people through ‗illegal‘ entry. The language used in public debates 
became emotive
296
 and government policies associated with mandatory detention, the 
excision of territories from the migration zone and offshore processing all heightened 
perceptions that a threat existed from the (Muslim) ‗Other. Protracted media coverage 
about refugees changed community perceptions, especially about Muslim and Arabic 
communities, and people of ‗Middle Eastern appearance‘.297 Because links between Islam 
and terrorism continues to inform most planning among security agencies, this further 
unsettles the general community.
298
 Writing about conditions in the UK after 7/7, Tariq 
Modood says the presence of Muslim minorities in countries that made half-hearted 
attempts to introduce multiculturalism policies (such as Germany)
299
 combined with fears 
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about terrorism, has left multiculturalism vulnerable to criticism from governments of both 
the right and centre left. Rather than eschewing multiculturalism it is an essential tool to 
preserve community harmony within a human rights framework and, Modood claims, 
contrary to the view of critics, violent extremism has nothing to do with multiculturalism 
per se: terrorism intrudes into domestic matters from the international arena. Governments 
that allow political extremism to fester, often through ill-considered foreign policies and by 
blaming ethnic minorities and multiculturalism, risk losing the ‗resource that is necessary 
for a long-term victory over domestic terrorism: namely, the fully and active ―on-side‖ 
cooperation of the Muslim communities‘.300 
Islamist terrorism has often been tardily discussed by opinion-makers in the West.
301
 
Although loose international networks exist – often merely inspired by al-Qaeda – that 
wish to attack anybody opposing their interpretation of Islam, they are a small (but real) 
threat, especially because some control substantial financial resources giving them the 
capacity to illicitly purchase the means of mass lethality. These groups continue to recruit 
idealistic and confused young followers, although most recruitment occurs in only a few 
regions, such as Iraq, Gaza, Pakistan or Afghanistan.
302
 Indeed, the activities of terrorist 
groups often reflect power struggles between competing, extreme positions, with most 
Muslims critical of their actions. As with any large population (in this case approximately 
1.5 billion) its members hold widely differing views. The Muslim world is not monolithic 
but fractured and, in the Middle East for instance, there are tensions between political, 
largely secular positions (across the spectrum) competing with fundamentalist causes that 
may be relatively peaceful, moderate, or Wahabist (highly conservative).
303
 Furthermore, 
ethnic and religious sub-groups (such as Shi‘ite, Sunni, Alawite, Sufi or Ahmadiyya) often 
vie with each other. Among the most radical exists the view that most Muslims are 
betrayers of Islam and are greater enemies than pagans and Zionists. This attitude has led 
to the carnage of countless co-religionists, particularly since the 1990s.
304
 Failure by the 
Western media to acknowledge this complexity confuses non-Muslim understanding of the 
issues.
305
 The threat of terrorism, then, is not limited to the general community. Violence 
may occur within Muslim communities or be targeted at other minorities – such as Jews 
who report a rise in assaults when violence in the Middle East increases
306
 – in addition, 
there are security risks associated with the far white right and some ethnic groups.
307
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Non-Muslim ideologies have also coloured international understanding about Islamist 
terrorism, encouraging a binary approach to issues. Drawing crudely on the clash of 
civilizations hypothesis was the axiom that people were either ‗with‘ or ‗against‘ those 
fighting a war on terror. As noted in the Introduction, inflexible approaches to far-from-
equilibrium circumstances compounds problems by minoritising groups. This was 
famously achieved by US president, George Bush, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
Bush‘s language, and that of many conservative allies and advisors, divided people into 
‗saved‘ and ‗unsaved‘, ‗evil-doers‘ and ‗the righteous‘. This was seen as code for Christian 
versus Muslim (although the satanic included socialists, homosexuals and Democratic 
voters).
308
 Bush was not interested in the rule of law and human rights, having proclaimed 
at the National Security Council, ‗I don‘t care about international law; I just want to kick 
ass‘.309 As Korten observes, this view was consistent with the perspective of an affronted 
empire. The USA has a plutocratic history that consistently favours wealth and corporate 
power at the expense of the subaltern amongst its citizens. Contrary to its propaganda of 
liberty and equality, the USA has a record of protecting elite interests, launching unilateral 
attacks and backing dictatorships.
310
  
Kevin Clements argues that human activity is typically peaceful; most people live in 
relative social harmony, doing they need to ensure group and personal survival. This 
concord may be threatened by those seeking greater control, or who wish to achieve their 
objectives through coercion: the most common form of power play. This is regarded as 
normal, even if undesirable. Others, with little or no political power, may resort to violence 
as a means of coping with: 
humiliation, rejection, marginalization and exclusion. For these people violence is a way 
of communicating grievance, generating fear and arousing a negative reaction in order to 
expand their struggle. Terrorism, in this instance, is a particular crime of the unheard.
311
  
Clements believes acts of terrorism are forms of sacrifice that demand broader 
acknowledgement of an agenda aiming to redress past sufferings and humiliation. Paul 
Berman, while not disagreeing, has a different perspective on Islamist terrorism. He argues 
the motives that triggered Western anti-liberalism in the 1920s (Fascism, Nazism, 
Stalinism) are shared by Islamism, and liberal traditions have been repeatedly warped to 
defend egregious crimes, including mass murder.
312
 European totalitarianism was driven 
by a desire to rebel that mutated into a cult of death, sharing one ideal. It was: 
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not scepticism and doubt. It was the ideal of submission. It was submission to the kind of 
authority that liberal civilization had slowly undermined, and which the new movements 
wished to re-establish on a novel basis. It was the ideal of the one, instead of the many. 
The ideal of something godlike. The total state, the total doctrine, the total movement.
313
  
Berman reminds readers that seemingly senseless violence, irrationality and fanaticism of 
Islamists are not traditions alien to the civilized West but share behaviours consistent with 
twentieth-century histories of Europe (think of the Dachau, Auschwitz and Buchenwald 
concentration camps), Africa (the Rwandan genocide) and Asia (Mao‘s Cultural 
Revolution; Pol Pot‘s Cambodia). 
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute‘s (ASPI) 2008 security assessment agrees that 
globalisation is driving ‗forces of integration and fragmentation‘, that interconnectedness is 
not only a positive force, but a ‗driver in identity conflicts‘.314 ASPI believes global 
security is complicated by factors such as demographics, energy, environmental pressures 
and technology,
315
 but notes that while al-Qaeda remains organisationally coherent and has 
inspired much Islamist violence since 2001,
316
 it is informal and local groups that may pose 
the greatest threat. The internet has democratised terrorism and fourth-wave terrorists 
continue to aspire to inflict catastrophic violence on civilians; this demands that states 
protect their security through national, regional and global measures. Military force, 
however, will not win contests ‗against terrorism because it cannot address the political 
grievances that underpin terrorist causes‘,317 a view shared with Aslan who argues 
terrorism is a battle for hearts and minds.
318
 The reasons an individual chooses the path of 
violence are many – varying between countries and ideological contexts. Radicalisation is 
a process that mixes religious, social, political and cultural, issues; these may be linked to 
wealth or economic disadvantage, they may be associated with an aggrieved sense of 
justice; the evidence is unclear.
319
 Increasingly, terrorism seems to arise in independent and 
self-radicalising cells functioning within, although incrementally disassociated from, the 
wider society in which they exist:
320
 alienation, retaliation and affiliation all help fuel 
sentiments of the progressively radicalised. Inclusion, opportunity and respect are all 
qualities – if available in a society – likely to provide some protections, although no one 
strategy provides absolute guarantees. For these reasons, many national and international 
efforts to combat terrorism recognise both hard and soft approaches are needed.
321
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Many official government statements assert that terrorism, particularly when linked to 
religious beliefs, can be combated through human-rights-based approaches. In January 
2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on states to adopt this approach by 
participating in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
322
 Originally dating from 2006, 
this strategy contains four action areas: addressing the conditions conducive to the spread 
of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building national capacities to manage 
threats, and ensuring human rights form the foundation of activities.
323
 Those measures 
that build resilience, encourage inclusion and support dialogue are integral to a human-
rights context and may occur through direct action (as in human-rights complaint services), 
complementary actions (laws and programs that provide transparency and access to 
restorative justice) or indirect actions (such as a comprehensive multicultural policy).  
Approaches to the threat of terrorism tend to be reactive and linear. The responsible 
agencies want clear answers to problems and for direct causal connections to cut through 
complexity. David Wright-Neville et al. argue this desire, while understandable, is risky. 
They say that the way these measures are delivered may increase sympathy for terrorism as 
a viable option for resolving grievances.
324
 In particular, the legitimacy of law enforcement 
agencies, and governments that grant them counterterrorism powers, run the risk of 
alienating otherwise potentially sympathetic communities; a view shared by Modood, as 
previously noted. Wright-Neville et al. say this approach is also wasteful given the 
likelihood of false positives, or inaccurate reports about people behaving suspiciously, 
because this approach often results in stereotypical individuals being scrutinised while the 
atypical are overlooked. Not only does this amount to poor policing, but labelling and 
implementing draconian laws may have perverse effects; further, such approaches 
undermine the freedoms of all citizens. The sacrifice of personal liberties, in particular for 
people stereotyped as suspect, may be ineffective or counterproductive if: 
they lead to alienation, increased solidarity, and resistance in vulnerable communities … 
[they] are also less likely to be forthcoming with information that might alert authorities 
to terrorist threats ... that human rights can or should be traded in favour of increased 
security may ... amount to a ‗flawed calculus‘.325  
This largely involves balancing competing risks. However, risk is often misrepresented by 
governments and the media for various reasons, such as ignorance or control. Denise Helly 
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warns that a central role of the state is to protect security. Yet, this has become a focus for 
legitimacy, a communication-vector, or a ‗prism for the definition of social reality and state 
intervention‘. She describes this as government by anxiety through systematic production: 
of ‗neurotic‘ citizens who are scared off by the constant talk of health, environmental, 
terrorist, humanitarian and financial risks, as well other dangers (paedophilia, local 
delinquency, urban violence, drugs) by the media, experts, politicians and managers.
326
 
Helly refers to Ulrich Beck‘s notion of the society of risk, meaning not that the world has 
become more dangerous but that it is the ‗new referent for the interpretation of the 
physical, societal and political environment‘.327 This makes those areas where national 
security meets government policy on social inclusion a critical issue. It is an issue at risk of 
becoming synaptic: of inferring there is a point where security management ends and 
human rights start. The models that have been developed show linear pathways to violence 
(see Figure 2.1). With the proviso the authors recognise the complexities informing their 
models, this at least illustrates how simplified explanations may influence policy 
responses, which, in turn, assume certain actions, values and skills fit into clearly defined 
modes of operation. The thinking on how to address the uncertainties associated with 
terrorism, although evolving, is largely reactive and rigid. Complexity elicites the response 
that either doggedness or variations of old methods are the answer. This suggests new 
approaches are required to discourage commitment to acts of terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Trajectory towards becoming a terrorist                                          
Adapted from Wright-Neville et al.
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Violence may be a manifestation of discontent that can be located on a spectrum. In this 
conceptual framework, at one end individuals feel included as respected participants in 
civil society. At the opposite end of the spectrum they may feel socially excluded, 
discriminated against, confined in poverty or similar socio-economic ‗traps‘ and identified 
(or identifying) with marginalised communities. For the more included, individuals are 
generally low risk (but not absolutely, the motivations for violence are seldom simple); at 
the opposite end, what begins with marginalisation can lead to social disconnection and, 
ultimately, retaliation. These individuals are higher risk, although what comprises ‗risk‘ 
cannot be easily determined; for example, somebody may be a risk of harming themselves, 
not others.   
Social inclusion and human-rights measures, delivered through interventions at points 
along the exclusion-to-acceptance spectrum, can help halt or redirect alienation, or reduce 
the likelihood of an escalation to violence. Elsewhere, (Section 3.3) I note that social 
connectedness is a health promotion concept that may assist thinking about ways to 
improve social inclusion. At a population level, holistic health promotion approaches to 
changing behaviours and attitudes can similarly inform counter-radicalisation work. 
Evidence from the health sector shows this methodology improves outcomes; it is a 
rational and verifiable assumption that it will also work for social and security programs.
329
 
Although it is unwise to equate terrorist behaviours with psycho-morbidity (although it 
cannot be entirely excluded), health promotion methodologies offer useful ways to respond 
to multiple forms of exclusion as well as religious persecution. The hypothesis that human-
rights approaches – delivered as a whole-of-community strategy and based on alternative 
models of intervention – are an effective strategy to reduce the risk of community 
marginalisation were tested and evaluated by a suite of national projects.
330
  
As with results garnered in the health sector, security outcomes cannot be achieved 
quickly. They take time, effort, carefully calibrated programs of partnerships, institutional 
and government commitments. Counter-radicalisation programs – which recognise that 
multicultural and multi-faith diversity is an asset, human rights are non-negotiable, and 
capabilities should be addressed as part of broader development goals – reflect a vision of 
how social inclusion and cohesion policies can contribute to public safety. Future 
directions in counter-radicalisation activities could find different but complementary roles 
for both the human-rights and security agencies to play. They may also help reassure the 
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wider community, thus helping to maintain social capital. Similarly, more reflective 
approaches on the part of the media to cultural, religious and social inclusion, could create 
an expanding cycle of dialogue conducive to a civic culture that does not victimise and 
alienate its minorities. As a Chatham House report on the challenges of globalisation 
observes, social harmony relies on respect for religious and cultural diversity, within the 
bounds of the law and human rights. A breakdown of this relationship carries risks, where 
‗schisms are easily exploited and cycles of violence can easily take root‘.331 
COMMENT  
The world is at a precipice. The Climate Institute, CSIRO, World Bank, UN agencies – 
among countless other voices – argue that inaction to substantially lower carbon emissions 
before 2020  mean it will be too late to prevent severe global warming.
332
 Climate change 
is not the only threat, even if it is far-reaching. Population growth, unrestrained growth, 
resource depletion, intercultural and religious conflict, global disequilibria in wealth, 
justice and opportunity are creating a ‗perfect storm‘ of uncertainty. The threats, however, 
are more extensive than those described in this chapter; for example, illicit trafficking of 
radioactive materials, cyber-espionage, and the risk-potential of nanotechnologies. 
Preventative measures associated with such fears occupy considerable efforts at 
intelligence agencies. Although concerning, these can be addressed with linear preventive 
actions and are therefore easier to control. 
The current risk-setting is frustrating. We know what is happening and the measures 
needed to stop disasters of our own making; nevertheless, many people deny the 
precautionary warnings. 
Humans are often selective in their acceptance of science. Many are confident science will, 
for example, cure cancer, expand agricultural yields in increasingly arid soils, suck carbon 
from the atmosphere, or provide evermore applications for personal digital devices: deus ex 
machina, the sciences will transmogrify our lives and save the planet. Although science 
will continue adding to the amenity and extension of life, our faith can be contrary. When 
it makes us well or adds pleasure for those already satiated, science is embraced. When 
science demonstrates we are destroying the conditions under which global civilization was 
established, many dismiss it. This is morbid delusion on an unprecedented scale. Seldom 
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has there been such compelling reason to accept scientific warnings, and there has seldom 
been such angry denial. This is a form of reverse reification: not to think of something 
abstract or imagined as real and tangible, but to think something real or tangible does not 
exist simply because it is undesirable. Given that science is inductive (based on empirical 
knowledge) to reify in reverse is to accept as true only those truths we choose and to 
declare as false those we do not.  
The Global North‘s embrace of enticements and justifications, offered by some in the 
media and politics, helps many people to cavalierly excise facts from a canon of beliefs so 
it contains only ideas its own vanity permits.
333
 Clive Hamilton compares this behaviour to 
the 1950s Sanandan movement. Here, Marian Keech purportedly channelled messages 
from an extraterrestrial being who predicted a global catastrophe after which only believers 
would be saved. Once the anticipated cataclysm failed to arrive, rather than abandoning 
Keech, her followers became more devout. The psychologist Leon Festinger investigated 
this counterintuitive phenomenon and named it ‗cognitive dissonance‘. He explained it as 
the tendency to associate with and only believe information consonant with one‘s existing 
beliefs.
334
 Similar self-deceptions about the health of the biosphere are both endemic and 
dangerous. As Wright observes, drawing on a Margaret Atwood dystopian novel, humans 
doom themselves with false hopes, ‗most of us will take a slim hope over prudent and 
predictable frugality. Hope, like greed, fuels the empire of capitalism‘.335 All will be well 
because we want it to be well in a world of lotus-eaters.  
In the Introduction I briefly described the ethical and normative (UN soft- and hard-law) 
international system; discussed culture as a determinant of individual and collective 
identity and preferences, and how systems, networks and thermodynamics function. I see 
these as a priori and a posteriori facts and, although they may seem irrelevant in the face 
of pressing international concerns, failure to acknowledge these influences means we may 
fail to grasp tangible challenges. This is rather like trying to understand the botany of a tree 
only from what we can see above the ground. Principles of human rights and deep 
democracy offer intellectual and moral anchoring points that may complement other forms 
of anchorage, such as religious faith or science. Together, they can make a world in 
transformation more coherent. They also provide tools that may help construct a 
sustainable, viable future. Persisting influences of culture and faith, greed, tension between 
individual agency and collective coercion, and competing forces of universalism and 
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particularism, account for much of the conflict in the world today. Additionally, rights and 
development frameworks (encompassing capabilities and flourishing) offer strategies to 
build more civil societies. These pieces help form a picture described further in Section 4.3 
and Chapter 5. 
Optimists often claim the challenges facing humanity are surmountable.
336
 However, 
humans must choose to surmount them. This largely relies on governments collectively 
agreeing on what the challenges are, how to address them, and then make good on their 
agreements. Yet, governments everywhere are challenged, not least because they confront 
mercurial and self-interested aspects of human nature. This means there are political 
inducements for governments to renege on commitments to change. Collectively, humans 
have trouble overcoming cognitive dissonances and visualising alternative realities. This is 
a concern given the stakes are vast and speculative.
337
 When problems can no longer be 
ignored it will be too late to avoid crises. Because most systems of governance are so 
complex, atrophied and disempowered – often due to the momentum of globalisation and 
transnational corporatism
338
 – most states are burdened by established practices and 
ideological commitments. This makes it more likely a dark age is ahead
339
 because we will 
fail to do what is needed, adequately, or in time.  
However, despite globalisation, there is a growing trend towards localism. In many ways 
this is positive, especially if the global and local can be balanced. Where there is a 
compulsion to move away from universalism and back to particularism, it is important to 
recall that universal principles and particular ideas do not always conflict. They also sit on 
a spectrum: related, opposite, but not necessarily opposed. The quest to find balance in a 
society is what Mill was first to call the ‗stationary state‘, and others ‗dynamic-
equilibrium‘.  
Having described global risks – what, in the Introduction, I raise as one of the four 
questions of this thesis – Chapter 3 examines aspects of human nature and agency, the 
factors that help build or threaten civil societies, and answer (at least partially) why some 
of these changes are occurring. 
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[3]   A CIVIL SOCIETY? 
It is often just assumed that ‗civil society‘ is a desirable social condition, however, it is 
neither easy to define civil society, nor is it clear what the role of its institutions should be, 
nor its viability given the many pressures it faces. Do we mean global, national, local or 
virtual societies or, collectively, all organisations that do not represent institutions of state 
or capital? What some may regard as civility, others may view differently; on this basis, 
how do we decide what comprises ‗civility‘?1 
Ideas and ideals about society have been the subject of debate for millennia. The first 
systematic analysis of the state in the Western intellectual tradition was by the Greek 
philosopher Plato in the fifth century BC; he described the just society as one where people 
dedicate themselves to the common good and practice virtues of wisdom, courage, 
moderation and justice.
2
 Some of his prescriptions are still valid; others less so. Although 
many classical authors discussed the nature of the state, much of their effort focused on 
governance (particularly constitutional formations) and human agency as civic obligation 
rather than as self-realisation. This clearly reflects the socio-political context, in particular, 
of the Roman imperium: free will and the notion of a social contract were underdeveloped, 
irrelevant, or found only in elite philosophical reflections.
3
 From the Renaissance, the 
literature again flourished, with an interest in how the state is structured and authority 
exercised (e.g. Guicciardini and Machiavelli in Italy and, a century and a half later, Hobbes 
in England); debate continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
absolutist regimes declined, the middle-classes expanded and revolutionary movements 
grew.
4
 However, from the late nineteenth century, there was less interest in the concept of 
civil society because social sciences tended to focus on a two-sector world: the free market 
(particularly liberalism) on one hand, and the state (nationalism and variations of 
totalitarianism) on the other. Indeed, many of the ideological conflicts of the twentieth 
century – such as between communism and Nazism, or Marxism and capitalism – were 
between two systems even though they often overlapped or hybridised. Only in recent 
decades has the idea of a third sector – an additional system to the market and state, 
representing the interests of civil society – been recognised.5 
This period of neglect has not helped develop an understanding of how societies and 
economies interact. The many responses to narrow two-sector thinking – such as 
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cosmopolitanism, cultural democracy or capabilities – illustrate attempts to locate culture, 
human rights and social justice as foundational principles upon which to build more 
inclusive communities. The Centre for Civil Society describes the third sector as the 
domain of ‗uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values‘, with 
institutional forms different from those of the market and government, although with 
boundaries that are often blurred and embracing ‗a diversity of spaces, actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power‘.6 
Third-sector organisations vary in size and activity and include, for example, sporting 
clubs, community associations, chambers of commerce, churches, trade unions, 
professional associations and welfare organisations. Robert Putnam argues that non-
political organisations are vital for democracy because they add to social capital, helping to 
bind connections within society, although their representativeness and the purported 
benefits to democracy have been questioned, especially when civil-society institutions 
attempt to exert political influence.
7
 However, both Putnam and John Ralston Saul argue, 
this critique of civil-society institutions is problematic.
8
 More recently, even some 
conservatives have advocated a revitalisation of community (effectively the third-sector), 
what Phillip Blond and David Cameron call ‗big society‘.9 
In Australia, many components of civil society are far from healthy, despite denials from 
conventional political quarters.
10
 Although the realms of civil-society activism may seem 
(or be criticised as) idealistic, it can be argued these are vital if societies are to remain 
cooperative and resilient; there are strong grounds to claim that the tangible and intangible 
structures that shape societies are essential for human adaptation, even if they occasionally 
precipitate conflicts. This is a ‗fork in the road‘ issue that may divide people on perceived 
biases or belief, for example, that advocacy may smack of eco-socialism, religious bias or 
‗class warfare‘. I submit it will be civil societies – built on foundations of equitable 
governance, accountable institutions, global ethics, cooperative behaviour and mutual 
respect – that will support a sustainable future worth living in, even if often noisy and 
confusing. The alternative – surrendering to collective incivility – will not. Because 
societies are complex adaptive systems, highly integrated, energy and resource dependent, 
those that are rigid and persist with old paradigms will be incapable of change and 
susceptible to violence and fragmentation. They will self-select for failure in potential 
periods of contingency, such as synchronous collapse.
11
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In this chapter, some elements of civil society are examined. This includes how humans 
self-perceive, function, flourish, and relate to each other; how government policies often 
respond to an increasingly complex, unpredictable world; how societies reflect and 
communicate; and how existing frameworks – such as human rights – are essential 
prerequisites for healthy societies. 
3.1 BEING HUMAN 
Humans are an evolved organic life form. Taxonomically, we belong to the kingdom 
Animalia, the phylum Chordata, the class Mammalia, and the order Primate (a 
classification we share with apes). A human body comprises 72% water, 21% protein and 
7% bone minerals. Chemically, this usually constitutes oxygen (61.4%), carbon (22.8%), 
hydrogen (10%), nitrogen (2.6%) and calcium (1.4%), which together account for 
approximately 98.2% of the body‘s composition. The remainder forms a cocktail of trace 
elements, including phosphorous, potassium, sulphur, silicon, magnesium, zinc – even 
mercury and arsenic.
12
 
While this mix may not vary greatly from the chemistry of many other chordates, in some 
ways humans are markedly different to other life forms. Our species combines a highly 
social nature, relatively high intelligence, manual prehension (allowing fine-motor skills) 
and an adaptive flexibility to changing environmental conditions. Within a short geological 
timeframe, these qualities have allowed humans to multiply rapidly and, through our 
mastery of technologies harnessed from various energy sources, to change the architecture 
of our planet‘s ecology, meteorology and geography.13 Although a single species, humans 
are physiologically diverse. The old anthropological differentiations of race are now 
contested, because they have often been used to denote intellectual or other forms of 
inferiority between visibly different groups. Nevertheless, based on ancestry – particularly 
long histories in defined geographical locations – humans illustrate significant range in 
eyes; body hair; skin colour; height; fat- to-body-mass ratio; life expectancy; response to 
consumed food, stimulants and medications; and vulnerability to differing illnesses.
14
 Yet, 
humans are classified as a single species: we successfully reproduce across races, share the 
same genome, and have a common evolutionary history and, therefore, similar behavioural, 
social, cognitive and ethical traits.
15
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For most of our history, humans have functioned as hunter-gatherers in small mobile social 
groups. Early erect hominids, such as Australopithecus, originally came from north-eastern 
Africa. It is now believed modern man, Homo sapiens, separated from a common ancestor 
approximately 200,000 BP (before present) and, from circa 70,000 BP, slowly spread out 
of Africa.
16
 Some regions, such as Australia, were quickly colonised, others more recently, 
with the southern Americas and New Zealand occupied within the last 15,000 years.
17
 In 
some regions, early agrarian settlements began circa 10,000 BP
18
 with large and complex 
urban centres established approximately 5,000 years ago in locations such as Mesopotamia 
and Egypt. Only then were written forms of communication invented, giving us a partial 
record of human activities and individuals we can name, stretching back to approximately 
3,000 BC. This means the norms of human life, as we commonly know it, represent only a 
fraction of our history. Because of our relative longevity, humans have been shaped more 
by culture than by physiological evolution over this time, and our intelligence has not kept 
pace with increasing technological sophistication.
19
 
If we consider recent events in human development (the last 6,000 years) as the percentage 
of time when we were human, and a tiny proportion of us lived in a recognisably settled 
community with some social and technical specialisation, this represents approximately 3% 
of our species‘ history. For the remaining 97%, Homo sapiens were nomadic foragers 
living in extended family groups, with no technology, limited communication skills, 
vulnerable to the exigencies of climate, disease and predation, and a life expectancy 
seldom exceeding 30 years.
20
 Our current world civilization represents an even smaller 
proportion of our history. Only since the beginning of the twenty-first century, have more 
humans lived in cities than on the land.
21
 Industry, as a carbon-powered process of mass 
production, has existed for scarcely two centuries. Electrical power for domestic use has 
been available for little more than a century, and only among the most privileged groups in 
the most technologically advanced nations. The efficient removal of sewage and supply of 
water (again in the most developed cities) has been available only since the late nineteenth 
century.
22
 Efficient, large-scale, global distribution networks are a postwar invention.
23
 
Personal computers became available to wealthy people in wealthy countries in the 1980s. 
Modern medical care (e.g. antibiotics, mass immunisations and blood transfusions) was 
introduced during the lifetime of many elderly people who are still living. In short, this era 
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of technological and scientific progress – if measured as spanning little more than 150 
years – represents only 0.075% of human history.24 
Despite this, due to rapid population growth, many more people have experienced 
modernity than have not. Basic advances in material conditions in the developed world – 
clean water, adequate nutrition and shelter, efficient removal of human and animal faeces, 
and primary care – have driven the quality and longevity of life in an unprecedented way: 
‗civilization does not run deep in time, but it runs wide‘.25 Apart from a number of notable 
exceptions, most people can now expect to live in comparatively good health into their 70s 
and, frequently, much longer. Progress against MDGs has done much to extend these 
benefits to the Global South, although, as discussed in the previous chapter, the gains are 
relatively meagre and come with costs. 
These observations merely begin to explain what it is to be human. What happened during 
the pre-modern 97% of our history? How were we shaped over 190,000 years, from the 
emergence of Homo sapiens to the formation of early agrarian settlements, and how – over 
this expanse of almost 10,000 generations – have human ethics, faith, language, culture, 
diet, socialisation and behaviour become genetically encoded and established? Today, as 
we try to envisage a sustainable future within the planet‘s biosphere, a failure to recognise 
who and what humans are means we will fail to acknowledge our collective weaknesses 
and the means to manage change. 
In an extensive review of scientific literature, Nicholas Wade collected evidence on what 
he calls ‗the faith instinct‘.26 Wade particularly notes the apparent interdependence and 
concurrence in the development of language, music, dance and religion. Indeed, language – 
that most distinct of culture markers – is almost certainly to have been the last of these 
human inventions. Musical expressions and a shared sense of belief probably predate the 
human ability to express abstract thought in dialogue. It would appear that music and dance 
– fundamental cultural expressions – meet innate emotional needs, including to bond with 
one‘s social group or clan. Solidarity helps guarantee survival, with accepted practices and 
understandings about what is ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘ within the social group also forming part 
of an axiological foundation that could be regarded as being essentially religious. This 
understanding of human social evolution helps to explain the co-dependency of religion 
and culture. This co-dependency provided the scope for individual creativity (the origins of 
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‗the arts‘), the transmission of religious and cultural knowledge, the relationship between 
human survival and the natural ecology, and the sine qua non of creativity and culture to 
human identity and communal survival. 
Drawing on anthropological data about remnant ancient social groupings, Wade describes 
how humans have functioned as collectives and pre-morals, evident in some primates, 
eventually grew into complex ethical systems. As this occurred, rituals based on cultural 
practices and beliefs helped strengthen group cohesion. Although elaborate ritualised 
behaviour comes with enormous opportunity costs in effort and time (which could be spent 
gathering food, for example), it bestows significant natural-selection advantages to a 
group. Within the pre-modern community, the intensity of internal bonding and support 
was matched only by an antagonism towards external (competing) communities. Such 
dichotomous behaviour reflects the necessities of survival: when living in an uncertain and 
violent world, the stronger a group‘s bonding, the greater the likelihood it would 
collectively survive.
27
 This offers an insight into the evolution of religion; it also explains 
why humans are tribal. As a species, we instinctively wish to belong to one or more groups 
– Brewer‘s notion of optimal distinctiveness28 – helping to reinforce and shape individual 
identity and give meaning to peoples‘ lives. For participants in communal activities, 
bonding has benefits, including health benefits. In its extreme forms, however, the need for 
belonging can become toxic. It can be expressed, for example, through crimes of race-hate, 
terrorism or mob violence. This explains, from an evidence-based anthropological 
perspective, why humans are capable of enormous self-sacrifice, collective action and 
compassion, as well as cruelty and selfishness.
29
 Our long evolutionary history has hard-
wired us with these instinctive behaviours, as Ronald Wright observes: 
we are at best the heirs of many ruthless victories and at worst of genocide. We may well 
be descended from humans who repeatedly exterminated rival humans – culminating in 
the suspicious death of our Neanderthal cousins some 30,000 years ago.
30
 
Moving inside the structure of the pre-modern community provides further insight into 
humanness, helping to account for individual (rather than group) behaviours. Geoffrey 
Miller, an evolutionary psychologist, explains this primarily in terms of establishing 
reproductive opportunities. He argues that most behaviour represents forms of trait-display 
to competitor-peers for power or pairing. His interest is to understand the drivers of 
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contemporary narcissistic consumption, which has its own (evolutionary) logic but not 
necessarily (economic) rationality. He argues that each decision we take to consume – 
whether food, clothes, education, media or leisure – is driven by instinctive needs to 
display and act as a form of marker, broadcasting direct or indirect messages to 
demonstrate belonging or to attract, reject, impress or dominate others.
31
 The extent to 
which, and how, humans manifest trait-display choices are determined by personality. 
Miller‘s definition of personality is drawn from behavioural psychology, which identifies 
only six general characteristics, or universal qualities, that transcend culture, time, age, 
gender and other variables. Because these attributes can manifest themselves in differing 
patterns and in varying degree across individuals, this model actually includes 171 
differing personality-types. Along with general intelligence, the five primary dimensions of 
personality are agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and stability (or 
emotional neuroticism). 
How humans are statistically spread across each of these characteristics can be plotted on a 
bell curve (see Figure 3.1). Using intelligence as an example: numerically, most 
individuals will fall in the middle of a spectrum from low to high intelligence quotas (IQ) 
with equally small numbers at each end. If the average level of intelligence is 100, an 
approximately equal number of humans will fall within the lowest IQ percentile as within 
the highest. Similarly, most humans will be of average agreeableness, with the bottom 1% 
containing an equal number of (extremely disagreeable) people as the top 1% (the 
exceptionally agreeable). This pattern repeats for the remaining four personality 
characteristics. Although personality qualities may be inherited, the big five dimensions are 
also environmentally determined.
32
 In the same way that understanding innate human 
group behaviours helps to interpret a range of community perceptions and attitudes, 
knowledge of the types and distribution of individual behaviours is useful for 
understanding the drivers of personal choices. 
In the way that humans have an inescapable social and behavioural legacy, shaped by 
evolutionary history, they also have a dietary legacy. Hunter-gatherer diets share broad 
similarities across the world and primarily consist of high-fibre fruit, nuts and tubers, 
occasionally supplemented by animal protein eaten raw or cooked.
33
 Meat, like seasonal 
nuts, is nutritionally dense and may be high in fat, making it a valuable source of energy. 
Sweet foods, such as honey or ripe fruit, are relatively scarce in the natural world and are 
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prized for taste, enjoyment and as an energy source. Generally, humans have instinctive 
cravings, and feel a sense of satiation when they consume meat, fatty salty and sweet rich 
foods.
34
 Of course, hunter-gatherers spend a considerable amount of time and exert much 
effort collecting their food. This maintains high levels of physical fitness and low levels of 
body fat in a way now rare for most people. Although evolutionarily determined optimal 
food varieties still comprise part of our diets, humans supplement their nutritional intake in 
many ways. Most foodstuffs now commonly consumed were rarely or never eaten by 
Homo sapiens before the agrarian revolution. Although wholemeal grains typically provide 
healthy additions to diet, they can be harmful to some people by causing a range of gastric 
complaints. However, processed grains, especially those genetically modified (for 
example, to boost gluten content) offer limited health benefits. When low-fibre, high-
carbohydrate foods are combined with humans‘ innate consumption preferences, the results 
can be detrimental, especially when they comprise a large percentage of diet. These goods, 
which dominate contemporary food production and distribution – deliberately fortified 
with trans-fats, corn syrup, sodium, other preservatives and chemical flavour enhancers – 
are escalating obesity rates across the world.
35
 Global food distribution and fast food 
chains capitalise on our taste vulnerabilities and, increasingly, produce unsustainably vast 
quantities of toxic foodstuffs, enhanced to improve shelf life, texture and taste appeal, 
cheap to purchase (in the short term), and detrimental to health when overconsumed.
36
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Bell curve illustrating the distribution of human personality traits. 
These can be applied to each of the qualities of intelligence, stability, 
agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness and extraversion. 
Given contemporary lifestyles, this form of processed food is perfectly designed and 
cleverly marketed to guarantee high levels of consumption. In a free society with a 
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demand-driven economy, the purchase of such commodities is a matter of individual 
choice. Unfortunately, at the population level, these choices have costs. Modified, 
commodified and overabundant foods that exploit inherent taste preferences, and are 
consumed in tandem with sedentary lifestyles, are pincer movements against human health 
and well-being.
37
 They represent a package of factors that are directly escalating chronic 
disease in developed countries such as Australia, where, as in many other parts of the 
world, knowledge about nutrition and the availability and affordability of healthy food is a 
matter of equity, reflecting broader socio-economic segmentation.
38
 Indeed, in this context, 
it is legitimate to ask whether, based on information and income, consumers do have 
genuine free choices. As Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot observe, ‗because global 
market forces control the food supply, healthy food is a political issue‘.39 There are also 
justice and environmental concerns when corporations, driven by market forces, use 
competition knowledge and promotional advantages to exploit the poor in both developed 
and developing nations.
40
 The price of a fast-food hamburger is an example where, 
factoring in all the negative externalities (such as soil and water degradation, deforestation, 
pesticide contamination, greenhouse gas emissions, employee exploitation and public 
health costs) a US$5 Happy Meal costs, in real terms, more than US$200: an unhappy 
price that will need to be paid in full at some future time.
41
 As Patel argues in his study of 
industrial-scale agriculture, with its global supply chains and marketing controlled by the 
corporate food oligopoly: in the interests of profit, it makes people sick, destroys the 
environment, gouges producers and assaults civil liberties. Agreeing with Wilkinson and 
Marmot on the food system‘s political dimensions, Patel says that calls for food 
sovereignty are also calls to action over the ‗poverty caused by the food system at both 
ends, rural and urban, in poor neighbourhoods across the planet. For what happens in the 
fields and in the cities is intimately connected and is ... part of the same problem‘.42 
Among the solutions proposed is greater community ownership and community production 
of food. The ‗greening‘ of urban landscapes is not only about health; self-determination 
and contesting corporate systems of production are also about long-term environmental 
sustainability and food security. 
For those holding religious beliefs, the mind–body divide is also a distinctive human 
quality. While there are known and measurable links between spiritual or religious beliefs 
and human psychological and somatic (physical) conditions, this is different from asserting 
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that being human is to have an immortal soul.
43
 Atheists believe this is a matter of 
unverifiable opinion, and should not be regarded as a defining aspect of humanity. 
However, what is distinctive are near-universal beliefs about such matters,
44
 which, as 
already noted, are culturally based and critical to issues of rights, agency, determination 
and peace-building. Therefore, humans can also be defined on ethical grounds. Ethics has 
been a domain of philosophical enquiry and religious teaching for millennia. More often 
than not, there are disagreements about what it is to be human, the nature of the social 
contract, proper conduct, free will, the afterlife, existence, matter, divinity and infinity. 
Although much is disputed, there is frequently agreement, with religions sharing many 
ethical principles. This is the subject of continuing interreligious and interdisciplinary 
dialogues, across faiths and cultures, exploring notions such as global ethics, 
interdenominationalism and cosmopolitanism. No universal morality is accepted: the 
closest agreement to a human-centred value system is that of human rights. 
The particular points I wish to reiterate are the importance of culture and belonging as 
shapers of identity – to be human is to be cultural and social – and, other than behaving 
collectively, equally important is the lived environment. Associations between the physical 
world, individual capabilities, functionings and cultural constructions, are all necessary 
ingredients of being human. 
3.2 BEING FREE 
There is a wistful or perhaps resentful saying: youth is wasted on the young. As with such 
platitudes, it contains an element of truth. Equally, it might be argued, freedom is wasted 
on the free. Freedoms – such as those of assembly, speech and expression – are often taken 
for granted in liberal democracies and, because most people believe they are free, consider 
they know what freedom is without thinking much about it. However, freedom has 
meanings seldom considered by those who live in ‗free‘ societies. Two centuries ago, 
Arthur Schopenhauer reflected on the false assumption that, at any moment, a person can 
commence another manner of life. Yet, people are often astonished to discover they are 
‗not free, but subjected to necessity‘ and from the beginning to the end of life ‗must carry 
out the very character which he himself condemns‘.45 
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Although the philosophical and legal complexities of freedom are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, a brief examination of freedom helps contextualise some of the issues discussed in 
this and other chapters. Debates about freedom are often framed by theories associated 
with the interdisciplinary studies of political psychology and sociology, which question 
how people develop and why they behave as they do. The following remarks are based on 
the premise that humans have an individual consciousness and collective awareness; they 
are informed by several fields of philosophy including utilitarianism and liberalism. 
Freedom is usually understood narrowly and politically (in which case ‗liberty‘ may be a 
more apposite term) and means the ability to do as one wishes, to be without external 
restraints or coercion.
46
 Because restraints are seldom considered until experienced, people 
tend to take freedom for granted. For example, we are unlikely to appreciate an ability to 
walk with comfort until our mobility is limited by a sprained ankle (a minor restriction) or 
by severed nerves in the vertebrae leading to quadriplegia (a severe restriction on the 
freedom of mobility). Similarly, minor restrictions on freedom of speech, such as 
limitations on the right to vilify on the basis of race, may antagonise those who resent the 
physiognomy of other members of society. In different settings, restrictions on freedoms of 
speech can be severe, as in authoritarian states where people may face lengthy and punitive 
jail sentences or cruel forms of incarceration for criticising the regime, even privately. 
These examples illustrate how forms of outward restraint may differ in degree. The greater 
the restraint, the more that freedom is limited and (probably), the greater the effect on those 
experiencing it. Humans are social and the manner in which their relationships are 
established and maintained are culturally symbiotic. In other words, the diversity of ways 
that people negotiate social relationships over time will reflect – but also iteratively shape 
– culture. This allows communities to balance their needs for self-preservation and self-
fulfilment with the requirements of social order and desire to achieve two forms of liberty. 
The first is liberation from negative factors: such things as hunger, fear, disease and 
oppression. The second liberty is enjoyment of positive freedoms such as potential, 
personal or group well-being, good health, education and cultural participation. Both forms 
of liberty, and the social contexts needed to sustain them, are included in the UDHR and 
related covenants; they reflect notions of positive and negative rights described in the 
Introduction. 
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In addition to what is commonly understood as freedom, there is another form: the state of 
individual autonomy that allows for the exercising of free will. Although influenced by 
external circumstances, this has been described as ‗inner freedom‘. For centuries, the issue 
of free will has exercised the minds of philosophers (who questioned the boundaries of 
individual responsibility and choice) and theologians (who questioned the level of choice 
humans truly have, given an omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent God). Many have 
debated whether free will exists at all.
47
 The argument that free will is impossible 
(determinism) centres on the belief that a combination of past events, current 
circumstances and the laws of nature will determine everything that occurs in the future. 
Known as ‗incompatibilism‘ (because free will and determinism are incompatible), this 
scepticism has pre-Socratic ancestry and recent defenders. For instance, it was a strong 
influence among the Puritan founders of America and shaped many of the corporatist 
attitudes that subsequently developed.
48
 Indeed, because the predeterminism of Calvinism 
was accompanied by a belief in human depravity, it complemented the dehumanising 
premises of neoliberalism, especially the view that – because humans are driven by self-
interest and their fate is preordained – the impoverished live miserably because it is their 
necessary condition.
49
 Determinism‘s gloomy outlook has been hotly denied by those who 
hold compatibilist opinions.
50
 Korten, for example, criticises the exclusivist attitudes of 
Calvinism and neoliberalism, which combine righteousness with wealth and power, this: 
provides a foundation for an easy alliance between contemporary religious theocrats and 
contemporary corporate plutocrats. The theocrats affirm the moral righteousness of the 
plutocrats, and the plutocrats provide media and funding support for politicians 
committed to the theocrats‘ restrictive social agenda. 51 
While agreeing there are deterministic pressures shaping and impeding free will, I believe 
absolute determinism is either unprovable or so finely calibrated as to be inconsequential; 
nor can it account for chaos and randomness. To be ideologically deterministic is 
synonymous with authoritarianism. The capacity to exercise free will, and to have personal 
agency, should be an essential human quality. Anything less is to diminish what it is to be 
human. This is not a rigorous, philosophically defensible argument, rather an expedient and 
(admittedly imperfect) foundation upon which to defend the future of civil society. 
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The common belief – that we exercise free will – is essential to individuality and identity. 
However, free will is challenged because it cannot be decoupled from external influences 
(such as culture, social pressures and historical context) and it may be surrendered 
willingly. This makes free will a paradox. Freedom is most likely perceived to exist when 
exercised in concert with other humans and in a community, even a virtual community, 
because participation provides belonging and helps shape the experiences behind 
constructions of personal and group identities. Modern societies are interdependent; to 
survive, members rely on larger systems.
52
 This has the effect, ironically, of increasing 
insecurity (at both individual and group levels) resulting from reduced autonomy and 
choices, despite an illusion of excessive choice. If a group member privately holds 
dissenting opinions, they will feel the pressure of social conformity compelling them to 
think and behave publicly in conforming ways. Globalisation, monolithic government, 
fears about terrorism, poverty or climate change – these are examples of external threats 
that put pressure on individuals and groups, who share interests or identities, to understand 
and negotiate what seems a hostile world. If they feel oppressed or marginalised within a 
larger society, their dislocation may become acute. Alternatively, such threats may 
encourage social or cultural surrender to a dominant norm. The experience of an 
overwhelming sense of external threat can lead people to fear freedom and seek forms of 
safety that work against their self-interests, especially their outer, political freedoms, even 
if at an unconscious level.
53
 
Erich Fromm explored these ideas in The Fear of Freedom. Writing during the Second 
World War, Fromm was concerned that similar conditions existed in America (where he 
had sought sanctuary), as those that had allowed Fascism to flourish in Europe, notably the 
insignificance and powerlessness of the individual. He challenged the conventional belief 
that, by freeing people from external restraints and forms of authority, democracy supports 
a true form of individualism.
54
 Because citizens in a democracy have the freedom to 
express thoughts and feelings, it was assumed individuality was almost automatically 
guaranteed. However, Fromm argued that the freedom to express thoughts means 
something only ‗if we are able to have thoughts of our own; freedom from external 
authority is a lasting goal only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are 
able to establish our own individuality.‘55 
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Seventy years after they were written, Fromm‘s observations have continuing prescience. 
As Gleeson has observed about his legacy, Fromm anticipated the destructive power of 
unfettered neoliberalism to erase human liberty.
56
 Although infrequently quoted, many 
contemporary authors echo Fromm‘s concerns. For example, the body of literature on 
‗affluenza‘;57 Reich‘s study on the supercapitalism that has transformed business and 
democracy;
58
 Berman‘s warning that state-sponsored terrorism often has liberal roots;59 
and John Kampfner‘s documentation of the way civil liberties have been eroded on the 
pretext of improving security and prosperity.
60
 
Although people who experience material fulfilment without constraint enjoy a form of 
liberty, this refers to outer freedom. The individual who enjoys human rights and who can 
exercise both outer and inner freedom is likely to be the most free. This privilege, however, 
is infrequently experienced due to the pervasive influence of culture. If the explanation 
provided in Section 1.2.2 is held to be true – that culture is collectively formed over time, 
mirroring, shaping and enforcing community and social relationships – then it is one of the 
most potent forces affecting individual behaviour, knowledge and thoughts. This means, 
ironically, that the right to culture is contradicted by the way culture impedes inner 
freedom: an individual may make decisions (as an internalised process of exercising free 
will and choice) but these are inevitably informed by external, lived experiences embedded 
in cultural context. To expect somebody to shed their cultural identity, to be ‗assimilated‘, 
or willingly (or without harm) disassociate themselves from their cultural roots is both a 
human-rights issue and an impossible expectation, intruding on inner freedom and cultural 
liberty. 
Cultural background shapes what we will, or can, see and be. It provides us with language 
to express feelings, wants, and to negotiate relations with other people. However, 
languages are partial. They enable and disable expression by being selectively articulate. 
Each language has its own way of interpreting and explaining reality: words for 
expressions or ideas that exist in one language often do not appear in another. When a 
language dies a variation in the diversity of understanding, and, therefore, of human being 
and doing, also dies.
61
 As Orwell graphically portrayed in his dystopian novel, 1984, 
language is meaning, simultaneously empowering and disempowering cognition, shaping 
consciousness and the interpretation of reality. Most people function from the emic 
perspective most of the time and use language without realising that how and what they 
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are, hear, feel, think, judge, interpret and desire are shaped by language.
62
 Nor do they 
recognise its evolutionary significance. Languages emerged as humans evolved morally, 
religiously, culturally and socially. These aspects of identity are intertwined, providing 
natural selection advantages to groups.
63
 Language, coupled with our social nature, is 
fundamental to human survival and collective success. However, given the conformity 
language imposes, this has contrary and negative effects on freedom, individuality and 
identity. 
Global trends associated with consumption, market economics and its effects on equity 
were anticipated in the nineteenth-century Marxist literature. They continued in Fromm‘s 
critique that unconstrained capitalism compounds individual alienation, and they persist as 
a truism of contemporary multidisciplinary analyses, even among those with free-market 
sympathies.
64
 Within this broad criticism are claims that excessive consumer cultures rob, 
or obscure, inner freedom. Egregious consumption also reflects and feeds upon innate 
human traits in pernicious ways. Consumerism can separate individuals from their 
community and culture under the guise of greater choice (or freedoms from, and to, things) 
even if, ultimately, this encourages greater insecurity and alienation. Consumerism, as an 
aspect of cultural life, offers a panacea or escape from anxieties in those societies 
overloaded with direct and embedded messages. Geoffrey Miller argues that visible and 
tangible trait-display is the underlying cause of consumption: people consume to attract 
mates, to position themselves in a social hierarchy and to signal they belong to (and 
perhaps dominate) a group. This means humans typically seek to acquire culturally iconic 
goods, even when they recognise such consumption is excessive, comes with high 
opportunity costs, or that a consumable is elastic (it may be easily and more cheaply 
replaced with another or a replica).
65
 Consumption is a species-trait with deep conscious 
and unconscious determinants. It is rational – grounded in the instinct to pair with mates 
with optimal fitness characteristics – yet irrational: the belief it works, one would want it to 
work, and (if it did work) that it would bestow meaningful benefits beyond a narrow 
coupling opportunity.
66
 
Evolutionary psychology may provide a scientific explanation for narcissistic 
consumption, but there is a long tradition of moral philosophy that has taken a similar 
approach, questioning the purpose of running on a ‗hedonic-treadmill‘.67 In his 1776 
treatise, Adam Smith recognises that pursuit of material goods is, in effect, trait-displaying 
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when he observes for most wealthy people, ‗the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the 
parade of riches, which in their eye is never so complete as when they appear to possess 
those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves‘.68 Similarly, 
in 1848 Mill inquired why it is a matter of congratulation that ‗persons who are already 
richer than anyone needs to be, should have doubled their means of consuming things 
which give little or no pleasure except as representative of wealth‘.69 
Fromm considered that excessive consumption indicates lack of originality in thinking, 
feeling and willing. Recognising this, however, is difficult for people who are embedded in 
the daily complexities of living and, because they have so many desires, their main 
problem is they cannot all be met. Fromm observed that most human energy is spent trying 
to obtain what is wanted, even though few question whether they know, or their pursuits 
are consistent with, their true wants. This is disturbing, because it questions the basis of 
most activity. People typically dismiss it, yet: 
all this bespeaks a dim realization of the truth … that modern man lives under the illusion 
that he knows what he wants, while he actually wants what he is supposed to want. In 
order to accept this it is necessary to realize that to know what one really wants is not 
comparatively easy … but one of the most difficult problems any human being has to 
solve. It is a task we frantically try to avoid by accepting ready-made goals as though they 
were our own.
70
 
Some of Fromm‘s views may have been drawn from Rudolf Steiner who believed there are 
two forms of freedom: thoughts and actions. Steiner held that inner freedom is achieved 
when the gap between perception (the external world) and the inner world is bridged; ‗true‘ 
freedom is only possible when this occurs. The extent to which the individual is able to 
separate from (generic) wider social and cultural pressures determines whether they can 
‗count as a free spirit within a human community‘.71 Steiner distinguishes between inner 
and outer worlds, arguing that humans are formed by both. Where a person is unable to 
achieve freedom for themselves, they comprise part of the wider social ‗organism‘ but 
where conduct springs from ‗individual ethical intuitions‘ this contributes to the process of 
developing moral activity, thus ‗the moral life of mankind is the sum total of the products 
of the moral imagination of free human individuals‘.72 
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Atypical groups or individuals often feel they face a barrier of conformity that leaves them 
excluded, demands they surrender their identity, or expects they repress intuitive, personal 
characteristics. These pressures are not new; they were described by Mill (again) as the 
way society issues its own mandates (proscriptive sociocultural norms) that impose: 
a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression … Protection ... 
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the 
tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by 
other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those 
who dissent from them … and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the 
model of its own.
73
 
Like other collective behaviours and cultural influences, consumerism encourages 
compliance with social norms. Consumption provides psychical gratification (helping 
people feel good about themselves: successful, beautiful, competent), physical gratification 
(offering sensory comforts) and social signalling (trait-displaying desirable 
characteristics).
74
 However, because consumption is linked to conformity, and conformity 
helps maintain economic efficiency and activity, mass-media marketing benefits from and, 
therefore, helps promote, conformist images of success. As argued by Clive Hamilton, 
personal (particularly inner) freedom is manipulated by powerful external forces, 
especially those of consumer capitalism. Sharing Fromm‘s approach to human desire, he 
agrees that many people have difficulty knowing who they are and how they can advance 
their interests. Rich countries generally focus on the promotion of economic (and to a 
lesser extent political) rights, while poorly protect forms of inner freedom essential for 
people to live to true human purpose.
75
 Because there are few impediments to fulfilling 
most material desires or capabilities, Hamilton says the issue is not whether people have an 
ability to flourish but whether they choose to do so. He asks, ‗will free citizens choose to 
imagine, think and reason in a ―truly human‖ way or are they conditioned or predisposed to 
pursue a stream of pleasurable episodes and never fulfil their capabilities and thus their 
potential as humans?‘76 
Hamilton‘s question is prompted by his concern that, since the early 1980s, neoliberal 
policies have been responsible for the atrophy of individuality, because ‗consumer 
capitalism encourages anodyne conformity and one-dimensionality, and an intolerance of 
those who wish to break out of the expressions of individuality manufactured by the 
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market‘.77 This form of capitalism is characterised by a created society, distinctive in its 
encouragement of impulsive greed, moral and intellectual weakness, the very purpose of 
which is to ‗make us the slaves of our passions … [and where] happiness is to be had 
through a series of instant pleasures‘.78 Hamilton is concerned that consumption has 
evolved into a cultural trait in developed economies, with many social and political 
consequences, including a rejection of nonconformity. Because cultural diversity is the 
most overt form of human difference, this helps explain some iterations of racism and 
cultural determinism. Such social exclusion may lead to other forms of rejection, for 
example, of people with a disability or atypical sexuality. 
Not only does consumption increase conformity in consumer-based societies but, says Sen, 
consumerism also transcends immediate social and cultural settings, making cultural 
liberty important in political and economic spheres.
79
 Even the idea of poverty cannot be 
fully understood without considering its cultural dimensions and people in the Global 
South face different, albeit equally acute, challenges retaining free will and identity. This is 
due to imported modes of consumerism continually undermining local cultural 
distinctiveness. Sen says choosing a lifestyle is not simply a matter of choice, but of 
whether people from precarious cultures are able to resist the ‗thunderous exposure to 
Western influences‘.80  
While consumerism has inspired a recent body of critical literature, the concern is not new. 
Writing in the late 1950s, Vance Packard cited research indicating there is no proof 
‗material goods such as more cars or more gadgets has made anyone happier – in fact the 
evidence seems to point in the opposite direction‘.81 He also quotes a contemporary who 
claims economic depressions are not all bad because they produce ‗a climate in many 
respects more productive than prosperity – more interesting, more lively, more thoughtful, 
and even, in a wry sort of way, more fun‘.82 Packard observes, with some foresight, that the 
‗larger moral problem of working out a spiritually tolerable relationship between a free 
people and an economy capable of greater and greater productivity may take decades to 
resolve‘.83 More than 50 years later, the ethical conundrums are still debated, although 
ecological and resource constraints may resolve the philosophical problems simply by 
ending the behaviour. 
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However, there are additional harms associated with overconsumption. The more injustice 
and exploitation in the world, the more insecure it becomes. The more insecure, the more 
fearful people become, and the more they escape into materialism or the shallow lures of 
fundamentalisms. Thus, they progressively lose capacity for inner freedom, rational 
thought and free will. This may encourage further consumption, leading to more 
exploitative production and fuelling the injustices that caused problems originally. The 
destructive cycle is perpetual, exponentially benefiting corporatist interests while 
shepherding evermore people towards the certainties of authoritarian or simplistic answers. 
This obscures the possibility of understanding the relationships between freedoms and 
security, rights and responsibilities, wants and needs.
84
 Kampfner claims citizens have 
incrementally relinquished their liberties in a largely unconscious pact – iteratively forged 
over the years by increasingly complicit and kleptocratic governments – who offer wealth 
(as if this is the sole goal of life) only by sacrificing freedom.
85
 
Even if these losses were acknowledged as poor secondary effects by neoliberal defenders, 
they would counter with the claim that unrestrained economic freedoms are a necessary 
condition for political liberties to flourish.
86
 However, radical liberalism functions in the 
opposite way. Money buys freedoms and to be impoverished in an economically liberal 
society is to have few freedoms. Indeed, the more wealth-creation is privileged as the 
prime agency of social transformation, the more societies become stratified and unjust.
87
 In 
addition, if it is accepted that affluence and liberty are positively associated, it should be 
recognised they are also negatively associated. This means extreme and simplistic 
approaches have extreme effects, and complex diverse nations must rely on hybrid poly-
ideological and flexible methodologies as the basis of preserving civil society. 
All freedom has a context. This includes the cultural setting that defines what personal 
liberty means and may be used, its axiological interpretation, and any limitations on 
freedom deemed essential for the health, well-being, and credibility of the person and the 
group to which they belong. Weighing up the demands of single or collective needs vary. 
Plural societies – especially multiracial, multifaith and multiethnic societies – are 
challenged to find ways of including groups different from the mainstream. Freedom, 
because it is enacted in some form of collective setting, is never absolute but hedged by 
obligations and prohibitions imposed for an (assumed) public good. Extreme individualism 
may represent a form of avoidance of socio-cultural reality: humans are not alone and 
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against each other, as represented in the conservative English tradition and voiced by 
Margaret Thatcher when she claimed there is no such thing as society.
88
 Rather, we all 
belong to a group (or groups) shaping, enabling and making demands. 
Therefore, it could be argued, societies that follow the multicultural path are not only freer 
but may also be safer. The homogenising tendencies of groups marginalise differences, if 
for no other reason than to protect members from engaging with inner freedoms – which 
demand intellectual and moral effort. Homogenisation also reinforces power relations; an 
example of this has been described as a form of (racial) social contract where skin colour 
indicates and determines status.
89
 Nevertheless, the pulls within society and individual 
consciousness are broadly dichotomous: one direction is towards universalism (conformity 
and belonging), the other towards personal preferences and the particular. Inevitably, 
diversity will be present in all societies. It will occur in monocultures (e.g. due to 
personality or congenital differences) but will be prolific in plural societies. The more 
monocultural a society, the more will outsiders appear as alien and threatening to the ‗in‘ 
group. This has two effects. It encourages persecution of the excluded (purposefully) and 
of the innocent (collaterally). When a society pathologises its fears of difference – such as 
Nazi paranoia about Jewish blood contaminating the Aryan race or McCarthyist 
investigation of accused socialist sympathisers – the innocent will be among the victims. 
Indeed, the slightest suggestion of dissent may result in bystanders being caught in a 
dragnet of conformity policing. Attempts by state authorities to enforce sameness will 
inevitably create frictions since absolute uniformity is an impossible goal – although other 
forms of conformity are achieved, with increasing success, by more covert methods, such 
as through the marketplace. Protecting cultural liberty helps counter some of these trends 
(or at least offer protections) by helping some people to express their identity. Inner 
freedom is difficult to achieve without a setting where civil liberties and democracy set the 
outer context of community relations, and legislative protections shield individual 
differences. 
It is not only possible, but common, for people to have most of their human rights realised, 
but not to be fully free.
90
 Because dysfunctional social processes (such as 
overconsumption) prevent a conjoint realisation of freedom and human rights, this may 
account for forms of psychological dissonance among those confused about their available 
choices, their freedoms and rights, or the expectations placed upon them. This may 
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manifest in several ways, from suicidal ideation and self-harm to obsessive behaviours.
91
 
Von Bertalanffy‘s attempt, in the 1960s, to develop a general theory of systems led him to 
observe that the social structures of ‗the affluent societies‘‘ expanding economy could only 
be sustained because of commercial, political, advertising and other forms of propaganda. 
This turned citizens into ‗automata, homeostaticlly [sic] adjusted conformers and 
opportunists‘.92 He believed this was a necessary step to engineer society to the financial 
system‘s goal of increasing production, the consequences of which have been 
unprecedented increases in psychiatric morbidity. Despite changes in material 
circumstances, ‗novel forms of mental disorders appeared as existential neurosis, 
malignant boredom … forms of mental dysfunction originating not from repressed drives, 
from unfulfilled needs, or from stress, but from meaningless of life‘.93 
This concern has been more recently expressed by Hamilton and Denniss who report on 
the failure of wealth to purchase happiness or prevent an epidemic of depression and 
suicide in Australia, and by nef who aim to demonstrate that wealth is not a gauge of gross 
national happiness.
94
 Psychiatric morbidities are likely to occur when individual will is at 
(especially hidden) variance with group demands and, increasingly, in settings where the 
expectations of society are less consistent, and there are more options for whom to refer for 
a sense of righteousness or direction. A challenge for plural societies – given atrophying 
democratic institutions and civic disengagement – is to make space for numerous groups 
and dissenting voices, to shield each from the demands of others, to determine points of 
consensus about standards of conduct, and to find ways for each to contribute to the whole 
while maintaining civility and principles of natural justice and egalitarianism. 
These issues relate to freedoms of speech and action, which also happen to be interests of 
strident libertarians who (selectively) decry ‗the nanny state‘. Attacks on so-called nanny 
statism typically rely on the argument that governments should not impose real or 
imagined barriers around choice. Superficially, this may seem reasonable. On examination, 
however, questions arise. One concern is the principle that rights are accompanied by 
responsibilities and, whenever a person chooses a course of action, it comes with 
consequences. For instance, they may choose to eat healthily, exercise and seek medical 
advice if required, or they may make other choices, such as to use licit and illicit drugs, 
overeat or lead a sedentary lifestyle. While choices should be made freely, one moral issue 
is who is responsible for the consequences, and how. Internationally, public health 
   149 | Page  
 
infrastructure is buckling under the population-level burden of non-communicable illness, 
or normally preventable illnesses that are the outcome of choice.
95
 This means, 
collectively, poor decision-making represents a vast negative externality where ill-
informed or wilful lifestyle choices have an effect on public health: it transfers the costs 
from the primary agent to everybody else. Further, other consumption choices have wider 
consequences. The libertarian argument holds that the user should pay, and individuals 
must be responsible for their actions. This leaves governments in an awkward position. If 
they legislate to ban harmful practices, or fulfil a duty-of-care to educate people about 
potential health-risks, or introduce consequential penalties (e.g. refusing to cover the cost 
of palliative care for smokers with lung cancer, or enforcing nutritional standards in mass-
marketed foodstuffs) this is critiqued as unreasonable interference.  
However, poor lifestyle choices have, broadly speaking, three kinds of effects. First, there 
are ecological, human rights and health implications.
96
 Second, there is an equity effect; 
people of low socio-economic status – in both poor and rich countries – are most 
vulnerable, being more likely to smoke, be inactive and eat toxic foods. Ultimately, they 
pay a price with early-onset morbidity, premature mortality and lower levels of well-being: 
these are the social determinants of health.
 97
 The third effect is cost. The decision to live 
‗toxically‘ will result in someone, or something, ultimately paying a price; if not the person 
making the choice then it may be shared through the economic subsidy of healthcare 
provision. 
How much personal power does the individual really have in making a choice? Multi-
national food corporations – integrating production, distribution and advertising – 
deliberately target the most vulnerable in both developed and developing nations, 
exploiting the poorly educated, impoverished, powerless and aspiring to sell them a toxic 
dietary lifestyle.
98
 Globally, the evidence of this achievement is documented in crippling 
and rising levels of non-communicable morbidity.
99
 Further, as already noted, numerous 
social and cultural determinants will influence individual thought and action. The 
dominance of mass-marketing, the commercial media and social expectations all conspire 
to compel many people to make decisions that seem to promise fulfilment and well-being 
but ultimately are unsatisfying or harmful.
100
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These issues suggest there are recurring patterns of secondary effects of both choice and 
faux choice, which the neoliberal position on the limits and responsibilities of governments 
fails to acknowledge. These effects do not account for the price the majority of humanity is 
expected to pay for the marginal benefits of radical liberalism. For years, some of the most 
powerful global institutions – international finance corporations – resisted government 
attempts to regulate their activities. When (as discussed in Section 2.3) the system buckled 
because of a flawed calculus, instead of allowing these institutions to fail, governments 
drew on public revenue to ensure their survival.
101
 This action parodied free-market 
principles in that failed institutions were rewarded for their recklessness.
102
 A similar logic 
is used in criticism of the nanny state. Timid government attempts to limit damaging 
lifestyle choices are condemned by syllogistic libertarian demands that the individual be 
simultaneously entitled to make poor decisions and avoid paying the price: an argument 
that effectively says it is reasonable to privatise damaging behaviours while socialising the 
costly consequences. 
There are questionable assumptions in public debates about freedom and the exercise of 
power.
103
 The rhetoric, particularly libertarian, is that state institutions (primarily) impose 
limitations on people and organisations to operate freely. Removing the authority and reach 
of governments, it is argued, provides greater space for markets to function, and for people 
to express individual preferences.
104
 However, power does not reflexively respond in this 
way. If one source of constraint is removed (such as punitive state controls), the lacuna is 
quickly filled by other forms. It is not as though withdrawal of state power, whether 
democratic or undemocratic, leaves a permanent sphere of liberty in which non-state actors 
can continually thrive. The removal of one form of domination merely offers opportunities 
for alternatives to fill the void. This domination may come from various sources: ideology, 
religion, plutocracy, corporatism, dominant social groups, or from alliances of such 
interests. Whether this is ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘ depends on the perspective of those who support 
them; however, if they impede the human rights and capabilities available to citizens, from 
a normative perspective it can be argued they are generally negative. Ideally, what fills the 
void is civil society, moderated by constant recalibration of freedoms, constraints, 
responsibilities and rights, overseen by transparent and accountable governance. 
A challenge facing many states is the consequences of dogged opposition to democratic 
institutions, ironically, at a time of expansion in the number of nations governed 
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democratically. Among the forces behind this trend are corporate interests, on the grounds 
that free enterprise can flourish only in fully liberalised states, which, additionally, 
represents a necessary condition for democracy. This argument is based on the premise that 
individual capacity to exercise free choice (potential or hypothetical freedom) is the same 
as actual free will and liberty (incipient or tangible freedom). Democracies often impose 
less restraint on business expansion, but this is largely contingent on governance that is 
weak or compromised, hence the tendency of many corporations (deliberately or 
otherwise) to undermine state controls. Small enterprises, which are more likely to engage 
fairly in free markets, are easily excluded by big business, which also tend to be favoured 
by government.
105
 
Typically, public discourse on these issues is polarised because any criticism of 
oligopolistic capitalism is reflexively attacked as unreformed Marxism. However, many of 
the first philosophers of liberalism anticipated that the current form of capitalism would be 
anti-competitive and would impede effective functioning of market mechanisms. Radical 
socialism, which argues for the eradication of free markets, conversely, is an extreme 
reaction to this threat.
106
 Debates have become so entrenched, and the histories and 
causation so complex, that they are beyond the awareness or understanding of most voters; 
this makes it difficult to shift the momentum of the existing political economy. Because 
corporate interests are supported by extreme wealth, a largely complicit media and 
manufactured cultural industry, the system is presently unassailable. 
Ironically, although a largely materialist and consumption-based culture thrives, it has not 
made people happier or healthier, and has left many apprehensive and confused about their 
world.
107
 This has resulted, peculiarly, in resentment towards government combined with a 
growing sense of entitlement: people want governments to ‗do‘ and ‗give‘, but they do not 
wish to pay, and they begrudge government interference. This has created a setting where a 
conservative approach, or dogged support for a compromised system, is contrasted with 
various forms of activism spread across the political compass. The remaining space – 
where rational dialogue on how to build sustainable, democratic, genuinely free-market 
societies – is like an island slowly being submerged by a rising tide of denial or dogma. 
Given the volume and breadth of reactive, linear and self-interested views, opportunities to 
debate the transformations needed to preserve the global civilization, that most people 
assume will continue into the future, are diminishing. 
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3.3 FOUR SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: 
SOCIAL COHESION, SOCIAL INCLUSION, SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
On 13 February 2008, the first action of the new government in the national parliament 
was to deliver the National Apology to Indigenous Australians for the damaging policies, 
implemented over many years, of forcibly removing children from their families. This 
apology to the Stolen Generations was widely praised as both an act of reconciliation and 
inclusion of Aboriginal citizens into civil society. Kevin Rudd, then prime minister and 
leading force behind the apology, may be judged kindly by history for this gesture, a public 
policy (the government believed) that would be a defining agenda of its tenure in office.
108
 
The origins of the social-inclusion approach date from 1974 when the secretary of state for 
social action in the conservative French government, René Lenoir, argued up to 10% of the 
population were ‗les exclus‘. Subsequently, with election of the socialist Mitterrand 
government in 1981, the concept was developed further to incorporate those who were 
excluded from society on more than economic grounds.
109
 Later, the idea crossed the 
English Channel, and it was extended under the Blair government in the UK from 1997. 
The British wanted inclusion policies to address material disadvantages (e.g. homelessness, 
workforce participation and education attainment) and to have social-justice dimensions.
110
 
New Labour‘s application of social inclusion has been analysed widely, with some 
commentators believing it compromises principles of social democracy and camouflages 
neoliberalism behind a mask of welfare.
111
 
For such a well-used term, there is no widely accepted definition of ‗social inclusion‘ or its 
sibling concept, ‗social exclusion‘. The British Social Exclusion Unit described social 
inclusion as the conditions (or locations) under which individuals or groups live and 
experience a combination of problems, such as poor housing, low incomes, unemployment, 
limited skills, high-crime and family breakdown – factors often aggravating the extent of 
disadvantage.
112
 Another definition emphasises the complex and interrelated determinants 
that may lead to exclusion, noting it affects the quality of individuals‘ lives directly as well 
as society generally. It is a multidimensional process involving: 
a lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in  
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the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, 
whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas.
113
 
The problem with understanding social inclusion narrowly (i.e. determined solely by 
economic participation) is one can be financially secure yet experience exclusion in other 
spheres of life. The Social Policy Research Centre states that, unlike the notion of poverty 
which refers to a lack of resources, exclusion is a more complex concept uncovering layers 
of division based on race, culture, gender and location, which may be overlooked when the 
focus is on resource allocation. The term also helps highlight structures, such as negative 
community attitudes, that may deny rights and exclude people from social participation.
114
 
Samina Yasmeen quotes Julian Le Grand‘s definition of social exclusion as: 
a condition where individuals or communities are geographically part of a society but feel 
that they cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens because, in their 
perception, a) conditions and institutions exist that actively limit or deny such 
participation, and b) where societal and/or governmental agencies portray them as 
‗outsiders‘.115 
Yasmeen expands this definition, arguing exclusion may be misconstrued, for example, by 
those who mistakenly believe they are excluded. This variance does not render the 
perception of exclusion meaningless; it may remain a contributor to how somebody relates 
to society. Nor is it a ‗unidirectional and uni-dimensional phenomenon. The ―excluded‖ 
minority are not immune to the phenomenon of excluding others: they may also relatively 
or absolutely exclude the majority or other members of the minority community‘.116 
In the Australian policy setting, the term ‗social exclusion‘ is used infrequently, perhaps 
due to its negative inference and governments prefer to promote positive approaches to 
reducing disadvantage. However, if social inclusion policy fails to recognise the factors 
that lead to exclusion it may fail its objectives; as Chris Ryan and Anastasia Sartbayeva 
argue, the terms are synonymous but describe different ends of a single dimension.
117
 This 
is also acknowledged by Ratna Omidvar and Ted Richmond, who explore its relevance to 
ethnic minorities, claiming it is about belonging, acceptance and recognition in various 
domains of life in a new country and, simply, ‗social inclusion ... can be seen as the 
dismantling of barriers that lead to exclusion in all these domains.‘118 Extending this 
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definition, social inclusion could be understood to accommodate any groups that are 
marginalised, such as Indigenous peoples, the disabled, or members of religious minorities. 
Social inclusion is distinct from a similar term favoured by the Howard government and 
some European states: social cohesion.
119
 In Australia‘s case, a change in government and 
a new policy focus on inclusion led to some confusion. Because of the tendency to use 
terminology that captures the ideological intent of the government of the day, and to reflect 
this in a fluid policy context, there is a risk meaning will be misconstrued. This laxity is a 
problem, with consequences for understanding in the wider community and for policy 
generally.
120
 Both terms reflect dynamic issues, making durable definitions difficult. 
Nevertheless, in a general sense, both have specific and useful meanings. To avoid inherent 
contradictions, they can be defined as having an overt (or primary) meaning, but also more 
nuanced (or secondary) meanings that can shift rapidly with changing circumstances. 
The word ‗cohesion‘ refers to bringing together, adhesion. It is a centripetal idea, of the 
disparate being attracted towards a mainstream. This can be seen as either positive or 
negative, depending on its use. Post-9/11, it was occasionally employed by security-
focused, nationalist advocates – an approach that garnered some criticism.121 Conversely, 
inclusivity is about inviting or helping others to participate, or to be part of something on 
equal terms. Superficially, inclusion is a more positive idea than cohesion, but if inclusion 
is given a standards-setting role (e.g. of raising the level of economic participation in target 
groups) this may curtail its potential and infer a policy goal is to leverage the non-included 
into a (possibly rejected) included norm. In terms of social capital, it could be said 
cohesion is about bonding or building social strength within communities that are largely 
homogenous and where values are shared and understood;
122
 whereas inclusion is about 
bridging capital, or bringing diverse communities together to build shared understandings 
and a mutually respectful civic discourse. 
Because the word ‗cohesion‘ has some connotations of homogeneity, this implies its 
opposite (heterogeneity, or pluralism) may be harmful to social relations. Not only is such 
a view unrealistic (no society can be completely homogenous), it denies the dynamism of 
societies that are creatively complex. Further, many members of society may actively 
prefer diversity to monoculture. If the cohesion approach entails less endorsement of 
choice and freedom, it may be seen as inelastic and more conformist.
123
 Therefore, social 
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cohesion has been regarded as less compatible with human rights and as missing 
opportunities associated with visions of social cohesion that involve participatory 
citizenship.
124
  
Establishing a clearer distinction between primary and secondary meanings of social 
inclusion and cohesion (see Table 3.1), may help to overcome potential confusions as well 
as explain why the inferences contained in the terms have elicited responses from critics 
who, for example, are apprehensive about implied goals of sociocultural conformity. The 
terms could be described as value-sets (which are essentially intangible), as well as 
principles upon which tangible programs are built. Both approaches can help negotiate 
subtle distinctions between a commitment to something rather than conformity with it. 
Indeed, social cohesion is an idea that could assist to ameliorate the negative, restricted 
risks of bonding social capital if associated with multicultural principles.
125
 
Table 3.1: Example of primary and secondary meanings of social inclusion and cohesion 
that could be applied in the Australian social policy context   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Australia, social-inclusion policy under the Rudd government largely replicated the 
British system but was adapted to domestic needs and precedents, such as the South 
Australian model.
126
 Thus, the government sought ways to resolve systemic disadvantages 
and barriers to human development, albeit primarily focused on poverty alleviation. The 
first major statement by the Social Inclusion Board paid cursory acknowledgement to 
human capacities and to how these can translate to social inclusion. Although a policy 
heavily promoted by Labor during the 2007 Australian federal election campaign, attention 
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wavered during the government‘s first term;127 the second-term minority Gillard 
government was more preoccupied with environmental, refugee and infrastructure 
issues.
128
 Social inclusion, which continues to be neglected as a comprehensive policy 
framework, does not meet its potential, in particular, to encompass culture and the 
capabilities approach.
129
 On the rare occasions that ministerial speeches are made, they 
continue to refer to social inclusion as a goal achieved through economic participation: a 
process that occurs primarily through education, workforce and support services enabling 
employment, such as childcare, and the participation of people with a disability.
130
 This 
idea of social inclusion infers the community is largely culturally homogenous (with the 
exception of Indigenous Australians). It also infers barriers to wealth and knowledge 
exclude, not other restraints, such as structural discrimination on grounds of gender, age, 
race or faith. This narrow application of the determinants of social inclusion not only fails 
to recognise the complexity of diverse societies but poses a potential risk. 
 To illustrate this limitation, racism and other forms of discrimination have direct effects on 
the social and emotional well-being of individuals. Depression, workplace prejudice, 
community threat and the like have direct economic effects, and not only for those 
immediately affected. At a population level, failures of social inclusion increase morbidity 
and limit productivity.
131
 This omission in policy discussions is concerning; to exclude 
cultural dimensions runs the risk that social inclusion programs may unintentionally 
discriminate on various grounds. In a truly inclusive society, these identity-markers, at a 
minimum, will be respected. More properly, they can be seen as an asset enriching civic 
life. Failure to consider culture potentially discredits social-inclusion approaches, although 
the announcement in 2011 of a renewed multicultural policy may encourage engagement 
with these issues in ways better reflecting the diversity society.
132
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates how, against social inclusion measures, a population group can be 
disadvantaged. Influenced by research conducted by Riaz Hassan into how Australian 
Muslims are poorly included,
133
 the indices shown could be extended to cover other 
determinants of social inclusion, such as rates of home ownership, levels of perceived fear, 
and sense of cultural connectedness. However, the point is clear: collectively (at the sub-
population level), Muslims are poorer, unhealthier, more excluded and experience greater 
economic disadvantage than does the ‗average‘ (or baseline norm in the general 
population), despite achieving higher levels of educational attainment. The most likely 
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reason for the disparity is that Muslims are an easily identifiable, culturally atypical group 
and, consequently, are treated with suspicion by the mainstream.
134
 A similar pattern of 
exclusion can be applied to others, such as black Africans
135
 and Indigenous Australians. 
Some definitions of social inclusion (quoted above) infer that unless culture is included as 
a measure, it will be ignored. This is also a human-rights and development issue: culture, 
race and faith can all be constraints that reduce capability conversion factors. Figure 3.2 
illustrates social inclusion can be measured on a spectrum. An individual‘s (or group‘s) 
position will determine how included or excluded they are, contingent on the indicator in 
question. This notion of continua, discussed in Section 2.6 relating to the application of 
health promotion methodologies to counter-radicalisation, is equally applicable to 
understanding the social inclusion model. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Social inclusion indicators showing a sub-population‟s exclusions 
due to cultural factors 
These observations largely focus on culturally diverse communities. However, there may 
be barriers to applying social-inclusion to other population groups, such as the elderly and 
young, because multiple determinants (not just multiple exclusions) add complexity to the 
   158 | Page  
 
conditions in which people live. This is to be expected, given forms of exclusion rarely 
occur alone. For example, those with low educational attainment tend to be at higher risk 
of unemployment or working in poorer paid, dangerous or physically demanding jobs; they 
are more likely to eat poorer quality foods and experience higher burdens of morbidity 
earlier and more severely than the well educated.
136
 In short, negative effects compound 
and reinforce each other leading to compounding disadvantages. This pattern is consistent: 
the more excluded the individual the more likely this will progressively worsen, affecting 
their quality of life. Life-chances are, therefore, critical. Research shows those children 
from households with high reliance on income support, where little priority is placed on 
education participation and there are low levels of community connectedness, are more 
likely to experience forms of exclusion as young adults. At a population level, family 
background is an indicator of one‘s socio-economic future and, it follows, long-term 
physical and mental health.
137
 Another study, which researched older adults, showed the 
higher the range of lifetime inclusion experiences (such as good health, paid employment 
and satisfactory income), the higher the probability of avoiding isolation and attendant 
risks leading to social exclusion. This is a major concern: Australia‘s ageing population, 
combined with increasing diversity, poses challenges for future service delivery. The more 
people are able to age independently, while maintaining personal well-being, the greater 
the capacity to manage service demand.
138
 As these cases illustrate, whether young, old or 
culturally distinct, at a population level social inclusion is another way of addressing the 
determinants of health where cohorts of at-risk groups can be tracked, across time, because 
the extent of their exclusion tends to remain an identifier across their life histories.  
A related concept is social connectedness. This describes the quality and quantity of 
associations people have (either face-to-face or online) with others in their circle of family, 
friends, colleagues and community. The more socially connected a person, the greater their 
sense of self-control and independence. The higher a person‘s self-determination and 
capabilities, the better their health outcomes. While mainly used in population-health 
literature, the term ‗social connectedness‘ is increasingly referenced in wider public 
policy.
139
 Social connectedness may be used as an indicator of inclusion and can be 
measured by determining the extent of both bonding and bridging social capital. It suggests 
a dynamic where minorities retain their identity but can still forge links with other 
communities. The concept of connectedness is distinct from cohesion and inclusion, which 
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(as discourses of power) may be treated with scepticism by communities in socially and 
economically marginal positions who suspect these approaches represent covert 
acculturation.
140
 The associations between connectedness, agency and well-being are also 
of interest to health promotion,
141
 and a 2011 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW) report recognised that the principles of social inclusion have strong links to 
health. Accordingly, AIHW bases its taxonomy and analysis of chronic-disease indicators 
on factors directly linked to the socio-economic determinants of health which are 
influenced, in turn, by social-inclusion policy.
142
  
One way of resolving deficits in social-inclusion policy is to re-envisage it as a capabilities 
model. The fact that governments adopted social inclusion rather than the capabilities 
approach may be due to timing: social-inclusion policies were developed first. Because the 
capabilities approach relates to human development outside the paradigm of economic 
participation, it focuses on disadvantage broadly and is culturally neutral. Government 
programs often inadvertently benefit those who need them least because those with high 
capabilities (e.g. the healthy, wealthy and educated) can better exploit opportunities offered 
by equal access than those with lower capabilities (e.g. the poor, uneducated or culturally 
excluded).
143
 Subaltern groups rarely have the power to control external social and 
economic conditions. While laws and programs may aim to ensure equality, and thus 
establish them in principle, equality may not exist in reality, and some people experience 
limited capabilities that exclude them at multiple levels. From both capabilities and human- 
development perspectives, inclusion is a matter of social justice. Social justice – which 
affirms equity across all aspects of civil society – encompasses principles that are an 
‗essential component of the social democratic project‘.144 Internationally, there has been 
agreement that social policy should aim to improve material outcomes and well-being for 
all excluded members of society. These principles are reflected in the UN‘s framework the 
Common Understanding of a Human-Rights Based Approach to Development 
Cooperation, which lists elements that are ‗necessary, specific, and unique to a human 
rights-based approach‘ to development.145 These elements are participation, empowerment, 
locally-owned and driven development, agency, and a focus on the marginalised or 
disadvantaged. The socially inclusive Apology to Indigenous Australians could be 
replicated with other groups that have experienced degrading treatment or social exclusion, 
such as asylum seekers unjustly detained for many years. Admitting past failures could be 
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a way of inducting such groups into the wider community through a similar reconciliatory 
process.
146
 It could also help destigmatise victims and to advocate that some attitudes – 
such as racism – are cruel and ignorant.  
As time has passed since 9/11 and the Bali bombings, community security concerns have 
gradually abated. News reporting has shifted from international to national coverage and 
the passage of time has seen fear of terrorism gradually replaced by economic worries. By 
2008, Unisys security reports show that apprehension focused on rising interest rates, to be 
subsequently replaced with fears about the global economy, (perceived) rising 
unemployment and personal-information theft.
147
 Other research released by the Scanlon 
Foundation maps Australian social cohesion. It demonstrates that although most people 
feel socially and economically included and comfortable, significant pockets of resentment 
and xenophobic fears remain.
148
 This has been validated by studies undertaken by James 
Forrest and Kevin Dunn who have mapped the demographics of racism.
149
 
Both inclusion and cohesion are valuable adjuncts to the discourse on how citizens should 
act as members of a diverse society. People may feel included in their local (or virtual) 
community but disengaged from the life of the nation, especially if they belong to a group 
marginalised by pejorative public opinions. These concerns could reconnect to a policy 
principle that existed until the mid-1990s: social justice.
150
 The terms social inclusion, 
connectedness, justice and cohesion are, or were, in use as various policies; nevertheless, 
they are members of a ‗concept family‘ that advocates good (fair, just, equitable) outcomes 
for all members in society. They aim to address discrimination, barriers to attainment, and 
encompass affirmative action. The policy name is of marginal relevance; what matters are 
normative principles behind government decisions to protect justice, equity, freedom and 
participation. These principles, when much of the rhetoric is removed, are development, 
democratic and rights-based. While it may be novel to central policy planners to take such 
approaches, they would help ensure inclusion measures also address exclusion, cohesion 
and the many cultural, social and economic impacts that are goals of a social inclusion 
agenda. 
Mark McDonald and Carsten Quell, writing from a Canadian perspective, defend 
multiculturalism and human rights while emphasising the importance of both cohesion and 
inclusion. They argue integration only occurs where reciprocal respect and understanding 
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is established between host nation and a minority group. At least two phenomena work in 
this dynamic. The first, inclusion, focuses on social and economic issues through the 
removal of barriers to immigrant and refugee settlement, including racism, discrimination 
and poverty. They see inclusion as different from cohesion, which is determined by the 
quality and form of relationships within society. How the values and interests of its 
members converge help to form a sense of shared identity (often described as ‗national 
character‘), which includes the degree of openness a society may have to diversity. For 
culturally and linguistically diverse background (CLDB) communities ‗cohesion is about 
the capacity for reciprocal attachment to and identification with the host society‘.151 In 
balancing inclusion with civic cohesion, McDonald and Quell warn that one does not 
automatically foster the other and these processes may develop independently. If so, this 
may result in formation of parallel lives and where communities are disconnected from the 
whole. Without ‗a sense of civic cohesion and common purpose, groups and individuals, 
even if they are not socioeconomically disadvantaged, may see themselves as 
―outsiders‖‘.152 Such forms of exclusion are incompatible with UNESCO‘s global ethics, 
which holds that bonds without options are oppressive, and options without bonds may 
lead to anarchy. The optimal balance between freedom and constraint is one of 
democracy‘s challenges; objectives of inclusion policies should aim for this equilibrium.153 
Modood also discusses the challenges of balancing cohesion with inclusion. He argues that 
national identity alienates some people because of fears it may inspire exclusionary or 
xenophobic discourse. However, inclusive concepts of national identity can be valuable for 
overall cohesion, because all groups need to be able to build civic connections. If this 
model is not multicultural, nor based in equity, national identity may have perverse effects. 
Modood believes multicultural citizenship is strengthened by pluralist collective identity, 
and that citizenship must be a respected, dialogical system, not one reduced to legal 
rights.
154
 Concerned that notions of national identity have frequently been antagonistic 
towards diversity, Modood explores the forms of public policies that help civic inclusion to 
work. He does not propose an ‗unreformed‘ model of nationhood but a flexible, responsive 
one. While recognising that globalisation, communications, migration and new 
cosmopolitan identities may contribute to the dissolution of the structures and sentiments 
of nationhood, they ‗do not so damage national citizenship that it cannot be a container for 
multicultural currents‘.155 However, post-9/11 fears can make it easy for ‗ordinary, decent 
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people to be very anxious and – where multicultural national identities are weak … to wrap 
themselves in strong nationalisms, militarisms and other dichotomizing, confrontational 
ideologies‘.156 The solution is not to privilege strong minority identities over weak shared 
ones. Modood believes it does not necessarily follow that cultural or religious identities 
will be intrinsically divisive, but they do ‗need a framework of vibrant, dynamic, national 
narratives and the ceremonies and rituals which give expression to a national identity‘.157 
Although Modood, and McDonald and Quell are commenting about exclusion on the basis 
of culture or faith, their arguments could be applied with equal ease to any group 
segmented by forms of marginalisation. For example, Gleeson cites research into culturally 
mainstream communities in regional Australia that are excluded by multiple barriers, 
including infrastructure, education and training, workforce participation and income.
158
 So 
entrenched, this has led to new subcultures that – combined with intergenerational ill-
health, poverty, ignorance, and located in places rarely visited by the wider population – 
they have become breeding grounds for alienation. 
Governments seek clear parameters within which to plan and deliver programs, finding 
crisp delineations helpful. If these delineations come at a cost – inflexibility, or a failure to 
respond to the dynamic complexity of transforming social, cultural and economic 
conditions – they risk leading policymakers into rigid planning or fads. One year, the 
justice model works, the next year cohesion, the following year inclusion. The cohesion–
inclusion divide represents this risk; neither approach offers remedies for fraught policy 
dilemmas. Attempts to capture definitive meanings fail to appreciate they are fluid 
concepts, describing changing conditions in complex settings. To be included, an 
individual, or a group, must be included in something. In a multicultural, democratic 
society, there must at least be some normative understanding of what constitutes such a 
society and the conditions that allow it to flourish. Multicultural democracy,
159
 the 
governance and ethical principles behind it, help bind plural communities together and can 
be a rallying point in times of crisis. A more calibrated approach may be to recognise that 
social cohesion and social inclusion describe different facets of the same issue, and both 
have a place in the lexicon of public policy. 
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3.4 MANAGING CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL DIVERSITY IN 
GLOBALISED SOCIETIES 
In its 2004 world report, UNDP scopes the importance of cultural liberty as a critical 
condition for human development.
160
 It argues that, because most nations are culturally 
diverse, multicultural democracies, although imperfect, are the best form of governance. 
Australia and Canada were the first countries to introduce national multicultural policies.
161
 
However, the Howard government progressively withdraw commitment to 
multiculturalism, an approach of concern to many concerned with social justice and, in 
2007, the AHRC published a position paper defending multiculturalism.
 162
 This mirrored 
many of the themes outlined by UNDP. In summary, both reports explain that the 
suppression of cultural identities can lead to conflicts, cultural freedoms are essential for 
human development, and human-rights principles establish the framework for productive, 
harmonious social relations.
163
 
The AHRC position paper argues that multicultural policy neither defends special favours 
for minorities nor encourages segregation. Quite the opposite, it demands commitment to 
democratic systems, participation in the wider community, relinquishing traditional hatreds 
and behaving with civility towards fellow citizens; these are responsibilities that 
accompany civil and political rights.
164
 Nor does multiculturalism belong to any particular 
political ideology,
165
 rather, it is an inclusive policy framework recognising people‘s 
identities and rights (including rights to inclusion and participation):
166
 compatible with 
cosmopolitanism and cultural democracy, multiculturalism is an approach that is both 
radical and progressive.
167
 Multiculturalism is also a civil-society building tool that 
protects cultural liberty. This is not about preserving tradition: ‗people should not be bound 
in an immutable box called ―a culture‖‘.168 Cultural liberties help expand people‘s options 
about how they live, not penalise them for their choices. UNDP argues that debates are 
often polarised between the upholding of national distinctiveness on one side, and 
safeguarding cultural heritage in the face of globalisation on the other. This is a misleading 
dichotomy, because ‗cultural identities are heterogeneous and evolving – they are dynamic 
processes in which internal inconsistencies and conflicts drive change‘.169  
However, multicultural policy has seldom been debated in Australia with reference to 
human rights, either as a legislative instrument or as an ethical framework.
170
 In recent 
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years, it has been equated frequently and incorrectly with settlement services and the 
inducting of humanitarian entrants into Australian society.
171
 Additionally, multicultural 
policy has instigated surprisingly little discussion about culture. Critics, who argue 
multiculturalism is a form of apartheid and insist on immigrant assimilation, ignore the 
impossibility of shedding cultural, religious and other identities solely because a person has 
moved to another country. Attempts to enforce conformity may confound aspirations of 
cultural liberty and are thus more likely to aggravate social disharmony than to repress 
diversity. Furthermore, there are benefits gained by nurturing creative classes which draw 
inspiration from diversity.
172
 
Ironically, governments that champion individualism are often most concerned about the 
extent of cultural and religious pluralism and promote nationalist concepts of cohesion. 
Helly argues that immigration has a dual status, which illustrates a liberal paradox: an 
economic logic of openness, but a political logic of closure. Openness ‗stems from 
capitalist development … closure, from each state‘s need to maintain the uniqueness of its 
nation and civil society compared with other states and societies‘.173 Dismissing the 
dividends of pluralism neglects forms of capital that grow from nurturing pluralism,
174
 
although focusing solely on the economic benefits can result in inequitable wealth 
transfers; for example, when immigrants trained in a developing country are attracted to 
work in Australia, a rich country that has inadequately invested in education.
175
 
Increasingly, multiculturalism is regarded as a framework for contesting discrimination, 
especially on the grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality and faith, and it is understood to 
help balance centrifugal forces in plural societies. As reflected in much of the UN 
literature, freedom and human development rely on the recognition and enforcement of 
civil, political, social, cultural and economic human rights; by upholding rights, people are 
protected from the state and its agents, and from abuse by others. Democracies are 
threatened when subgroups (whether citizens or non-citizens) are treated differently, 
stigmatised through implicit or complicit exclusion, or are denied selected rights.
176
 
A common criticism of multiculturalism is that it encourages ghetto
177
 with critics 
offended that  some communities act to preserve aspects of their identity which distinguish 
them from the mainstream. For example, the continuing use of first languages (as in public 
signage) and celebrating cultural events have been interpreted as either sinister or a 
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rejection of Australian ‗values‘.178 As well as questionable from both human rights and 
libertarian perspectives, such views are irrelevant.
179
 Providing conduct is lawful, people 
are free to go about their affairs unhindered. A society that bans harmless but atypical 
conduct is a society on a path towards banning other forms of identity expressions that 
deviate from social, sexual or behavioural norms. How such norms are decided, interpreted 
and policed are questions no free society should ask. If it imposes norms, according to one 
particular standard, it heads towards totalitarianism. A state that genuinely respects human 
rights must also support principles of multiculturalism because these complement the 
protections enshrined in ICESCR which cover individual and (certain) group rights.  
In large and diverse societies, inevitably, some members will call for the derogation of 
certain freedoms, whether collective (such as religious expressions) or individual (such as 
gender identity). There will be many motivations for such calls for prohibition, but two 
particular reasons help explain why. First, there is concern that some minority groups pose 
a threat to the majority. These concerns may be legitimate, as already discussed in relation 
to terrorism. The reflexive assumption, especially since 9/11, is that such groups are 
religiously inspired, despite tangible threats coming from other sources.
180
 A fundamental 
principle underpinning Australian legal institutions is the assumption of innocence: people 
cannot be punished for hypothetical or imaginary crimes. The state has intelligence and 
police agencies responsible for investigating those suspected of planning violence; it is 
their role to act independently and with probity to protect society from harm. It is not the 
job of non-executive players to provide unsought vetting and policing of (religiously or 
ethnically) ‗suspect‘ communities for, what they perceive, might occur. This is an 
alternative form of theocracy.
181
 
Another reason for calls to selectively curtail rights is that assaults upon minorities are 
manifestations of power politics. All societies are stratified, and certain groups will have 
more power than others. With this power comes privilege and privileged voices will be 
heard above those with little influence. Privilege is inevitably valued; it offers control and 
security, it may be wielded benignly and with good intention, but it may also preserve the 
status quo. Discourses about multiculturalism are littered with examples of how power and 
privilege are used to ensure certain traits are marginalised and how members of minorities 
are accepted only if they reject aspects of their identity.
182
 Australia, typical of other 
countries, has forms of privilege that are a legacy of history. Public calls for selective 
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exclusions, banning certain practices or the enforcement of conduct are attempts to 
maintain hegemony, power, and to exclude rival ideas from jostling for recognition. A 
peculiarity of this situation is it is often those excluded by their low socio-economic status 
who most resent competition from emerging, culturally-distinct groups seeking to find 
their own place within a mainstream society and culture. This is a form of struggle to avoid 
ending at the bottom of a socio-cultural ‗barrel‘; it is a struggle that typically becomes ugly 
and embraces violent notions of racism.
183
 In a democracy, people have the right to express 
opinions and attempt to maintain their status. However, to observe that unequal power 
relations even exist often borders on taboo. Societies can only consider themselves truly 
democratic and egalitarian when there are established mechanisms to ameliorate the 
influence of those striving to maintain their place at the expense of the disempowered, and 
to provide authentic platforms for the marginalised to be heard and inequity corrected. 
These issues also relate to cultural rights, explored further in Section 4.2. 
The threats posed by religiously inspired terrorism has increased interest in, and support of, 
interfaith activities. In Australia, the Howard government believed the interfaith movement 
could complement security objectives by encouraging greater respect between religions.
184
 
Further, the concept of ‗core Australian values‘ became closely linked to discussions about 
religion and ‗integration‘ of all CLDB groups. This focus on religion distracted 
government efforts from multiculturalism and race discrimination, with interfaith activities 
almost becoming their surrogate. The causes of this are unclear: it may have been because 
distinctions between interreligious dialogue and multiculturalism were poorly understood, 
the decisions could have been political or unintentional.
185
 Whatever the reasons, these 
approaches were consistent with the clumsy way religion is often ‗managed‘ by secular 
states.
186
 
A common source of conflict is passages contained in some central religious texts that may 
provoke members of another religion because they feel this somehow offends their beliefs. 
This can be an excuse to persecute those of different faith.
187
 One of the premises of 
interfaith dialogue is that critical inquiry may better help dissipate antagonism between and 
within faiths than punitive legislation. For these reasons alone, the role of interreligious 
activity is seen as justification for government endorsements.
188
 However, interfaith work 
has the potential to ameliorate other social tensions. It is common for diaspora 
communities to have escaped persecution in their home nations, yet continue to experience 
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intimidation from fellow, former nationals who have different religious, racial or ethnic 
affiliations. For example, the Bahá‘í community from Iran have been persecuted for many 
years by an often repressive Shi‘ite regime and legislature.189 Overseas events, such as civil 
disturbances, persecution, assassinations and genocide, have the potential to affect 
expatriate communities and inflame tensions in ways that reflect what is happening abroad.  
Multiculturalism in Australia has mainly dealt with diaspora communities as a secular 
access-and-equity issue. It has not dealt significantly with culture and almost never with 
religion. In the same way that racism could be redefined in hard-law treaties to recognise 
religious discrimination, multiculturalism could better recognize religion as a feature of 
diversity. This was a deficit in prior multicultural policies although the 2011 iteration 
acknowledges religion as a dimension of cultural diversity for the first time.
190
 This 
approach is essential in multifaith societies because it helps address some of the risks 
posed by extreme forms of religious expression.
191
 However, concerns about interreligious 
conflict and its peaceful negotiation are global, not specific to any one country. 
International attempts to build peace can be difficult, such as those UN resolutions that 
aimed to ‗combat‘ religious defamation.192 Among the criticism of these resolutions is their 
use human-rights language and legal instruments to privilege Islam because it is the only 
religion that claims their faith can be defamed;
193
 although flawed, these resolutions are 
compatible with other international standards (see Appendix A2.2).
194
 Furthermore, 
religious freedoms are important for human development. As outlined in a report by the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, discrimination can equally affect 
civil and political rights as economic, social and cultural rights, and religious exclusion can 
damage the life of an individual, their family and community, affecting their health, 
education, employment and standard of living.
195
 
Although freedom of opinion may be exercised through public comment, behaviour, 
writing or artistic expressions, societies place boundaries around these freedoms. Laws 
exist that proscribe defamation and obscenity; as a whole, societies continually formulate 
implicit codes of conduct, which are largely based on intuitions, traditions and religion. 
The idea that unrestricted liberties are untenable is not new. By the late Renaissance, 
European literature regularly explored ethical dilemmas associated with conduct outside 
normative standards (then primarily meaning religiously dictated morals). As the public 
expression of free thought became increasingly possible during the seventeenth century, 
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these notions were examined more boldly. For example, although his motives remain 
cryptic, Shakespeare‘s Iago exemplifies the free agent who acts outside ethical or social 
codes. If we compare Shakespeare‘s character (Othello dates from approximately 1603) 
with an antihero of later that century, we see how the depiction of unaccountable human 
agency has evolved. In Thomas Shadwell‘s 1675 play, The Libertine, Don John and his 
acolytes rob, murder and rape as the whim takes them. This is a caricature of then-popular 
philosophical conceits about Nature that had been advocated by England‘s first significant 
public sceptic, Thomas Hobbes. Libertinism was heavily based on naturalism, typically 
illustrated by Adam and Eve prior to The Fall being favourably compared to beasts.
196
 This 
‗pre-lapsarian‘ innocence represented a human ideal where behaving naturally was a moral 
imperative. Don John‘s justification for his conduct was that self-restraint would be a 
denial of his nature and, therefore, immoral.
197
 
Such sophistry may appear puerile until one reflects that similar logic continues to be used 
to justify different, albeit equally offensive, conduct. The white supremacy movement 
considers it reasonable to humiliate and threaten homosexuals, Jews, other minorities and 
(occasionally) inflict physical hurt on them. Despite public vilification being a form of 
violence, it is asserted that the conscience of those expressing ‗white pride‘ should not be 
restricted.
198
 Their relative freedom to do so can be contrasted with the way most 
democracies response to slander in civil law. For example, a journalist who broadcasts 
unverifiable claims that damage a person‘s reputation may be sued (along with their 
publisher); a business that makes unverifiable public claims about a competitor‘s goods, 
thereby harming their business, may receive severe penalties under trade practice laws. 
Typically, the rule of law will set limits on freedoms of expression and speech, requiring it 
remains within the boundaries of what is deemed ‗reasonable‘.199 These limitations are 
seldom questioned in certain domains of life, but in others – such as racial, religious and 
cultural matters – protections are poor, and voices are often raised to defend an entitlement 
to express vile opinions.
200
 There is a salient point about rights to personal expression that 
is easily overlooked: while people have the freedom to form views that are dictated by their 
conscience and experience – opinions others may dislike or emphatically disagree with – 
and the right to express these opinions privately, it does not follow this transfers to an 
additional right to impose their opinions on others and in the manner of their choosing. 
When opinions are highly offensive, or incite violence, they cross the line of acceptability. 
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What does incite violence or is offensive, however, is not always easy to define. 
Subjectivity should not provide sufficient justification for inaction. Judicial discretion and 
interpretation of law is, generally, a reliable foundation for a just decision about what 
comprises a reasonable public expression of opinion. The shortcoming – when it comes to 
race, faith and culture – is the limited law for judges to interpret or under which the 
aggrieved can take action.
201
 
For many, the 2008 election of Barack Obama to the US presidency was highly symbolic. 
It demonstrated that a country with a history of black African enslavement, home to the Ku 
Klux Klan and, since emancipation, over a century of social, political and economic 
exclusion, could overcome its past. This may augur well for a future where racism based 
on physiognomy recedes in significance, but it does not mean racism is disappearing.
202
 
Racial distinctions are a product of the anthropological sciences and date from the late 
nineteenth century, a time of enthusiasm for categorising and describing visible differences 
between humans. Labels such as ‗Mongoloid‘, ‗Negroid‘ and ‗Caucasian‘ described 
common features of people of Asian, African or European descent and often carried with 
them prejudiced assumptions. In its extreme form, especially during the early twentieth 
century, eugenics were promulgated under regimes, such as Nazi Germany.
203
 The very 
notion of race, however, is now contested and racism does not necessarily survive due to 
the existence of ‗races‘. Human genetics has demonstrated race is a meaningless concept 
and many scholars maintain race to be a construct with potent social and political effects 
but with no basis in biological fact.
204
 Nevertheless, many reasons are used to concoct 
categories based on old anthropological markers such as skin colour, hair, height and eye 
structure. Common types of racism – such as the use of slang to denigrate people – are 
evolving into more covert forms, informed by cultural, religious or subtle ethnic markers  
which stigmatise an individual or group. This trend is likely to continue given globalisation 
and the mass-movements of people.
205
 When populations settle into new communities, they 
may retain, deliberately or not, a distinct presence.
206
 When this happens, racism is able to 
morph and be expressed in novel ways such as credophobia, cyber-racism and xeno-
racism.
207
 More commonly, superficial physiological distinctions, compounded by cultural 
difference, help maintain myths and, consequently, racial discrimination;
208
 beliefs that can 
be reinforced in unintended ways.
209
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Because physiognomy cannot be changed, or modified only with expensive surgery, race is 
not a matter of choice. This is sometimes seen as an argument that makes racial 
discrimination less acceptable than discrimination on other grounds that may be freely 
chosen (such as beliefs). In the case of religion, it could be argued it differs from a person‘s 
physiognomy because faith is a matter of choice. However, like culture, religious belief 
can be deeply ingrained into individual identity and psychology. On this basis, we can 
question whether faith is, indeed, simply chosen.
210
 Some representatives of religious 
organisations contest the suggestion that faith is substantively different from physical 
identifiers, arguing faith is not necessarily subjective but an unmoveable reality.
211
 
Transnational population movements may be a consequence of globalisation, while also 
providing economic benefits; however, when immigrant communities experience racism 
and exclusion, imposed by a resident citizenry resentful of their presence, host nations have 
an obligation to protect minorities via criminal laws and policing (a universalist approach) 
and (particular) multicultural and inclusion policies. When they become victim of 
persistent discrimination, minority groups will also be vulnerable to alienation. If severe 
and protracted, this may make them resentful and prone to retaliation. Cultural democratic 
approaches, as a way of building community with others of shared identity, are relatively 
easy through the use of communication technologies such as cable television and the 
internet. 
The structure of communities within communities presents challenges to national self-
imaginings, community harmony and cultural maintenance.
212
 Because minorities are 
growing and ever diversifying, governments have two equal duties of care. The first is to 
ensure people are treated with justice, equity and in a manner consistent with the civic 
experience of the population majority;
213
 this may involve substantive equality programs 
that can cause resentment from some within the mainstream. The second duty is to manage 
possible security issues: protecting the minority from the majority and vice versa, and 
preventing intercommunal tensions from escalating. As argued in the 2002 report of the 
World Conference against Racism, the maintenance of civil society – given that racism and 
related forms of discrimination can easily increase in these settings – is a critical role of 
government.
214
 UNDP also offers four principles that inform multiculturalism in global 
contexts. First, defending traditions (which are not always a necessary good) can restrain 
development although (second) it is essential that diversity be respected. Third, imbalances 
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in economic and political power threaten cultures of weaker communities that may need 
protecting, and fourth, diversity generally thrives in an interdependent world, especially 
when people feel permitted to have multiple and complementary identities.
215
 
Human rights are an internationally recognised system, but with imperfections. The same 
can be said of multiculturalism with some criticisms deserving consideration. Among these 
is the argument that, if interpreted narrowly and strictly, multiculturalism can work against 
personal liberty, with various approaches described as either ‗thin‘ or ‗thick‘ versions.216 
The case of gender suppression as cultural practice (which could occur under a thick 
iteration of multicultural policy) is often mentioned, particularly by Susan Okin.
217
 While 
there have been vigorous responses to Okin,
218
 the debate demonstrates why 
multiculturalism could benefit from being re-envisaged as a human-rights-based policy 
because it may help conciliate between competing values and act as a tool to build civil 
society. For example, laws and dispute mechanisms may help protect the rights of women 
subject to violent or restrictive domestic lives within some minority communities. These 
instruments would override conflicting claims by patriarchs who argue physical restraint or 
unfettered sexual access is a cultural norm. Such an approach to multiculturalism is 
compatible with the view that, in the fight against racism and related intolerance: 
the legal human rights-based approach must be complemented by intellectual and cultural 
strategies aimed at reaffirming the value of multiculturalism within and among States, as 
well as respect for cultural diversity and for universal human rights.
219
 
 
3.5 CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY 
The concept of the citizen is inextricably linked to the nation state. While citizenship is 
now a widely accepted institution, with precedents in antiquity, its current status is quite 
recent.
220
 For instance, it was not until 1984 that Australians ceased to be British subjects, 
and Australian nationality and citizenship became singular concepts.
221
 The construct of 
the nation is also relatively modern, being well established for little more than 200 years, 
particularly with the formation of European states during the nineteenth century.
222
 Ideas of 
national self-determination gathered pace in the twentieth century, and it was only in the 
decades after the Second World War, with decolonisation and establishment of the UN, 
that a global community comprising nation states was comprehensively in place.
223
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Modern nations originally tended to coalesce around monarchical systems although, in 
Northern America and France, they did so around new republics. Existing nations were 
strengthened, and new ones made more possible, with improvements in technology, 
communications, transport infrastructure and centralised political control. Their cohesion 
tended to be associated with notions of shared kinship, culture, geography, laws and 
politics. Indeed, many national myths are about homogeneity: aspects that are shared and 
help define the distinct qualities of a nation and provide national ‗narratives‘.224 
Citizenship represents the official form of membership, and affiliation with, a particular 
nation and can be of value to both the granter and grantee. It is a form of social contract, 
effectively a promise (even if one is born with, or never sought, such a ‗contract‘) that each 
party will work in the interests of the other. The citizen will be loyal to the nation, may be 
required to fight to protect it, will abide by its laws, and may carry certain other 
responsibilities. The nation, through its governance and those agents who act on behalf of 
the executive, will defend the realm (its territories and populace from external threats), 
maintain social stability, laws and institutions so that citizens can live in relative safety 
(from internal threats) and ensure basic material requirements. In the modern democratic 
understanding of res publica, the responsibility of the nation to protect ‗the rights of man‘ 
is a primary responsibility to its citizens.
225
 
Superficially, this contract between citizen and nation seems reasonable. However, the 
relationship is not straightforward, and citizenship in a heterogeneous state can be 
contested by questioning the: 
 conflicts between ethics (a personal sense of right and wrong), duty (a public 
obligation to the demands of civic authority) and the manner in which dissent can 
be expressed
226
 
 possibilities of multiple or global citizenships in an age of transnational diasporas 
 unequal power relations between an individual and the monolithic state  
 social divisions within a nation between the citizen and aliens 
 effects when nationalist agendas harness citizenship to incite antagonism towards 
atypical members of society 
 role of human rights in defining the freedoms of citizens 
 how, when and why a citizen becomes ‗Othered‘ or made alien in their own nation. 
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Although such issues are relevant to current debates on citizenship, many are not new, 
having often inspired exploration of universal challenges of the human condition. As early 
as 442 BC, Sophocles dissected the competing ethics of state and private responsibility in 
his play Antigone,
227
 and, with the formation of states in the mid nineteenth century, Alexis 
de Tocqueville detailed and compared governance problems in France with American 
democracy.
228
 
In recent years, Australian citizenship has received much attention and an Australian 
Government department was renamed to denote this particular responsibility (Immigration 
and Citizenship). To prove its validation of national identity, the Howard government 
introduced a test in 2007 for those seeking citizenship – a controversial matter, albeit one 
replicated in other countries.
229
 Most questions in the test covered lifestyle, Anglo-centric 
culture, history and ‗Australian values‘ – a term frequently used by politicians at the time. 
Particularly contentious was the perception of the state as either aiming to inculcate 
communities or exclude those who were too different, or lacked the capacity or will to 
conform. It also sent subliminal messages to the Australian-born (already citizens) that 
those seeking citizenship needed to prove their loyalty by passing the test or would be 
otherwise suspect – of what, was not clear, but the inference was social insularity at best or 
insurrection at worst. Consequently, this strategy was criticised for being conformist and 
capitalising on a general mood of post-9/11 apprehension.
230
 Ironically, certainly from a 
conservative political perspective, testing had perverse effects, with many British and 
European immigrants disinterested in citizenship while those with greater need for a new 
national home – such as African refugees – clamoured for citizenship, yet had difficulty 
passing the test.
231
 
Despite the government‘s enthusiastic endorsement of Australian citizenship, it is an 
amorphous concept, poorly described in law and with vague privileges. In its closing 
weeks, the Howard government released a publication that emphasised citizenship is about 
belonging to a distinct national community with shared values, institutions and identity, but 
one demanding sacrifices and obligations. The publication asserts traditional and relatively 
simplified visions of the citizenship ideal. However, this marketing exercise is ambiguous 
about those rights prospective citizens might expect to enjoy. Consistent with an 
assimilationist agenda, Becoming an Australian Citizen says new citizens are expected to 
have appropriate levels of English competency, knowledge of Australia‘s history, heritage, 
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people and ‗unique national culture‘; this will help ‗foster a cohesive and integrated society 
with a sense of shared destiny and, should the need arise, shared sacrifice for the common 
good‘.232 It also states ‗citizenship provides for an overriding commitment to Australia‘ 
and for citizens to build ‗an even stronger and more united‘ nation.233 
The document also lists Australian values, perhaps an antidote for ‗un-Australian‘ conduct. 
These include freedoms of speech, association and religion; equality under the law, of 
opportunity, between men and women; tolerance; respect and compassion for those in 
need; peacefulness; and respect for equal worth, dignity and individual liberties.
234
 These 
values (many of which are neither values nor unique) ‗reflect strong influences on 
Australia‘s history and culture. These include Judeo-Christian ethics, a British political 
heritage and the spirit of the European Enlightenment.‘235 
Citizenship may imply rights; it may also infer values are stable and enduring, yet little can 
be guaranteed. Citizens and prospective citizens must take on trust that ‗values‘ have effect 
as legally enacted civil liberties. However, while Australian citizenship provides certain 
privileges (e.g. the franchise and to hold a passport
236
), generally, the rights of citizens are 
unprotected by the Constitution or statutory charter. This is confirmed in another 
government publication released at the same time, the Readers‟ Guide: Australian 
Citizenship Act 2007. This Act introduced the citizenship test regime and, as the guide 
explains, the purposes of the Act were not to define the legal effects of citizenship other 
than its acquisition or loss. These are covered by other laws. Of note is the qualification 
there is no: 
reference to Australian citizenship in the Australian Constitution and consequently there 
are no explicit constitutional rights of citizenship. Whether there are any implied 
citizenship rights ... is something for the High Court of Australia to determine, not the 
Parliament.
237
 
This reality, that citizenship fails to confer rights because most rights cannot be guaranteed, 
is poorly understood by most Australian citizens, whether born with or seeking this status. 
These inconsistencies highlight the fragility of individual freedoms as well as the real value 
of citizenship, especially from a state that expects more than it is prepared to give. 
Confusing government rhetoric about human rights can be illustrated in several ways. The 
health sector offers one example. While many public health services proclaim their 
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commitment to patient rights, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare has issued a carefully worded Australian Charter of HealthCare Rights, that 
says the Australian Government ‗commits to international agreements about human rights 
which recognise everyone‘s right to have the highest possible standard of physical and 
mental health‘.238 It goes on to explain what the citizen can ‗expect from the Australian 
health system‘.239 The operative word, ‗expect‘, reveals the myth at the centre of such well-
intentioned claims: Australian human rights are ideas, not legal guarantees. They are 
neither enshrined in law nor secured as a normative tool for citizens to protect their health 
or the services to which they (should be) entitled. 
Australia was founded by supplanting its First Nation peoples; it has been rapidly 
populated by diverse migration flows, and is multifaith and multiethnic. The idea it has a 
distinctive national character is problematic unless it can be understood as being essentially 
multicultural. This means, to function, communities must be party to a reciprocal social 
contract where individual and group identities are respected, but where rights are paired 
with responsibility. Hence, the importance of social cohesion – or certain shared public 
ethics and forms of participation to which citizens should commit – to make inclusion 
meaningful. Becoming an Australian Citizen portrays citizenship to joining an elite club – 
belonging to ‗a distinct national community‘ with both tangible and intangible rules – 
where membership is selective and entails accepting ordained beliefs that demand 
adherence. The tangible rules (such as the legal system) are clear and responsible, but the 
intangible rules are not. It is unclear, for example, what is meant by statements such as 
citizenship relies on ‗sentiments of nationhood and enduring attachment to what 
Australians hold in common [providing] ... common reference points‘.240 
John Biles and Paul Spoonley interrogate the assumptions embedded in this type of 
document. They question how societies, that receive immigrants, ameliorate the alienation 
and exclusion experienced by many young people through the promotion of a highly 
inclusive national identity and whether such a clearly articulated and immutable identity 
‗acts as an appropriate and impermeable membrane to exclude those elements that are 
unable or unwilling to be assimilated into the national identity of the state in question‘.241 
This debate, they argue, is whether a national identity should be sufficiently amenable to 
accommodate new identities, especially the culturally diverse, or whether core values of 
citizenship are truly universal. If the latter, does this serves to dictate who can or cannot be 
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accepted as a citizen? Such a view holds that citizenship and national identity are 
inextricably linked. However, in many ways this stance is belated. Most countries that 
supported high levels of immigration now host diverse populations, which ‗short of 
massive expulsions and the wide scale revocation of citizenship (which is abhorrent to 
liberal democracies and contrary to international law), will continue‘.242 For regimes that 
proselytise on the desired qualities of new citizens, selective acculturation tools (such as 
citizenship tests) are intended to limit cultural diversity while running new arrivals through 
orientation programs to encourage increased assimilation. However, when institutional, 
social and normative structures remain untouched under such a system, there are 
implications for both national identity and security.
243
 
Related to the role of citizenship, is a ‗problem‘ in many countries: the issue of national 
identity.
244
 Active promotion by centralist governments – combined with persisting beliefs, 
fears and practices within the majority of a population – tends to construct an image of the 
nation as encompassing various (usually ‗unique‘) qualities advocated as an ideal to 
cultivate, protect and comply with. Commitment to this partly fabricated, partly tangible 
collective imagining is the process of bonding to a national identity. If citizens cannot 
envisage being members of society within the nation, then, without belonging, they may be 
alienated from it. When individual or collective identities are disengaged, or find few 
meaningful points of connection with sanctioned standards of the social, economic, 
political and cultural life expected of citizens, the process of national identification fails. 
Ideals of citizenship that are inflexible or conformist can aggravate identities by inflaming 
differences and, perversely, wedge people from wider society. Conflicts often occur when 
mainstream citizens perceive minorities as nonconformist. These differences can relate to 
indigeneity, migration status, race, religion, or other determinants such as gender, disability 
or sexuality. The way such groups are accommodated in a citizenship culture will affect 
how the state manages social cohesion and inclusion. Ultimately, how this is negotiated 
will be shaped by the way identity is respected. 
Humans have many identities, and identity can be understood in many ways.
245
 A person 
may have a gender identity (a sense of being male, female, or an alternative such as 
transsexual); a career, family or religious identity, or an identity associated with a sport or 
hobby. Sometimes people wear different identity ‗hats‘ depending on the circumstances. 
They may also perceive an issue through different identity ‗lenses‘, helping them to 
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recognise the complexity or perspectives of certain issues. Paradoxically, identity may 
appear contradictory in some people, such as those who demonstrate behaviours and 
attitudes that differ across the domains of their life. For example, an apolitical public 
servant who carefully adheres to procedures may be an unconventional activist in their 
private life. This is not necessarily inconsistent; rather, it shows they can comply with 
professional standards – indeed, such a dual approach to life and work may be part of their 
identity. 
Often people will choose their identities, such as membership of a professional body. 
Sometimes identity cannot be chosen or disguised, such as one based on skin colour. For 
others, the issue is more complex, as it is for those belonging to ethno-religious groups. 
Some people may have many identities, moving between them depending on 
circumstances. Hyphenated descriptors, such as Aboriginal-Australian or Chinese-
Australian, are also used to denote identity. This offends some people; others welcome it as 
one aspect of an expression of who they are. Identity – as the way a person chooses or 
‗grows‘ to create meaning in their life and to negotiate their internal and external realities – 
is such a fundamental feature of the human condition that it may be a better defining 
quality of difference than culture, language or race.
246
 That is not to diminish or 
differentiate identity from these attributes; instead, it is a way of explaining how and why 
these qualities shape and define a person or group.
247
 
Brewer analysed these tensions when developing the concept of optimal distinctiveness. 
She says the instinctive need for belonging can sit on a continuum where, at either extreme, 
a person‘s sense of worth is threatened. Being distinctive (highly individuated) leaves the 
individual vulnerable to isolation or exclusion, even when they excel in something 
desirable. Showing little distinctiveness (low individuation) entails surrendering much of 
one‘s identity. As such, ‗social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human 
needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need 
for uniqueness and individuation (on the other)‘.248 Brewer argues the individual is pulled 
between the need to belong to a group and the need to express a separate identity. Similar 
to the way economic theory posits market forces of supply and demand trend towards 
equilibrium, Brewer plots differentiation and assimilation preferences on a plane; the point 
of intersection represents where the individual finds an optimal position between the need 
to conform and to self-express.
249
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Because identity recognition acknowledges the uniqueness of both the individual and 
group, it involves both personal and collective self-determination, making it an issue of 
civil liberties. Identity preservation often becomes political, particularly when dealing with 
shared identities, culture and the perception of associated injustices.
250
 Collective 
mobilisation to defend identity does not necessarily involve disloyalty to the state or a 
shared concept of citizenship. However, the popular media may portray it in this way given 
it often responds negatively to any specially claimed status that implies a rejection of 
dominant cultural, social or political-economic paradigms. Such actions are a human right 
and do not necessarily compete with ideas of national identity, indeed, they can be 
complementary, especially if they embrace liberal traditions.  
Identity is typically interpreted through the cultural lens of the viewer. For example, the 
wearing of a headscarf by some Muslim women is often criticised as a form of gender 
suppression, but many Muslim women feel this choice gives them more freedom, not less. 
It provides an escape from unrelenting cultural expectations or unwanted sexualisation 
generated by media and advertising which, ironically, promotes alternative forms of gender 
suppression and exploitation.
251
 Identity, however, can be associated with risks. This can 
occur where an identity is unbalanced or exclusive, such as when an individual freely 
chooses, or is deceived into accepting, a mono-identity of the kind often linked to political 
or theocratic fanaticism.
252
 The criticism that multiculturalism has an ideological effect, 
inferring it places principles of identity preference above those of the common good, is a 
misrepresentation. It also ignores that much human thought and behaviour is informed by 
an ideology of some sort. Such criticism is essentially a debate about whose ideology is 
better – a subjective and ultimately futile task, even if it is accepted there are some absolute 
standards that help determine preference. No matter which side is chosen, extreme 
ideology is particularly problematic because, by definition, it will not tolerate 
competitors.
253
 
There are dangers in excessive affiliation to any single identity and, in far-from-
equilibrium circumstances, most humans seem to want guidance from an authoritative 
figure that provides comfort through decisiveness, and who articulates their fears in simple 
terms.
254
 This is often ideological. Young people, especially those angered by injustice or 
alienated from society or their own community, are at risk of turning to radical doctrines. A 
major challenge for civil societies is to therefore remain engaged with those at risk of 
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surrendering their free will or identifying with mono-identities.
255
 Modood argues that, 
despite the caution with which nationalism should be viewed, there are protective factors 
associated with a healthy vision of a national identity and an acceptance that rights must be 
accompanied by civic obligations.
256
 Authentic multicultural democracies respect the 
identities of their citizens, accepting this as a cultural norm. They will also be made more 
cohesive by a sense of responsibility that accompanies rights. This form of social contract 
helps builds citizen loyalty and supports constructive responses to change and crises. 
Globalisation and its accompanying cultural products have eroded personal and collective 
identities, weakened national sovereignties and individual rights, and degraded 
citizenship.
257
 These trends, however, can be countered by citizens empowered by 
democracy and equity. The erosion of institutional and social conditions erodes the value 
of citizenship, whereas a robust citizenship, built on healthy civic participation and rights, 
helps protect institutions of state governance. Such symbiosis can provide the real value of 
national distinctiveness where citizens have strong individual and group identities and, in 
turn, actively defend the structures of nationhood. 
3.6 PUBLIC OPINION AND HOW IT IS SHAPED 
Public opinion is a potent force heavily influencing the direction of civil society. It can 
shape cultural trends, political decision-making and power dynamics. Paradoxically, it has 
the capacity to drive change and force reluctant public leaders to follow progressive 
measures; yet, is also susceptible to manipulation by forces that fear or seek to exploit it 
and, perversely, it can be harnessed to work against the public good.
258
 As observed by 
Mill over 150 years ago, public opinion can represent a form of tyranny as destructive and 
potent as that exercised by political despotism.
259
 Seen thus, public opinion has significant 
human-rights implications. 
Public opinion is most commonly influenced by politics, corporate interests and the media, 
although these are not easy to disaggregate given their interests are entwined. Jürgen 
Habermas argued that, in Western democracies, public opinion is susceptible to 
manipulation by elites (particularly politicians and capital).
260
 Herbert Blumer is less 
proscriptive than Habermas and believes public opinion differs from collective behaviour 
(as expression of mass consumer preference), it cannot be simply classified and may 
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comprise many opinions on numerous issues held simultaneously and in conflict.
261
 Toby 
Miller analyses the complex interplay between corporate and media interests, and how they 
have influenced US citizenship, consumption and public knowledge. He argues these 
forces have so altered America that it has become the least socially mobile Western nation. 
Given the dominance of market economics: 
the role of government has been redefined, at least rhetorically, from a sometimes feisty 
agent stabilizing labor and capital via redistribution, to a mendicant servant of capital with 
some residual duty of care to the citizenry.
262
 
Miller observes that even outwardly innocuous media, about the weather or food, are used 
politically and to reinforce consumption stereotypes. His is concerned that global 
commodity chains have influenced types of citizenship and political engagement, creating 
a culture of acquisition and belonging that is unaware, or moved by, ‗the oppressive, 
unhealthy and destructive character of the regime under which [US citizens] live and are 
governed‘.263 This failure highlights the difficulties of finding common ground between 
often-competing strands of the political right: economic conservatives (who are not 
necessarily social conservatives), and many social conservatives who often dismiss the 
principles of market economics. Economic conservatives may have fostered the current 
materialist climate but this is often critiqued by social or religious conservatives who see 
commercialism as too secular or as having harmful moral consequences.
264
 
An interesting comparison to Miller‘s theoretical approach is the qualitative research of 
Maggie Hamilton into the experience of being an Australian girl. Similarly, she is 
concerned with cradle-to-grave global marketing, the alliance of advertisers, child 
psychologists and social researchers in exploiting the vulnerabilities of children to sell 
goods and develop lifetime brand loyalty. Hamilton argues that the next generation of girls 
is at risk of becoming compulsive consumers: highly conformist, prematurely adult, 
sexually active, and obsessed with fashion, belonging and materialism. Simultaneously, 
they are at risk of mental-health problems, disconnection from realities (community, 
nature, their own exploitation) and evolving into a generation, collectively focused on 
acquisition and appearance. This is a form of gender abuse and violates the rights of the 
child. However, the problems are largely ignored because they are driven by corporations 
and advertisers, in tandem with a range of media, especially commercial television, the 
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internet and magazines, all coordinating their efforts to capture a receptive demographic. 
Hamilton argues that girls in late childhood define their social worth and success: 
by the brands they wear, eat and live with … functionality takes a back seat to the belief 
that along with ownership of a brand comes success and admiration ... Impressionable, 
and painfully vulnerable to social pressure, tweens and teens are willing to give up their 
inner freedom in exchange for the hopes of social acceptance ... promised by marketers.
265
 
Other feminists have echoed Hamilton‘s concerns. Melinda Tankard Reist fears these 
trends – mass media marketing, consumption and popular cultural product – reflect a 
‗pornographied‘ society. She says the messages delivered reflect a culture so obsessed with 
body image that the freedoms of young females are limited; the pressures are so powerful 
that we are producing a homogenised generation. Rather, we should encourage 
independent thought and exploration of the world that ‗goes beyond the airhead cult of 
celebrity and fashion – to have aspirations beyond being Miss Silicon 2008‘.266 
Although public opinion, consumer preferences and citizen knowledge are valued because 
they can be harnessed for profit and control, as Toby Miller ironically observes, 
‗glorification of consumers rarely endorses organized political action by them‘.267 Indeed, 
corporations often deploy the discourse of opposition to exploitation, repackaging it for 
their own interests. Meredith Levande, writing about the use of pornographic female 
images by the popular music industry, says the: 
use of feminist rhetoric with sexual commodification is not incidental; since media 
companies now distribute pornography, there is an economic interest in promoting ideals 
that are in line with the bottom line ... where all the outlets are forced to mainstream 
pornography in peer-pressure-filled efforts to keep up and compete.
268
 
Gail Dines agrees, documenting the strong links between ‗industrial scale‘ pornography, 
mass-marketing and popular culture.
269
  
Critics of the media‘s role in manipulating public opinion express concern that, as 
shareholders of public companies increasingly gain control of media organisations, profits 
become more important than the public good, and the news media chase stories that are 
quick and cheap to produce at the expense of considered, in-depth coverage. In this 
environment, images of the world are not so much reflected as they are refracted to 
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reinforce consumers‘ existing worldviews with all their embedded prejudices.270 
Hegemonic corporations, interested solely in profit maximisation, are unconcerned with 
individual freedoms, diversity or social inclusion, unless they can be exploited to increase 
sales or market share.
271
 Whether this is pursued through presenting difference as positive 
or through demonising difference is immaterial: it merely depends on which position is the 
most profitable. Advocacy for social justice is often more expensive for corporations than 
avoiding it. When profits are made outside of regulatory or normative moral frameworks, 
businesses may be at the sharp point of cultural, economic and political conflict.
272
 A 
persisting fear about commercial media, given its power and influence, is that these outlets 
are easily tempted to influence public opinion in clandestine ways: to behave illegally and, 
through combined threat and inducement, to corrupt others, including politicians and 
police. These were demonstrated to be genuine concerns when the protracted bribery, 
telephoning-hacking and related criminality at the UK branch of News Corporation 
between 2005 and 2011 became known.
273
 Journalist and activist John Pilger claims the 
media often colludes with kleptocratic governments; a view sympathetic with Boulding‘s 
observation that ‗a world of unseen dictatorship is conceivable, still using the forms of 
democratic government‘.274 Pilger argues that many democracies are succumbing to 
corporate dictatorship behind a media facade, where journalists, whether wittingly or not, 
are trained as: 
tribunes of an ideology that regards itself as non-ideological, that presents itself as the 
natural centre, the very fulcrum of modern life [that] may very well be the most powerful 
and dangerous ideology we have ever known because it is open-ended.
275
 
Echoing Berman‘s concerns about the common failings of liberal democracies in 
condoning or even sliding into extreme political views,
276
 Pilger warns (despite many of 
liberalism‘s benefits) of false perceptions and complacency, ‗if we deny its dangers, its 
open-ended project, and the all-consuming power of its propaganda, then we deny our right 
to true democracy‘.277 
Business as usual – whether political, financial or corporatised media – is difficult to 
redirect, not least because of the enormous momentum behind it.
278
 However, if businesses 
and media conglomerates are not regulated to curtail the worst offenders of malfeasance, 
the system of global capital is at risk. This is ironic, given that neoliberalism has 
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constructed a self-referential edifice with its own logic of self-regulation and perpetual 
growth, which is, simultaneously, self-destructive. This view of an internationally 
oppressive and influential media that is primarily motivated by business inducements and 
skewed by culturally narrow perspectives, is made by Philippa Atkinson. She complains 
media bias often deliberately obscures the real causes of conflicts, exaggerates the 
‗savagery‘ of those involved and complements a Western political agenda that often fuels 
peripheral wars by condoning exploitative free-market practices. This remains ‗part of a 
broader post-Cold War trend of the establishment of the supremacy of the Western liberal 
ideology and market-driven culture‘.279 If the clash-of-civilizations concept has validity, it 
could be applied to the way – in rich and poor nations alike – public opinions are shaped 
by the monolithic assault of Western values and modes of consumption that are largely 
invented media products. 
Public reactions to the Schapelle Corby trial in Indonesia, in 2005, illustrate the way the 
media and public opinion can feed off each other. This was an example of how fascination 
with a celebrity (however defined) can shift rapidly – favoured one week, victimised the 
next, criminalised the week after, then redeemed. The saga of celebrity role-changing can 
last for years, feeding a seemingly endless hunger for information, recycled innuendo or 
accusation. These narratives become a form of desublimated expression, or projection, of 
the human condition. In the Corby case, audience reactions to media reports were often 
racist: they assumed Corby was innocent, the Indonesian legal system would fail to deliver 
justice,
280
 and an Islamic Indonesian judiciary would issue racially biased judgements – 
phobias laced with irony and error.
281
 With the lens of commercial media often distorting 
international events, vulnerable audiences may be incited to respond xenophobically 
towards other cultures, persuaded the world is violent and their fears legitimate. As 
Corby‘s story unfolded over the years, combined with revelations of a criminal history in 
the family, her victim status changed and, with it, public opinion. There seemed to be 
resentment about previously felt empathy or her betrayal of a communal sense of 
superiority over foreign barbarism. Nevertheless, with many opportunities for future 
interpolation of Corby‘s life-vagaries, this attitude may change with audiences having her 
story implanted in their collective consciousness. This is a similar experience to the 
Chamberlain family. Their case evolved into a multi-decade tale of intrigue and 
accusations after the disappearance of their child, Azaria, at Uluru in 1980.
282
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In Australia, the media encompass a wide range of technologies, political orientations and 
audiences, although electronic and print media are largely privatised and in the hands of 
large corporations such as News Ltd and Fairfax. The main alternative is a small 
community broadcasting sector and government-owned, free-to-air networks (ABC and 
SBS), which provide television, radio and internet services. Privately owned cable 
television has increased the number of available channels, Satellite TV has brought further 
diversity and the internet offers vast opportunities for smaller private and community 
organisations to produce content.
283
 Nevertheless, media controlled by major corporate 
players dominate – with egregious content conformity – information and entertainment 
consumed by most audiences. Thus, the advertiser–publisher relationship shapes the media 
landscape and greatly influences Australian social and cultural life. 
The mass media broadly reflects the belief that Australia is a secular society with Judaeo–
Christian values,
284
 although there are often tensions between a secular world-view and 
Christian-influenced ethics that find expression in the media. Most ethnic community 
conflicts tend to be reported and interpreted in culturally deterministic ways that seldom 
consider other possible causes, although most commentary is based on a cultural 
perspective that reflects Australian norms. These norms are often reinforced by the 
attitudes of influential citizens, particularly politicians, frequently reported in the media. A 
2009 study of public statements across the major political parties revealed the influence of 
embedded conservative Christian values or cultural assumptions.
285
 Although politicians, 
like all citizens, have the right to freely practice any religion or hold any beliefs, problems 
may arise if this is not disclosed or is used mischievously to influence or ‗wedge‘ public 
opinion.
286
 
Print media content ranges from ostensibly balanced and factual reports to opinion pieces; 
the latter are dominated by the views of polarising commentators (sometimes called ‗trolls‘ 
for their aggressive or opinionated style) who are typically conservative and suspicious of 
pluralism and human rights.
287
 Talkback hosts on commercial radio reflect similar views 
and are commonly drawn from the same group. They attempt to exploit prejudices among 
listeners and mobilise public opinion, often against Muslims, refugees, asylum seekers and 
other diaspora communities, although this easily shifts to other targets as opportunities 
arise, such as the unemployed, single mothers, ‗greenies‘ or Indigenous Australians.288 
There has also been debate about the content and effects of reporting from newsrooms. 
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Some researchers have argued there persists a systematic bias, and a longitudinal review of 
the print media revealed a deeply embedded set of views that reinforce Anglo-Christian (or 
at least, Western) worldviews.
289
 If true, such biases would merely reflect the broad form 
of Australian society, even if undesirable because of its potential subjectivity. In a 
culturally and religiously plural society, when prejudiced views are presented as objective 
truth, there are likely to be ramifications for social cohesion. 
Despite occasional lapses by newsrooms, and the opinions of a small group of columnists 
and vitriolic commercial broadcasters, Australian media are full of what can be described 
as lifestyle stories. Indeed, this comprises much of the print media. These continue to 
reflect consumer preferences which are increasingly integrated into a globalised world 
interested in overseas travel, ethnic cuisines, foreign film, arts, crafts and goods reflecting 
cultures and values distinct from those of mainstream Australia. 
Nevertheless, the media often functions in vicious cycles: fears about intercultural violence 
and social conflict can fuel fears in the wider community which, in turn, creates media 
copy for further fear-mongering. Some in the media have short-term interest in doing this 
because it provides self-perpetuating stories with sensational content.
290
 Since 2001, the 
media‘s relation with Islam has been particularly controversial. In Australia, as in other 
countries, there has been repeated negative stereotyping that reinforces prejudices about 
Muslims, along with a tendency to link reporting about terrorism with Islam.
291
 While 
terrorist attacks are a legitimate (albeit remote) concern, and the media have a role to 
inform the public of real threats, reporting that reflexively makes this association has 
significantly effected Australian Muslims and undermined community relations.
292
 Muslim 
frustration with this approach continues to be reported in research.
293
  
This century, the main incidents attracting frenzied media attention in Australia were, first, 
the events that began when the Norwegian boat Tampa rescued asylum seekers from a 
sinking vessel off the West Australian coast. This occurred just prior to the 9/11 attacks 
and was followed (among other events) by the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, the 
Australian embassy bombing in 2004 in Jakarta, the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 and the 
attempted attacks in 2007, numerous arrests of alleged ‗homegrown‘ terrorists in England 
and Australia, as well as years of horrific internecine conflict in Iraq and ongoing conflict 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Howard government adeptly used Tampa, and 
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subsequent incidents, to reinforce through the media, a connection between Muslim asylum 
seekers and the risk of domestic terrorism.
294
 This manipulation, repeated in following 
years, embedded a relationship between the communication agents of government, and 
certain members of the media, which compounded perceptions in the community that 
Muslims are a threat, Islam is an inherently violent religion, and national security should 
be a higher priority than human rights.
295
 Peter Manning argues that ‗dog whistling‘ 
became common in Australian fear-politics in the post-Tampa period. Dog whistling refers 
to the use of language that appears superficially neutral but contains a hidden narrative of 
alternative ‗meanings‘. For those who use it, the utility of dog whistling is its plausible 
deniability even when its encoded messages of fear and division inflict social harm.
296
 The 
way mass media and politics have colluded to shape Australian public opinion has been 
analysed by Josh Fear who argues, because many voters privately hold views far more 
extreme than those generally accepted, politicians must choose between leading: 
public opinion on an emotionally charged issue such as race and risk a voter backlash, or 
they can take a populist approach and inflame prejudice in the community. Some want to 
have it both ways: to send a message of support to voters with racist leanings, but not to 
alienate those for whom an appeal to prejudice would be anathema.
297
 
Dog whistling is frequently a tactic used by politicians who work covertly with (usually 
extreme right-wing) commentators ‗to disseminate the right messages‘.298 Mastering the art 
of double meaning, of presenting texts with both exoteric and esoteric content, was a key 
strategy of Leo Strauss, the political philosopher who most influenced US neo-
conservatism. It is perhaps unsurprising this has morphed into the vulgar form of dog 
whistling now employed by his widely disbursed students in Republican administrations, 
from where the tactic has spread.
299
 
Local and state media also played a role in publicising one of the most divisive issues 
involving Muslims. Due to rapid growth, improving prosperity and geographic spread, 
Muslim communities have often sought to build new religious schools or mosques. 
Planning decisions about development applications are the responsibility of local 
governments, and such applications have triggered local protests. These have not been 
limited to concerns relating to zoning and development such as changes in traffic flow and 
noise but have sometimes included religious and cultural bigotry. Tabloids and talkback 
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radio keenly commentated on these events, their approach ranging from balanced to 
inflammatory. For example, in May 2008, a local council rejected on zoning grounds an 
application to build an Islamic school in the outer, south-western Sydney region of 
Camden; this gained national media coverage, and locals were recorded vociferously and 
offensively complaining they did not want the school built in their community.
300 
Such 
events have also fuelled satiric comedy. The ABC television satire The Chaser publicly 
displayed a model of a mosque in the wealthy Anglo-Australian Sydney suburb of 
Mosman; it advised local residents it was to be built nearby and filmed the generally 
horrified reactions of passers-by.
301 
Humour, here, highlighted largely hidden problems 
relating to more-covert local-government decisions about such matters. One study into the 
way councils use by-laws to limit the rights of cultural and religious minorities suggests 
these decisions are often problematic.
302
 
The most notorious event of recent years involving the Australian media and Muslim 
communities was the December 2005 riots at Cronulla, a beachside suburb in southern 
Sydney. Some 5,000 people gathered to ‗protect their beach‘ from a perceived threat of 
Muslim men or ‗Lebs‘ (people of Lebanese ancestry, not necessarily making any 
distinction with Muslims) arriving from western Sydney to use the beach and, allegedly, to 
harass local women and lifesavers. Cronulla is the only seaside suburb with a rail link to 
the hotter western suburbs where many Muslims and people of Middle-Eastern ancestry 
live. The subsequent police report noted the role of certain media players who helped 
instigate and organise the event. In particular, one commercial-radio talkback commentator 
gave airtime and encouragement to racist agitators, approving their hate-speech.
303
 Such 
events, where the media shapes public opinion about Muslims, are not unique.
304
 It has 
been a trend across the world, often because of the multinational structure of conventional 
media, which share stories as well as inherent editorial biases.
305
Although victims of poor 
media standards are usually minority, disempowered or visibly different groups, in other 
regards they are everybody. For example, the media have consistently passed judgement on 
the illicit drug trade. Public health experts have argued for years that zero-tolerance 
approaches (like alcohol prohibition in the US) have only served the interests of organised 
crime, doing little for users.
306
 No matter the medical and social evidence or the authority 
and criticisms of the approach, a rational debate on reform is impossible because much of 
the commercial media are sensationalist, and advocate of punitive policing and sentencing 
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measures.
307
 Despite decades of failure and immeasurable human suffering, the media 
ensure that alternative approaches to the problem are continuously stymied. 
At its worst – and failures at the now-defunct News of the World provide an example – 
when the mass media is unaccountable or perverted not only will it intimidate 
governments, corrupt police, and behave cruelly to victims it sees as threats or 
newsworthy, it also determines what people know, believe, and think.
308
 A study by 
Wendy Bacon into Australian press reportage on the issue of climate change highlights 
how the media achieves such control. She says the issue is not ‗one of free speech or the 
right of a few individuals to push their ideas but the market power of a dominant company 
to build support for particular policies‘.309 Bacon documents News Ltd‘s near monopoly 
and the flagrant bias presented in articles and opinion pieces targeting government policy 
and climate science.
310
 Given its principles and methodology, bias is inappropriate in a 
profession committed to objectivity, autonomy, immediacy, ethical standards and 
providing a public service.
311 
The problem is that the quantity and quality of journalism 
produced by the formal media is declining; indeed, it is increasingly opinionated, 
inaccurate, and propagandises the interests of those corporations that employ journalists.
312 
Such blurring of truth – what Marshall McLuhan referred to, half a century ago, as the 
messages embedded in the medium and Packard warned as the hidden persuasions of 
advertising – are now the status quo in converged, transnational information and marketing 
products.
313 
We now live in what Kenneth Galbraith described as a society where people 
are ‗surrounded by a systematic appeal to a dream world which all mature, scientific reality 
would reject‘; it is one where its members advertise their ‗commitment to immaturity, 
mendacity and profound gullibility. It is the hallmark of our culture.‘314 This is not in the 
public interest; it does not strengthen civil society, nor does it protect ideals of human 
freedom, rights and agency. 
While these trends in mass media and advertising are alarming, they also need to be seen in 
the context of counter trends. Some of these are positive; others are not. On one side of the 
picture is the decline of traditional media institutions, such as the ‗media mogul‘ who 
controls national or global networks of radio, television, newspapers and even film, music 
and web production. Here, the old business model of tabloid and broadsheet newspaper 
printing is in serious decline and the public often gain information from other, often free, 
sources. This is eroding the ideological monoliths of public-opinion formation that have 
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shaped mass media for more than a century.
315 
Although some may welcome the trend to 
more sceptical, resourceful or quizzical audiences, this is only part of the picture. The 
internet, indeed convergent technologies, was heralded as a catalyst for diversity and 
creativity, but unsurprisingly, people have not always used them this way. Rather than 
democratising knowledge and opening minds, the opposite may be occurring, although 
traditional media outlets are actively responding to these challenges to their authority.
316 
For all its faults, mainstream media and cultural product promoted a degree of social 
normality that was largely inclusive (even if intolerant of ideas or groups on the periphery 
of norms). Now, because the citizen can tailor the media they receive, the information they 
read, the truth they know and the opinions they wish to hear, this is driving people into 
ever-narrowing groups and marginal opinions. It is not encouraging an open society or an 
exchange of ideas; instead, it is self-reinforcing user-generated content.
317 
Anyone can 
become a citizen journalist or opinion author. This does not necessarily mean they are an 
expert writer, trained journalist or reliable researcher – and their motives may be far from 
enlightened.
318
 Indeed, the new realm of the media as shaper and reflector of public 
opinion is often the prejudiced views of anonymous authors who communicate with virtual 
communities in the blogosphere.
319
 Everybody has (or should have) the right to personal 
expression and the opportunities provided by social media have had demonstrable 
democratic effects.
320
 Yet, the issue of how social media operates is fraught. The principle 
that applies to conventional social domains should perhaps be applied to this new realm as 
well. Web-based hate speech is not an opinion expressed in private: it is a public statement 
to the world. The laws of defamation and discrimination that place limits and impose 
penalties for such expressions in the real world should equally apply to the virtual world. 
The law, however, still has far to go to address this new media and its negative effects.
321
 
COMMENT 
This chapter does not pretend to comprehensively examine civil societies. Civil societies 
are shaped by factors mentioned only obliquely: education, open justice, law enforcement, 
democratic participation, community engagement, transparent governance and healthy 
environments. The list is too long to cover thoroughly. However, the selection of issues 
examined was not arbitrary. My goal was, first, to help answer one of the questions raised 
in the Introduction: not only what, but why the things that are happening are happening. 
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The second goal was to make connections between culture, rights and civil society because 
they relate to the case for the role of cultural institutions made in Chapter 5.  
Humans are agents and arbitrators of their survival or extinction. Repeatedly, we have 
invented the means of our flourishing or demise. The ancient Sumerians believed they 
were witnessing the end of days when their carefully cultivated world was erased by floods 
unconsciously orchestrated by their own works.
322
 Not as cataclysmic (yet), our networked, 
international civilization has rendered itself vulnerable in different but equally dangerous 
ways. Existing cultural preferences, social pressures and the political economy all conspire 
to erode agency, responsibility and standards consistent with global ethics. Instinctive 
behaviours, the primacy of the market and the exercising of power all combine to inhibit 
real opportunities for human-flourishing. For example, when Hamilton and Denniss 
observe, ‗the epidemic of psychological disorders is, at least in part, the price we are 
paying for decades of economic reform, the ceaseless promotion of market values, and the 
associated erosion of traditional supports in family and community‘, they acknowledge 
those trends limiting opportunities for a system which could better provide  opportunities 
for inner freedom (the particular), cultural liberty and other outer rights (the universal).
323
  
I particularly wish to highlight links between individual preferences, collective norms and 
identities (this chapter) and wider trends in cultural and social change, the political 
economy, demographics and the physical environment (Chapter 2), which, in turn, have 
had effects (across local to global levels) on development, distributive equity and stability. 
Human needs, behaviours and beliefs – combined with available resources and 
environmental assets – are the root causes of social and cultural formations. These 
symbiotically shape, and are vulnerable to being influenced by, inventions that compete 
with other volitions (for power, dominance, wealth). Single and group beings and doings at 
once fulfil and fuel need, development and invention, but simultaneously destroy, exploit 
and deplete. The capacity for imagination, morality, agency, self-actualisation and 
aspiration are unique human qualities – although offset by equally strong requirements for 
affirmation through conformity, belonging and status. These relationships are depicted 
(albeit, simplistically) in Figure 3.3, which shows innate needs for inner, outer and group 
freedoms (denoting requirements for individual and social expression) and how these 
function within the context of a wider society, which, in turn, is part of a global setting 
with its parameters of ecological limits and cultural, economic and social effects.  
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This view has parallels with Korten‘s argument that there was a shift in attitude towards 
community, which began approximately 5,000 years ago with emergence of the idea of 
‗empire‘. He links this with studies on gender, scale and religiosity. His thesis is that, for 
most of human history, deities were linked to fecundity, nurturing and protection. These 
were feminine earth gods, ensuring balance and dialogue within social groups, including 
early city-states. The earth gods were eventually paganised and replaced by sky gods, or 
masculine gods of empire building linked to domination, expansion and hierarchy 
(although, as a practising Christian, Korten makes the proviso there were concurrent 
traditions of nurture and egalitarianism within sky-god faiths). These are largely opposite 
social, cultural and power paradigms. One is about birth, husbandry and dialogue (the 
feminine) and the other war, destruction and authority (the masculine). The experience of 
empire and its associated values of privilege, exploitation and favouritism are generally 
accepted as the norm, because histories are typically written by imperial chroniclers. 
However, this history and the behaviours linked to it have been catastrophic to most 
people, and to the environment. Korten calls for a rebalancing between these intuitive 
gendered tendencies, believing democratic free communities that live within the 
biosphere‘s limits are the necessary condition for survival.324 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The relationship between the total environment, civil society and 
the human need for freedoms 
Civil society, besieged by consumerism and mass-marketing, appears increasingly brittle. 
Simultaneously, state power has been undermined by globalisation, especially from threats 
to economic sovereignty, and politicians have often capitalised on opportunities afforded 
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by community fears. As a controversial BBC program posits, politicians have discovered 
new ways of restoring their authority: 
Instead of delivering dreams, politicians now promise to protect us from nightmares. They 
say they will rescue us from dreadful dangers we cannot see and do not understand. And 
the greatest danger of all is international terrorism … But much of this threat ... is a dark 
illusion spread unquestioned by governments around the world, secret services and the 
international media.
325
 
Clement agrees about the role of politics. He warns that history teaches us, where ‗there is 
a reassertion of military solutions to political problems without an exhaustion of non-
violent negotiated solutions, citizen rights and fundamental democratic principles are 
jeopardized‘.326 
Humans tend to respond to the challenges of diversity and change either conservatively or 
progressively. Conservative voices have been loud in recent years,
327
 warning les exclus, or 
the ‗Other‘, will destabilise society, take jobs, devour resources, eschew ‗mainstream‘ 
attitudes, and that security is guaranteed by enforced conformity.
328
 The progressive path is 
different. Here, pluralism is normalised, nourishing communities, promoting 
cosmopolitanism and a global citizenship that embraces the values of compassion abroad 
and active engagement at home. These attitudes are not based on ‗tolerance‘ but on the 
principle that, when people behave with reciprocal respect, differences can be negotiated 
and conflicts resolved.
329
 Progressive approaches are primarily rights-based and recognise 
that with freedoms come responsibilities, violence is not a solution, and democracy, the 
rule of law and social justice are protected. Such approaches rely heavily on the civic 
moral sophistication and resilience of citizens: qualities eroded in recent decades. Carl 
Ungerer argues community resilience requires a better understanding about what it means 
to be a member of a diverse, modern state where rights and responsibilities of both the state 
and its citizens relies on agreement around values. This requires peoples of different faiths, 
cultures and beliefs to ‗explore their pluralism and diversity through a common political 
process and a shared public morality‘.330 
I hope to have at least partly illustrated that it is illusory to believe the existing social, 
economic and environmental conditions are satisfactory. Although utopian dreams are 
unrealistic, this should not deflect humans from aspiring to more equitable and engaged 
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forms of civic life, nor from imagining pathways to do so.
331
 Carl Sagan‘s reflection on the 
relative insignificance of the pale-blue dot of Earth shares, across the millennia, the spirit 
of Somnium Scipionis.
332
 For all humanity‘s: 
imagined self-importance [and] delusion that we have some privileged position in the 
Universe ... Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark. In our 
obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save 
us from ourselves.
333
 
This recurring apprehension can provide motivation for transformative action. As various 
authors argue, there is a need for a transition or turning: to find balance between the market 
and non-market, the private and public, growth and its limits, the individual and 
community.
334
 Thus, it may be possible to ensure future societies are worth inhabiting 
because they respect civil liberties, are peaceful, sustainable, creative, prosperous, and 
function in dynamic-equilibrium. 
We need to re-imagine how these societies might look. In many ways they will mirror 
current arrangements; in other ways, they will be decidedly different. For example, such a 
society will have a restructured economy, less self-interested media, a re-engineered 
welfare state, restrained plutocracy and strengthened democratic structures. New industries 
(e.g. solar, wind, thermal and hydropower generation), improved and sustainable food 
production (e.g. organic farming or ‗slow food‘), expanded human services (e.g. education, 
mentoring, health, aged, respite and child care), experiential amenities (e.g. cultural, 
artistic and community development
335
), urban renewal (e.g. maintenance, enhancement, 
greening and restoration) and ecological reconstruction (e.g. removal of waste, pests and 
pollutants; revegetation and the consolidation of degraded systems) are some activities of 
future free-market civil societies, based on productivity without growth, that are 
environmentally, culturally and socially sustainable, and compliant with principles of 
human development and rights.
336
 In such steady-states, humans will have to share more, 
mobilise their bodies more, and be more socially connected.
337
 This will bring significant 
benefits in terms of health, equity and creativity. In these societies, cultural institutions will 
have opportunities to fulfil activist and leadership roles as never before. 
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[4]   CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE NORMATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK  
Thus far, this thesis has largely discussed context: the challenges facing the world, some of 
the social and policy issues important for building respectful and cohesive societies and the 
implications of cultural liberty and freedom. This was presented within the broader 
framework of human rights, global ethics and capabilities. Part 2 builds on this context.   
Chapter 4 examines how understandings about culture are evolving, especially in relation to 
converging issues of sustainability, development and peace-building. Cultural expression and 
creativity are necessary for greater human flourishing and a full realisation of rights, they are 
also meaningful and enacted by people locally and in the context of their lived social, 
environmental, political and cultural milieu. This is the terrain where cultural institutions – 
particularly museums – will need to maintain and expand their niches. It examines the 
significance of culture: first, by analysing some of the international literature, conventions 
and concerns about cultural rights, and second, by reflecting (in Chapter 5) on the challenges 
facing cultural institutions, given the range of challenges to future human well-being.   
As noted in Chapter 1, culture describes some of the most complex and varied human 
creative products as well as social, ethical, spiritual, ideological, political, behavioural and 
ontological conditions, knowledge and actions. The word ‗culture‘ has many uses and 
meanings, and is understood in widely varying ways by different people in a variety of places 
and times. Sixty years ago, culture was still understood as referring to ‗civilization‘ or ‗the 
arts‘: equally elastic terms. Today, after decades of post-modern, structuralist and relativist 
critique, these notions (culture, art and civilization) are viewed less absolutely and with more 
ambiguity than in the past.
1
  
4.1 UNESCO’S CHANGING UNDERSTANDING OF THE MEANING & 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURE 
The evolution of the understanding of culture is reflected in the definitions found across 
publications released by UNESCO since 1946, the year the organisation was established. 
Compared with the way culture was defined several decades ago, the definition of culture in 
UNESCO‘s Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue (2009 World Report) 
reflects the shifting knowledge about what culture is, its importance to humanity, and its 
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association with human rights. The Helman definition (in Chapter 1) is largely functional: it 
explains the way culture is formed and functions within social units and how it influences 
individual thoughts and actions. UNESCO‘s approach to defining culture is more meta-
analytical. It amalgamates, summarises and reviews a global body of knowledge about 
cultural functionalism. A review of UNESCO‘s definitions provides a useful way of viewing 
how convergences around culture, sustainability, security and human rights have developed 
over the last half century, and how these have informed various reports, action plans and 
treaties. 
UNESCO was established in the immediate postwar period and, like the umbrella UN, its 
mandate focused on peace-building and human rights. UNESCO‘s approach to conflict 
prevention was to encourage mutual respect through education that aimed to overcome the 
ignorance and suspicion that have often led to violent conflicts. UNESCO‘s Constitution 
famously states, because ‗wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the 
defences of peace must be constructed‘.2 UNESCO promoted culture because it believed 
sharing ‗artistic riches‘ would help to build global peace. The concept of ‗unity in diversity‘ 
was coined to describe how, through mutual understanding, people could be freed from their 
separate cultures and better enjoy the common heritage of humanity.
3
 In the earliest 
UNESCO reports of the late 1940s, culture refers to works of art (‗the fruit of culture‘);4 the 
role of culture as a determinant of human identity was not yet defined.
5
 
As well as postwar peace-building, one of UNESCO‘s urgent tasks was to help redress 
culture-related crimes committed during the Second World War. For this purpose, it defined 
culture largely in terms of property and its theft in the Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954 (Hague Convention). This treaty 
was a response to the Nazi despoliation of cultural sites (the great museums, libraries and 
galleries of Europe), as well as the theft of cultural property, primarily from European Jewry, 
and its removal to collection sites within the Third Reich.
6
 These actions were primarily 
motivated by greed and, although the Nazis were generally antagonistic to ‗degenerate‘ art 
(works typically produced by Jews, primitives, socialists and ‗the insane‘7), they were more 
preoccupied with the pressing tasks of racially-motivated human genocide than with 
genocide through stealth, or the eradication of groups through indirect means as was 
occurring, for example, at the same time in Australia.
8
  
   223 | Page  
 
The Hague Convention defined cultural property in three ways. The first two definitions 
relate to property with universal cultural-heritage values, such as immoveable monuments of 
architecture, art and history. These include religious, secular and archaeological sites, as well 
as groups of structures. The second definition covers moveable property: items such as 
manuscripts, books, art or collections.
9
 The third definition encompasses cultural property, 
which includes those buildings that preserve or protect movable cultural property, as well as 
‗centres containing monuments‘ (‗centres‘ meaning cities or neighbourhoods).10 These 
definitions illustrate that culture was already understood as an endowment existing in relation 
to a wider, inhabited, living, human ecology. The Hague Convention also reflected the 
thinking that was developing at that time about the importance of culture to peoples‘ quality 
of life. As early as the fifth session of the General Conference in 1950, it was noted that the 
UDHR – which had been promulgated two years previously – affirmed ‗everyone has the 
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community (and) to enjoy the arts‘.11 By 
1951, some cultural activities were classified as actions that served human rights. Because 
the early 1950s were a period of escalating postwar decolonisation – with culture claiming an 
important place in the identity politics of nation building – it was increasingly recognised 
that culture (as a vector of UNESCO‘s peace-building mandate) could no longer be 
understood solely as meaning works of art.
12
  
In the year of its introduction the Hague Convention was immediately expanded with a first 
protocol; 44 years later, in 1999, the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention (Second 
Protocol) was adopted. At this time, during the various ethnic and faith-based conflicts 
between Balkan states after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Europe witnessed a return of the 
types of crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis and their allies half a century 
earlier. The deliberate targeting of cultural property, in particular by Serbian forces, not only 
contravened the Hague Convention, but was also a deliberate attempt to commit cultural 
genocide.
13
 This attempt was pursued through the eradication of the traditions, stable 
community structures, infrastructure (such as buildings) and movable heritage materials 
(paintings, books, manuscripts), which comprised a meaningful ethnic, religious and cultural 
context for minority communities who had been an integral part of the Balkans for 
centuries.
14
 In this context, the Second Protocol maintained the definition of cultural property 
used in the Hague Convention (article 1(b)) but aimed to ensure it better complemented 
‗rules governing the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict [and to] … 
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reflect developments in international law‘.15 The Second Protocol, therefore, was responding 
to the ways in which culture was being used by the late 1990s as part of the ‗armoury‘ of 
some combatants in military conflicts. It is interesting to compare this recent codicil, even if 
it is more inferred in those UNESCO cultural conventions of four and six years later, where 
we see tangible evidence of changing notions of culture.  
The type of cultural genocide inflicted during the Balkan conflicts was specifically addressed 
in the UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 
2003, which notes those clauses in the Hague Convention‘s preamble that explains damage 
to cultural property represents damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind.
16
 It also links 
the protection of culture with human rights, the preamble stating, ‗intentional destruction 
may have adverse consequences on human dignity and human rights‘. It requires states to 
respect rules relating to ‗the criminalisation of gross violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, in particular, when intentional destruction of cultural heritage 
is linked to those violations‘.17 Article I warns that destroying cultural property prevents the 
transmission of knowledge to future generations; although this article is not linked 
specifically to human rights, it does infer that an intergenerational right is violated through 
the intentional destruction of cultural heritage. The events in the Balkans, as an example, 
clearly had human-rights implications.
18
 The destruction of cultural heritage directly effected 
the rights of those who were being deliberately targeted. This is because human identity, 
through membership of a shared community, participation in cultural activities, access to 
culturally appropriate education, freedom of religion and belief, and practice of beliefs, are 
all rights described in the UDHR and protected in subsequent conventions.
19
 
Article 6 of the Second Protocol (‗respect for cultural property‘) states there is no 
justification for attacking cultural property unless, through its function, it has been 
deliberately made into a military objective. Even so, the principle of ‗proportionality‘ must 
be applied to minimise the effect on the site in question. Article 7 (‗precautions in attack‘) 
outlines how, in cases of armed conflict, military forces must do whatever possible to verify 
whether the object of an attack has immovable cultural significance or contains materials of 
movable cultural value. If it does, attacks should be cancelled, suspended, or care taken to 
reduce the damage to cultural property to a minimum. Article 15 (‗serious violations under 
this Protocol‘) states it is an offence for any person to intentionally make protected cultural 
property the object of an attack,
20
 to deliberately use cultural property or its surroundings as a 
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part of a military action,
21
 or to steal, pillage or vandalise cultural property.
22
 These articles 
in the Second Protocol emphasise the importance of cultural property and the duty of care 
imposed on combatants in the field to ensure it is protected. The reasons are not solely for the 
intrinsic value to humanity of significant heritage, but also for the human and cultural-rights 
implications of its destruction, theft or vandalism.  
Moving forward 16 years – from promulgation of the Hague Convention to the next 
UNESCO treaty relating to culture – the definition of cultural property was changed and 
expanded in the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970 (1970 Convention). Cultural 
property now includes specimens of flora, fauna and minerals and objects of palaeontological 
interest; property relating to history, technology and social history; objects of ethnological 
interest; musical instruments; and sound, photographic and cinematic materials.
23
 This shows 
how culture was now perceived as more than iconic works of civilization; it includes 
ephemera, the practical tools of civilization, and samples of important natural heritage. The 
treaty reflects some of the remaining legacies of the Second World War, such as the need to 
address misappropriated cultural property, but more specifically focuses on the fragility and 
endangered status of much culture. For instance, the preamble says, ‗it is essential for every 
State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect its own cultural 
heritage and that of all nations‘, and that cultural institutions ‗should ensure that their 
collections are built up in accordance with universally recognized moral principles‘.24 This 
indicates that the protection of culture was increasingly being linked to the protection of 
human rights; it placed clear obligations on cultural institutions to consider human rights 
along with ethical acquisition practices, and to reconsider the retention of those artefacts with 
ambiguous provenance or ambivalent ownership status.
25
 
The definitions contained in the 1970 Convention were expanded two years later in the next 
UNESCO cultural convention – perhaps the best known of all its treaties – the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972 (World 
Heritage Convention). Its preamble states: 
cultural heritage and natural heritage are increasingly threatened with destruction not only 
by the traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic conditions 
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which aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of damage or 
destruction.
26
  
Harking back to the 1940s‘ defence of universal cultural and natural heritage values, the 
World Heritage Convention states these are important to all peoples, and there must be 
safeguarding of ‗this unique and irreplaceable property … as part of the world heritage of 
mankind as a whole … [given] the magnitude and gravity of the new dangers threatening 
them‘.27 Whereas earlier treaties had tended to focus on culture as property, the World 
Heritage Convention is concerned with heritage more generally, dividing it into three broad 
categories. The first is monuments, which includes architecture, monumental sculptures and 
paintings, cave dwellings and the like, ‗of outstanding universal value from the point of view 
of history, art or science‘.28 The second category is buildings and sites that are ‗works of man 
or the combined works of nature and man‘, including those of universal value from 
historical, aesthetic, anthropological and ethnological points of view.
29
 The third comprises 
geological and physiographical formations (especially endangered habitat), natural sites of 
beauty or importance to science, and natural features of value from either aesthetic or 
scientific points of view.
30
 The World Heritage Convention is noteworthy for regarding 
world heritage as definitively either of natural heritage significance, human heritage 
significance, or (simultaneously) of both human and natural heritage significance. This 
linking of broad heritage types heralds later recognition that human relationships with the 
environment are of primary importance to culture, and that actions are required to sustain the 
biosphere. However, as the 1970s progressed, attention was increasingly turned to the need 
to protect and preserve not only the natural world but also culture in all its forms.
31
  
Leaving aside the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2001 
(specific to the protection, salvaging, archaeology and ownership of materials collected from 
underwater sites and related laws of the sea), the next UNESCO convention illustrating 
significant development in the understanding of culture did not appear until 31 years later. 
By the time the Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH 
Convention) was adopted in 2003, two years after the proclamation of the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2001 (UDCD), a new discourse on culture, human rights, 
global ecology and sustainability had emerged. The lacuna between the World Heritage 
Convention and the ICH Convention, nevertheless, was a period during which progress was 
made in understanding culture. In particular, over the course of these three decades, 
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awareness of the exponential effects of globalisation became apparent. This recognition is 
reflected in the Mexico Declaration on Cultural Policies (Mexico Declaration) released after 
the World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mondiacult in 1982. The Mexico 
Declaration provided a new way of describing culture, explaining that, in its widest sense, 
culture includes: 
the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that 
characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also 
modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and 
beliefs.
32
  
The Mexico Declaration strongly focuses on the importance of culture in development and 
the human right to culture,
33
 acknowledging the links to individual identity and self-
determination. This recognises qualities about culture that reflect both the universal and the 
particular: processes that are deeply personal and local, yet with transcendent qualities giving 
them the potential to build dialogue across humanity.
34
 Although the wording of the Mexico 
Declaration demonstrates an increasingly sophisticated analysis of culture, it has not been 
without criticism. One such is the ambiguity about whether it describes the diversity of 
expressions or merely forms of social organisation.
35
 
The conceptual changes between 1972 and 2003 encompassed several areas. These included 
an appreciation that development should not be restricted to economics and the goals of 
growth should include cultural development, individual and collective fulfilment, and general 
welfare. By the time the issue was discussed at the Stockholm Conference in 1998, culture 
was recognised as perhaps humanity‘s greatest asset and essential for sustainable progress.36 
Another area of conceptual refinement was respect for the role of cultural diversity in social 
inclusion, whether of endogenous cultural minorities or transnational diasporas from various 
cultural settings. As early as the 1980s, the debate about culture, therefore, was seen as 
critical for community harmony in multicultural nations. By the time the Mexico Declaration 
was issued, this understanding included an acceptance that, in an interdependent world, no 
culture can exist in isolation and that cultural diversity must be managed within societies; 
this reinforced culture as a potentially political issue. Following from this principle was the 
need to pursue intercultural dialogue in peace-building. In a globalised world, it was 
recognised that much diversity is at risk of disappearing, particularly in societies facing the 
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onslaught of Western (notably US) cultural content and values. This demanded they required 
protection; as such, by the late 1990s cultural policy was viewed as a key plank of 
sustainable development.
37
  
The ICH Convention presented important priorities for action in the redefined domain of 
culture that was anticipated, but not fully developed, in the Mexico Declaration. Adoption of 
the ICH Convention marked the culmination, after 50 years, of a comprehensive suite of 
treaties covering:  
 the protection of culture during armed conflict 
 the illicit trafficking of cultural property 
 iconic cultural artefacts that are moveable, immoveable and tangible 
 natural heritage  
 cultural landscapes 
 human underwater heritage 
 intangible heritage (the most fluid and fragile, yet fundamental to identity and 
expression).
38
  
Intangible heritage is a form of culture, which Richard Kurin describes as ‗the culture that 
people practice as part of their daily lives … often described as the underlying ―spirit‖ of a 
cultural group‘.39 The ICH Convention has been seen as a complementary instrument to the 
World Heritage Convention (which the former references in its preamble
40
). It is linked to the 
2001 Proclamation of the Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage (2001 
Proclamation), which lists the first 19 ‗outstanding cultural spaces or forms of expression‘, 
and which recognises the universal value of significant forms of oral culture.
41
 The 2001 
Proclamation was intended to be a partial ‗corrective‘ to the World Heritage List, which, 
because of its focus on iconic physical sites (such as monuments) rather than on iconic 
intangible expressions, could be regarded as culturally biased.
42
 The ICH Convention, which 
is notable for its attempt to address the last major gap in protections covering the full range 
of cultural diversity in a sustainable-development and human-rights framework, reinforces 
this by describing such heritage as:  
transmitted from generation to generation … constantly recreated by communities and 
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history … 
[providing] them with a sense of identity and continuity.
43
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Given the complex forms of intangible heritage, it is difficult to define its parameters and to 
decide what to target for preservation. The ICH Convention opens by referring to existing 
international human-rights instruments, in particular the UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR,
44
 
stating, for its purposes, the only intangible heritage covered is that which is ‗compatible 
with existing international human rights instruments, as well as the requirements of mutual 
respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development‘.45 It 
also recognises that globalisation and the accompanying social transformations produce 
conditions ‗for renewed dialogue among communities ... as does the phenomenon of 
intolerance, to grave threats of deterioration, disappearance and destruction of intangible 
cultural heritage‘.46  
The significance of the ICH Convention, explains Koïchiro Matsuura, is that for the first time 
nations had available a universally-valid ‗standard-setting instrument to assert [UNESCO‘s] 
conviction that intercultural dialogue and respect for cultural diversity and tolerance are 
among the surest guarantees of peace‘ and that all cultures should be regarded as having 
‗equal dignity‘.47 Matsuura emphasises the themes outlined in the UDCD: that cultural 
diversity is as necessary for humanity as biodiversity is for nature, cultural diversity is the 
common heritage of humanity, recognition of cultural diversity humanises globalisation, 
human rights help guarantee cultural diversity, and culture is a necessary component of 
human development. These UDCD principles have been reaffirmed by UNESCO in the 2009 
World Report, discussed below. The ICH Convention gives effect to aspirations contained in 
the UDCD and demonstrates the progress made over previous decades in understanding 
culture. 
Two years after the ICH Convention (which Australia has not ratified
48
) came the most 
recent of the UNESCO cultural treaties: the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005 (DCE Convention). Among the range of cultural 
conventions, this treaty most explicitly links culture with human rights. There is additional 
(inferred) expansion of the notion of collective rights and the most detailed explanation of 
the need to integrate culture into sustainable development. Previously, sustainable 
development, human development and cultural protection had largely separate but parallel 
histories (see Appendix 3). It is only since the mid 1990s that the role of culture as an 
integral part of development policies has been fully understood, and although these sectors 
often continue to move along different trajectories, there has been an integrated approach 
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reflected in the UNESCO treaties and reports since Our Creative Diversity appeared in 
1995.
49
 
In its comments on whether Australia should ratify the DCE Convention,
50
 the AHRC noted 
it is essentially a treaty that defines cultural practice and preservation as human rights. This is 
linked to sustainable development and, therefore, associated with international cooperation, 
aid and (because of its integrated approach) has the potential to contribute towards a global 
culture of peace.
51
 In the DCE Convention, the importance of human rights is noted 
repeatedly:
52
 the preamble proclaims it celebrates ‗the importance of cultural diversity for the 
full realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the UDHR and 
other universally recognised instruments‘. Article 2 (‗Guiding Principles‘) says cultural 
diversity relies on human-rights protections such as freedom of expression, information and 
communication, and article 5 commits state parties to achieve the purposes of the DCE 
Convention ‗in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of 
international law and universally recognised human rights instruments‘.53 
Drafting of international treaties is complex, usually involving lengthy negotiations and 
compromises, and the DCE Convention generated considerable disagreement. When 
UNESCO member states voted on its adoption, four abstained (Australia among them) and 
two voted against it, including the USA. US concerns created the most controversy, with the 
influential audiovisual industry lobbying against it on the grounds it would restrict free trade. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had been deadlocked on the issue of 
audiovisual cultural product since 1993, with America and European countries arguing over 
restrictive quotas on US films. In this circumstance, the DCE Convention was seen as a 
potential barrier to the expansion of US businesses. Although he believes their more strongly 
stated claims were exaggerated, Alan Brouder describes how the US delegation claimed that 
the wording and definitions in the DCE Convention were vague. More legitimate, says 
Brouder, was the argument the convention could potentially restrict access to information for 
the citizens of signatory nations. If so, this would be contrary to several human-rights 
principles, such as article 19 of the UDHR.
54
 However, article 2 of the DCE Convention 
precludes clauses being invoked to infringe any human right, making the US apprehensions 
largely unfounded. Although he dismisses most of the US assertions, Brouder does suggest 
the DCE Convention is limited and weakened by the lack of any significant obligations 
imposed on signatories. It should have been the first international treaty to protect minority 
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rights; instead, it is something of a ‗paper tiger‘.55 These deficiencies are largely the result of 
the USA‘s influence over the drafting because it feared that an empowering hard law could 
potentially justify the formation of barriers to US cultural products. This political and 
economic pressure also explains the failure to include enforceable obligations and poor 
reporting arrangements. For example, if state parties oversee a decrease in cultural diversity 
under their watch, they can omit to report this trend; thus, non-reporting becomes 
misleading.
56
  
One of the DCE Convention‘s most contentious clauses, article 13, says state parties ‗shall 
endeavour to integrate culture into their development policies at all levels for the creation of 
conditions conducive to sustainable development‘.57 David Throsby argues such a reference 
to culture in human development is unclear and there are no agreed models on how it should 
be done,
58
 this reflects still-evolving understandings of the intersections between 
development and culture. Throsby proposes five principles for the culture sector that are 
compatible with environmentalism: intergenerational equity (the protection of culture for 
future generations); second, intragenerational equity (equality of access on a non-
discriminatory basis to ensure development is consistent with poverty alleviation); third, 
cultural diversity is itself a value in much the same way as biodiversity; fourth, the 
precautionary principle (if cultural sustainability is threatened, risk-averse approaches should 
be adopted); and fifth, interconnection (recognition that economic, social, cultural and 
environmental systems cannot be seen in isolation).
59
 Throsby proposes that these principles 
can be used as a short-list to measure whether policies meet cultural-sustainability standards; 
they are also consistent with the principles outlined by Holling (quoted in Chapter 1) 
regarding sustainable ecosystems.
60
  
Biodiversity helps preserve complex systems, which may be compromised by species loss, 
and it provides a genetic repository from which future adaptive opportunities may be drawn. 
Cultural diversity is similar: the totality of diversity is itself a resource, one that is essential 
for continuing processes of creation, re-creation and cultural survival.
61
 This recognition has 
arisen due to apprehensions that creeping international monoculturalism, driven by 
globalisation, may erode inventiveness. Human diversities provide a repository of varied 
beings and doings in thought and action; this enriches and expands innovation.
62
 Because 
cultures are fluid forms of collective expression, they simultaneously influence, and are 
influenced by, creative interpretations, fusions and additions. These meanings of culture, 
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‗one self-referential, the other self-transcending – are indissociable and the key to the fruitful 
interaction of all peoples in the context of globalisation‘.63 
The 2009 World Report summates UNESCO‘s work on culture over the preceding sixty 
years and provides renewed intellectual and ethical rationales. Among its explanations, 
UNESCO describes culture as constantly evolving and shifting in form, comparing it to a 
river flowing through lands and giving life. Despite seeming to take a similar shape from 
day-to-day, it is never the ‗same‘ river. This is an ancient analogy: 2,500 years ago, 
Heraclitus observed that no person can step into the same river twice, because neither the 
river nor person will be the same.
64
 On this understanding, culture should not be thought of 
as a noun, but a verb; not as an object, but an action. Because culture can be easily reified – 
or assumed to be real solely because imagined – it is ontological, increasing the likelihood it 
will be seen as fixed, rather than as a contingency. Culture, therefore, is simultaneously a 
stock and a flow. It is a body of accreted material with collective meaning, but unstable and 
in flux. It is not only a past inheritance, but a future project.
65
  
The 2009 report also argues that human-development initiatives that do not integrate culture 
into their planning are more likely to fail than those that do, and poverty-alleviation programs 
are more likely to work if they are empowering.
66
 Since the World Heritage Convention, the 
co-evolving interdependence of the human and the natural world has been recognised. On 
this basis, climate change will have potentially devastating and widespread consequences for 
human and cultural rights.
67
 Therefore, it could be questioned whether culture is one of the 
pillars of development or, rather, an embedded feature of the economic, social and 
environmental actions that must be addressed if sustainable development goals are to be 
realised.
68
 A further aspect noted in the 2009 World Report is that intercultural dialogue is 
critical for peace-building. This is consistent with UNESCO‘s foundation role as a 
contributor to world peace through promoting education, science and culture. Reciprocal 
understanding of cultural difference through intercultural dialogue helps to dispel 
stereotypes, expose cultural reductionism and encourage the acceptance of difference.
69
 In 
this, UNESCO echoes many other international reports and authors.
70
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4.2 CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OFTEN FRAUGHT 
RELATIONSHIP  
Cultural rights are meant to protect the practice of a culture, including religion, spiritual 
beliefs, language, rituals, institutions, social norms, and tangible and intangible heritage. 
Because culture is such a profound influence in defining individual and group identities, the 
right to engage in cultural activities is necessary for both individual and collective self-
determination. Cultural rights apply to contemporary participation, but they equally apply to 
the rights of future generations to enjoy their heritage.
71
 Given this explanation, cultural 
rights may seem relatively straightforward; nevertheless, they are quite controversial. 
Development in the understanding of culture has mirrored refinements in the understanding 
of human rights. As described in Chapter 1, human rights are broadly grouped into three 
categories, (1) civil and political, (2) economic, social and cultural, and (3) collective.
72
 How 
these relate to the various UNESCO definitions of culture are informed by the generally 
accepted premise that all human rights are of equal importance, inalienable, indivisible, but 
also interrelated and co-dependent. Although inalienable and indivisible, to some extent 
human rights can be interpreted as culturally relative while remaining universal in their 
principles.
73
 Cultural rights are an amorphous subset of the human-rights system, which may 
partly explain hesitance regarding their realisation. Understanding the complexity of cultural 
rights, however, helps to enlighten some of the cultural and religious tensions at the centre of 
clash-versus-alliance debates about civilizations.
74
  
Cultural rights are sometimes regarded as ‗underdeveloped‘.75 This may be compounded by 
difficulties associated with defining culture compared with defining the more tangible 
freedoms and development goals. It has been proposed that cultural rights should be achieved 
progressively and that they are subsidiary to more pressing rights, such as those relating to 
life and security.
76
 This two-tiered approach has been criticised for missing the 
interrelatedness of many aspects of life and embedded cultural presence.
77
 Because cultural 
rights contribute to self-realisation, they are not supernumerary, but rather ‗capacities of 
capacities … insofar as they contribute to the effective exercise of other human rights, at the 
heart of which lies our sense of dignity‘.78 
To understand why many governments are suspicious of cultural rights, it is necessary to 
recall the way human rights have been classified. Negative rights are those that protect 
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people from something or that may cause harm if removed, such as freedom of speech or 
freedom from violence. Alternatively, the rights to do, access or be given something are 
positive rights; they may include the right to be protected from harm, and the right to be 
given adequate healthcare, an education or minimum standard of living. Although useful 
distinctions, they are simplistic. Some rights can be both positive and negative, and they may 
conflict when a choice must be made between competing rights. Another way of classifying 
rights is by ‗generations‘, where the first generation includes the negative rights of civil and 
political life (covered in ICCPR), the second generation represents the positive rights of 
social, economic and cultural life (covered in ICESCR), and the third generation refers to the 
rights of groups over time. This third generation may include, for example, the right to an 
environmentally sustainable future, to collectively bargain, and for certain cultures to 
survive. Like the positive–negative binary, the generations idea is helpful to understand 
complex taxonomies; however, because human rights often help resolve intersecting claims 
in changing circumstances, applying ‗labels‘ is difficult – and the most difficult are cultural 
rights. The first subset of rights (civil and political) includes those where state action can 
most easily be achieved. These rights are protected legislatively, but often passively, with 
little need for direct intervention. The next subset – economic, social and cultural – requires 
action. Their protection adds to the quality of life by going beyond protection from harm, to 
enlargement. States are often reluctant to venture into this area.  
Although these taxonomies offer uncomplicated explanations of complex protections, they 
may establish a mistaken idea of primacy within the rights system, with positive rights seen 
as more important than negative rights, or first generation rights more important than second 
or third, or vice versa. However, there is something of a ‗rights-symbiosis‘ where 
establishing sound civil and political rights provides the foundation on which to build other, 
equally necessary, rights.
79
 Because many civil and political rights are difficult to achieve, 
the protections pertaining to social, economic and cultural rights (which should follow) are 
neglected or placed in a ‗queue‘, awaiting protection in an indeterminate future. The right to 
certain things is substantively different from the right to be protected from them. When the 
notion of entitlement enters the debate so do arguments about whether one person or group‘s 
rights can or should be preferred, or whether this may lead to socially or culturally perverse 
effects, such as social disunity. These claims are essentially a digression. Culture is a 
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collective experience; it is formed collectively over time; it is enjoyed, preserved, developed 
and provides for collective benefits. 
Human rights have been criticised on the basis they inadequately address collective 
freedoms
80
 and are fallible because they apply primarily to the individual. In the field of 
culture (as distinct from racism and related intolerance
81
), this has led to debates concerning 
whether the liberty to enjoy cultural activities applies to the group or to individuals only. 
While human rights are commonly described in UN declarations, conventions and reports in 
a way that infers the singular, they can be interpreted (but are often specifically defined) as 
applying to group rights, intergenerational rights, or both. The UDHR (articles 22 and 27) 
suggests access to one‘s culture, and related rights protecting culture (e.g. education or 
religious belief), are typically enjoyed as a family, group or community. ICCPR states 
(article 18) that a person ‗either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private ... [may] manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching‘; article 21 recognises the right to peaceful assembly, and article 22, ‗the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests‘.82 Although ICCPR does refer to a person‟s right to do such 
activities, its meaning relies upon being collective. Practicing a religion, joining an assembly, 
associating with others, all self-evidently imply those with whom a person has the right to 
consort will share at least some common ideas and values. Necessarily, the rights according 
to one are nominal if they fail to apply to a group in this context. Rights in other treaties 
extend the notion from the collective to the intergenerational. For example, the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) lists the rights of indigenous people to 
traditional lands, and that these be preserved in a form that remains physically (legally) 
accessible and ecologically (usable and healthily) sustainable. Given this explanation links 
past custodianship with ongoing tenure, it is a right spanning past to future generations. 
The links between culture and human rights, along with intercultural dialogue and peace-
building, have been integral to UNESCO‘s advocacy for the role of culture in development.83 
As noted in Section 4.1, many of its soft- and hard-law treaties complement UN attempts to 
enforce universally accepted human-rights principles. Some conventions make specific 
reference to this role, thus bringing cultural protection within the ambit of international law. 
UNESCO‘s 2009 World Report recognises that the human-rights system has been questioned 
from two opposing views. One view accuses the system of being a form of Western cultural 
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imperialism, especially when practices such as slavery or state authoritarianism conflict with 
human-rights norms.
84
 Another perception is that cultural diversity results in a relativisation 
of principles and, therefore, poses challenges to the universality of human rights.
85
 However, 
culture has never been fixed; this dynamism leaves it open to change, including change that 
may be related to human rights. Because human rights are indivisible, they are also 
interdependent and linked. UNESCO says this must be negotiated through dialogue and 
embedded into domestic and cultural settings to promote the universality of human rights, 
even when interpreted through differing cultural lenses. Indeed, the recognition of such 
diversity ‗grounds the universality of human rights in the realities of our societies by drawing 
attention to their appropriation by all individuals who can identify these rights with a sense of 
ownership, regardless of language, tradition and location‘.86 This does not mean rights can be 
relativised and, consequently, fail universal standards. 
First Nation peoples have been particularly vulnerable because cultural rights remain 
neglected. Nevertheless, indigenous perspectives highlight the nexus between culture, 
environment, intergenerational custodianship and responsibilities to preserve coexistent and 
reciprocal cultural and physical conditions. The Indigenous Peoples‟ Seattle Declaration 
states, despite being most adversely affected by globalisation, indigenous peoples are best 
placed to offer alternatives because their: 
sustainable lifestyles and cultures, traditional knowledge, cosmologies, spirituality, values 
of collectivity, reciprocity, respect and reverence for Mother Earth, are crucial in the search 
for a transformed society where justice, equity, and sustainability will prevail.
87
  
The arguments put forward by the world‘s indigenous communities intuitively recognise and 
rely on the relationship between culture and ecology.
88
 Similar conclusions have also been 
drawn by environmental scientists, such as Holling, who noted that ecosystems function by 
following general patterns found in all systems. Conclusions can be drawn from evidence 
that ‗social-ecological systems act as strongly coupled, complex and evolving integrated 
systems‘.89 This has lessons for governance and planning at local and global levels, because 
resilience requires understandings of both the ecosystems and the knowledge of local users: 
the ‗outdated perception of humanity as decoupled from, and in control of, nature is an 
underlying cause of society‘s vulnerability‘.90  
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ICCPR protects the rights of minorities, including indigenous groups, to enjoy their cultures, 
practise their religions and use their own languages.
91
 It notes that environmental 
contamination or destruction may affect a group‘s traditional practices, such as hunting, 
fishing, and land ownership and use, which are all manifestations of culture; this is also 
reflected in the DRIP.
92
 Although recognition of indigenous rights is included in international 
treaties, indigenous peoples worldwide remain victims of some of the most destructive 
environmental damage and loss of intangible heritage.
93
 They also remain vulnerable to 
exploitation by global business, for example, traditional medical knowledge about the 
healing properties of plant extracts, and holistic ways of treating illness. Not only has this 
knowledge influenced Western biomedical research and treatment, it has provided 
information that led to new (and profitable) therapeutic goods. Misappropriated knowledge 
and abuse of intellectual property will continue to be a contentious issue until systems of 
cultural justice and fair-trading are more equitable for indigenous peoples. They sit squarely 
in the domain of cultural rights.
94
 
Cultural rights have also been brought into focus due to events such as identity-related 
genocide, profits gained from exploiting vulnerable communities, and theft of cultural 
knowledge. It could be argued these examples neither justify nor discount cultural rights. On 
the basis they are reprehensible, such crimes may be punished under civil laws covering 
intellectual property or under criminal laws relating to murder or the destruction of private 
property. Recourse to such remedies, where they exist, do not render cultural rights 
irrelevant. In fact, the principles of cultural rights can set standards for domestic laws, better 
protect rights, and provide appeal-mechanisms for the vulnerable. However, because of their 
subaltern status, the strength of community advocacy for these rights will generally be 
ignored or contested by groups with greater influence and resources. Those whose interests 
compete with minority rights are easily able to leverage fear, obfuscation or 
misunderstanding about hypothetical threats, they claim, are associated with cultural 
practices. 
One particularly fraught cultural right relates to female genital mutilation (FGM): an ancient 
ritual practised in a number of religions. It is particularly prevalent in northeast Africa and 
involves the mutilation (sometimes radical removal) of the external genitalia of small girls. 
This act is usually done privately, without safe medical procedures, by women and with 
maternal consent.
95
 As with many entrenched cultural practices, contesting FGM is difficult. 
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On one hand it should be condemned as a tradition that conflicts with multiple human rights, 
such as to be protected from cruel and degrading treatment;
96
 the rights of children to be 
protected from physical or mental violence;
97
 and the rights of women.
98
 Further, there are 
emotional and psychological traumas associated with an involuntary act that denies 
individuals the right to express fully their sexual identity. In this circumstance the rights of 
women and girls to be protected from harm, and to a decent standard of health, clearly 
overrides any claimed cultural rights. On the other hand, FGM is typically practised by 
poorly educated women who live in poverty and the small stipend they receive for 
conducting the procedure is essential to their material survival; this makes it a human-
development issue. Combating FGM is linked to progressive education, training (such as 
elementary midwifery), establishing alternative models of economic livelihood, and 
promoting the idea it can be transformed into a symbolic rite of passage rather than a painful 
and permanent mutilation.
99
 Although FGM may seem an ethically unambiguous example of 
how cultural rights are moderated under the umbrella framework of human rights, even this 
practice is riddled with contradictions. Culture, rights and preferences are so fluid and 
personal that credible arguments have been presented that render FGM another continuing, 
contested domain over female bodies, illustrating how cultural rights may pose wicked 
dilemmas.
100
  
Another example of the debate over cultural rights, in some liberal democratic states, relates 
to the burqa (a complete body covering) and hijab (headscarf), both worn by some Muslim 
women to conform to Islamic cultural traditions. Several reasons have been given for why 
the practice should be banned, including the paranoid suggestion these garments could 
conceal the accoutrements of terrorism, the practice is an offensive reminder of female 
repression by patriarchal Islamism, and that it is a divisive antisocial statement of the 
separation of Muslims from wider society.
101
 However, that some people are uncomfortable 
with women wearing prescribed cultural clothing is irrelevant to the fact that to prohibit their 
choice to do so is contrary to human rights that protect personal expression, beliefs, religious 
practice, culture, conscience and movement. Particularly problematic is that such prohibition 
would be highly selective. These calls do not include claims, for example, that the habits 
worn by Catholic nuns or the saffron robes of Buddhist monks offend civil society. In 
addition, complaints about segregation are hypocritical or, at best, misleading. The issue is 
not about social inclusivity or openness, but a closed form of cohesion that demands 
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compliance.
102
 Calls for bans on Islamic garb reflect deep-seated faith-hate directed towards 
a group visible to a culturally intolerant minority. Here, reference to a ‗minority‘ needs 
elaboration. Typically, collective intolerance is fostered when radical elements successfully 
masquerade as representing ‗majority‘ views. For example, ultraconservative Christian 
groups – who would typically alienate more laissez-faire members of the public – proclaim 
themselves as the legitimate voices of Christianity, which, despite a retreat as the dominant 
ethical and cultural influence in most Western societies, remains its progenitor. As 
progressive Christian voices have lamented – such as Bouma, Korten and Jim Wallis – it is 
extreme and conservative views that now frequently occupy the public sphere as the 
normative Christian opinion on such issues.
103
  
The issue of Islamic clothing sits in the midst of public arguments about the presence of 
Islam in Western society and the cultural rights of Muslims.
104
 The legal and moral contexts 
are the right to freedom of religion and belief,
105
 and the principle that some public 
expressions (even those that do no harm) should be protected from coercion from the norms 
of a dominant group. Therefore, it represents a conflict between the subaltern and 
hegemonic: between those who are disempowered and those who possess and use power 
(although similar forms of compliancy, of course, occur in some Islamic states
106
). This hijab 
furore also illustrates how groups with entrenched privileges may attempt to mobilise legal or 
policing powers to enforce their preferred sociocultural norms. A woman dressing in 
distinctive ways, even modestly compared with fashion norms, may be highly visible. Thus, 
what should be inconsequential becomes, from the etic perspective, menacing. This menace 
is because it represents an idea, fabricating a new anxiety. Concerns about female safety 
(often expressed, ironically, by groups with very different moral positions: conservative 
Christians and liberal feminists) have the most substance. Yes, women – as any group who 
may be vulnerable – must be protected from violence, rape and other forms of abuse; 
however, the rule of law and state intervention must be applied equally. To target 
interventions against one group is morally questionable. When cases of abuse are forensically 
examined, to assess whether cultural influences have shaped the conduct of the perpetrators, 
it will often be the case that culture has been a factor. It is inevitable that cultural and 
religious determinants will shape some violent behaviour – but so will personal history, 
personality traits, intelligence and other influences.
107
 While some perpetrators may be 
Muslim, many may not be. If violence against women is a trait shared by adherents of a 
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range of religions as well as by the irreligious, why should Muslims be singled out for special 
treatment? It could easily be argued that gangster rap music and its misogynistic subculture 
are more morally offensive and violent. The main difference is Global North economic and 
cultural interests have decided rap is marketable, profitable and – therefore – permissible.108 
Western corporate advertising may have pornographied and commodified Western culture, 
but this is considered acceptable because it is a norm, now sanctioned by the popular media 
and overlooked by governments.
109
 Although this example reveals the power of cultural 
politics, the logic used to criticise cultural rights should be applied equally to all. If this view 
is accepted, the belief that cultural practices that do no tangible or direct harm should be 
subject to prohibition, is revealed as either irrational or discriminatory. 
In a similar vein, Charles Mills describes racism as reflecting a form of unspoken social 
contract, where the history, sociology, philosophy and exercise of power is based on, or 
articulated by, ‗white‘ voices and agents. This, he claims, represents a racial contract, a term 
used not only normatively ‗to generate judgements about social justice and injustice, but 
descriptively to explain the genesis of the society and the state, the way society is structured, 
the way the government functions, and people‘s moral psychology‘.110 Mills focuses 
primarily on race whereas Carole Pateman uses the same framework to explain gender 
power-dynamics.
111
 The notion can be extended to other forms of contract where minorities, 
who fail to conform to dominant cultural or religious norms and have little real power, are 
effectively excluded from exercising self-determination or influence in any tier of society. 
These issues – balancing public and private, rights and responsibilities, equity and privilege, 
conformity and nonconformity – are rationales for multiculturalism. Critics such as Okin are 
actually attacking cultural rights. She takes a rather binary interpretation of human rights, 
assuming that either culture comes first (as a right), or it does not.
112
 This is a reductionist 
understanding, seeing culture as fixed and unchanging. UNESCO argues culture can 
accommodate human rights and vice versa: rights are not ‗imposed at the expense of cultural 
integrity, but rather as being declared from within the cultures in order to fulfil a need‘.113  
Vulnerable groups, therefore, should not be threatened by cultural rights. As repeated 
throughout the human-rights system, a right only applies when it does not impinge on others. 
The claim, that cultural rights protect fixed and immoveable practices, is mistaken.
114
 
Cultures constantly evolve and human rights have the potential to take harmful practices and 
guide their evolution.
115
 Cultural rights can be secured, and cultural practices preserved, 
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through such transmogrification: a view supported by Farida Shaheed, the Human Rights 
Council‘s independent expert on cultural rights. Shaheed‘s 2010 report argues that, because 
cultures are living and dynamic, they can assist with peace-building, community harmony 
and poverty-reduction. Nor can cultural rights be equated with relativism; if cultural practices 
impede human rights they require modifying or discarding. Shaheed says protecting ‗cultural 
diversity is less about preserving cultural goods and practices as they exist ... than about 
ensuring the conditions which make possible the continuous creation and development of 
cultural goods and practices‘.116 Despite their importance, as well as the numerous references 
to cultural rights in international human-rights laws and declarations, Shaheed agrees that 
cultural rights remain undeveloped. This is a problem for democratic states, because they are 
obliged to ensure freedom of their citizens, including their cultural heritage and protection 
from forms of discrimination, such as racism. This right, ‗to participate in cultural life entails 
respecting and protecting cultural heritage in all its forms, including intangible heritage ... 
[and through] sustainable development‘.117  
Cultural rights, heritage conservation and religion can conflict, particularly if embroiled in 
contested issues. Three examples illustrate such tensions. The first is that of the Babri 
Mosque in Uttar Pradesh, a state in India and home to more than 30 million Muslims. Built in 
the years after the Mughal victory in 1527, the mosque was located on the legendary 
birthplace of Rama, a Hindu God. The construction of Babri was a symbolic act associated 
with imposing a new religion over recently conquered territories. In 1992, against a Supreme 
Court ruling, a crowd of Hindu nationalists demolished the ancient mosque. In the aftermath, 
riots erupted in cities across India leading to the deaths of over 2,000 people.
118
 Centuries-old 
conflicts can retain their immediacy and potency among those with strong religious zeal.
119
  
The second example is that of the Bamiyan Buddas located in Afghanistan. Dating from the 
fifth century, these were once the largest statues of the Buddha in the world. Mullah Omar, 
spiritual leader of the Afghan Taliban, which controlled most of the country between 1996 
and late 2001, initially agreed to protect this iconic heritage. His decision was reversed in 
early 2001 and, despite international pleas to leave the statues untouched, prior to their 
demolition the Taliban stated the Buddas violated the Islamic prohibition against sacred 
images and, therefore, had to be destroyed: 
All the statues in the country should be destroyed because these ... have been used as idols  
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and deities by the non-believers ... They are respected now and may be turned into idols in 
future too. Only Allah, the Almighty, deserves to be worshipped, not anyone or anything 
else.
120
  
The people of the Bamiyan region are Shi‘ite Muslims and had strongly resisted the Sunni 
Taliban. The decision to destroy the statues was probably an act of sectarian vengeance as 
well as a form of cultural genocide. Although Buddhist, the statues had long been regarded 
by Muslim locals as important to their heritage.
121
  
The third example relates to the controversy that arose due to a development application to 
build an Islamic cultural centre in New York two blocks from ‗ground zero‘, the original site 
of the World Trade Centre. There was an extraordinary domestic response to the proposal, 
despite the US Constitution‘s First Amendment which prohibits impeding the free exercise of 
religion or freedom of speech. This angst was reflected in polling demonstrating that, 
although many Americans opposed the centre‘s opening, there was grudging recognition of 
its constitutionality.
122
 What motivated the opposition was complex; it may have been 
antagonism to Islam or a sense that the symbolism of the site would be compromised by an 
Islamic presence within a certain radius. If so, this raises moral and legal questions: what is a 
reasonable radius, do Muslim deaths in the World Trade Centre give Islam no right to grieve 
or to condemn the 9/11 attack, is Islam (collectively) accountable because of the act of a few 
(if so, does this rule apply when Hindus, Christians or Jews – for example – commit 
atrocities), and how long will it be before interreligious reconciliation is possible? The 
building application triggered strong reactions far from the site. For instance, Terry Jones, 
pastor of a small congregation in Gainesville, Florida, and author of Islam is the Devil, 
planned to burn copies of the Qur‟an to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 
attack. His threat prompted global anger, including demonstrations in Kabul and threats to 
attack Christians and Americans across the world if the burning took place.
123
  
It could be argued that such events are driven by many processes, not solely irreconcilable 
religious differences. Faith seems an obvious cause of conflict, but so too are cultural, social 
and political differences. Therefore, remedies aimed at peace-building should be based on 
rights to culture, belief, expression and justice. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, Australia‘s 
lacklustre multicultural policy, unrealised action on human rights and political dog-whistling 
mirrors other failures such as neglect of cultural-rights principles in human services 
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provision and in the arts, culture and heritage sectors.
124
 However, governments not only 
wish to avoid inciting conflicts between cultural or religious groups. In a neoliberal age, they 
are reticent about spending public monies on what may be perceived as personal preferences 
(such as cultural expressions) that could be achieved through market mechanisms.
125
 Claims 
that social, cultural and economic rights may be too expensive, disruptive, anti-competitive 
or complex to protect with legislation are governmental lexicons of procrastination or 
ambivalence. Although cultural rights may pose challenges for politicians, because they are 
difficult and easy targets of media misinformation, this does not legitimise their neglect.   
The links between cultural rights and the arts and heritage are significant, but largely ignored 
in public debate and policy. When combined with religion, there is an added dimension of 
complexity. Any explanation of the distinction between culture and faith is necessarily vague 
and contestable; boundaries are fluid and differ within cultural and spiritual contexts, 
constantly confounding attempts at a systemic definition.
126
 In some religious traditions, a 
deity or spiritual beings may dwell in, or be inextricably linked with, human-made cultural 
artefacts. For example, the Aymara people in the southern Altiplano in Bolivia regard their 
weavings as communal objects that embody ancestral souls. Known as the sacred weavings 
of Coroma, some of which are several hundred years old, many were stolen or purchased 
illegally and later appeared at a US ‗ethnic art‘ exhibition in 1988. The loss of the weavings 
caused trauma in the community, with many members distressed about the loneliness and 
sadness of their ancestors who had been removed from their communal home. The artefacts 
were seized and subsequently repatriated to the Aymara. This was a rare but significant case 
of how culture and spirituality are enmeshed: a nexus easily misunderstood by those lacking 
cultural knowledge, but central to issues around cultural rights and sustainable heritage.
127
  
When religio-cultural artefacts are deemed desirable by wealthy art collectors two things 
immediately happen. First, hermeneutics reorients their value. This may shift an object‘s 
status from having negligible financial worth but vast religious value (from the perspective of 
the holders of cultural and religious traditions) to one of vast financial worth but negligible 
religious value (from the collector‘s perspective). At the same time, an artefact‘s perceived 
aesthetic value may change from a parochial object imbued with arcane spiritual qualities to 
that of an irreplaceable work of art. The artefact itself has not changed, only the way it is 
subjectively viewed or coveted. Second, when this transformation occurs and objects are 
removed from their religious and cultural context, if involuntary, this may have profound 
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effects on those who lose possession.
128
 As well as legal and ethical considerations of theft, 
fraud and misappropriation, such occurrences have cultural-rights implications. In the case of 
many indigenous spiritual traditions, the cultural–faith distinctions are also problematic.129  
The Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights (Fribourg Declaration) was issued in 2007 as 
an aspirational but non-binding standard. It makes explicit the interdependency of culture and 
human rights (article 1), its relationship with sustainable development (Preamble (6)), and 
that individuals and groups are entitled to self-determination on the basis of cultural identity 
(articles 2 and 3).
130
 The Fribourg Declaration also affirms that cultural rights are necessary 
to preserve the cultural and creative heritage of humanity (article 3) and are consistent with 
peace-building (Preamble (3)). Sen argues that culture and development must coexist, 
although he recognises that forcing people and groups to choose between traditional and 
potentially new practice may require certain cultural compromises. He accepts that 
sometimes culture must be a victim of development – if such decisions can be freely made, 
they should be considered.
131
 Where cultural beliefs and human rights conflict, it is usually 
possible to negotiate some form of compromise. When this is impossible, it indicates the 
cultural practice in conflict with the normative standard must be so rigid and harmful to 
individual or collective well-being it should be surrendered to the more compelling rights of 
humanity.  
Poor levels of trust between culturally distinct communities, and between majority and 
minority communities, are a continuing problem.
132
 The choices between inclusion (positive 
and assisted participation in civil society norms) and assimilation (indirect, enforced or 
resentful compliance to norms) are those of balance.
133
 This should involve supporting 
cultural diversity and strong identities – necessary for inner and outer freedom and the 
realisation of cultural liberty – while preserving a legal framework that makes citizenship, or 
affiliation with both local and national communities, relevant for all members of society. The 
social cohesion approach – if structured around human capabilities, cultural liberty, human-
rights standards and collective cultural competence – can support intercultural dialogue and 
enablement. Governments everywhere have opportunities to trust people to act collectively 
and decently and to decide how to promote this enabling. Such an approach would not 
absolve governments from protecting their citizens and balancing freedom with tasks 
necessary to maintain the state and its members from risks associated with cross-cultural or 
cross-faith conflicts.
134
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In Australia, as in many Western nations, there is little capacity to address issues associated 
with cultural rights, although there are several areas where Australia has accountabilities and 
systems of review. These are obligations under international treaties and national law relating 
to ICESCR, ICCPR, the DCE Convention, the Australian Human Rights Commission Act, 
1986 and the DRIP.
135
 The DCE Convention, which Australia ratified in 2009, comes with 
reporting and (voluntary) funding obligations, some of which can be interpreted as relating to 
cultural rights. These include recognising that cultural diversity and human rights are linked 
and must be protected and promoted as such (article 5), reporting on the treaty to UNESCO 
every four years, undertaking education and public awareness in relation to the DCE 
Convention‘s obligations (article 10), promoting the diversity of cultural expressions 
domestically, and cooperating internationally by providing preferential treatment to 
developing countries (article 16).
136
 At the time of writing this thesis, it is unknown how 
Australia will respond to the obligations that accompany treaty ratification. Australia has also 
ratified ICCPR and ICESCR – which give effect to the UDHR – but unlike with other 
conventions, Australia has never made laws that implement fully its obligations under either 
convention. This makes Australia the only democracy without a constitutional or legislated 
charter of rights.
137
 
Although ICCPR has not been given effect with domestic legislation, the AHRC does have 
related functions, albeit limited to conciliation and reporting on breaches to parliament. 
ICCPR includes several articles pertaining to cultural rights. For example, article 1(1) states 
all people ‗have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development‘; 
article 18, previously cited, protects religious freedoms (including parental rights to educate 
their children according to their faith); article 19 protects the right to hold opinions without 
interference; and article 27 refers to states where ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
live, and ‗persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language‘.138 
Another UN treaty that partially addresses cultural rights is the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
(Religion Declaration). Its aim, without contradicting other human-rights treaties (article 8), 
is to remove discrimination on the basis of religion. This includes the right of a child to be 
   246 | Page  
 
religiously educated according to their parental or guardian‘s wishes (article 5(2)), rights 
with a cultural dimension (article 6) such as specific days of religious celebration (h), the 
establishment and maintenance of charitable institutions (b), to use articles of faith (c), and to 
produce publications on religious issues (d).
139
 Although the AHRC has functions under the 
Religion Declaration and ICCPR, it has none regarding ICESCR. This means it cannot 
investigate many important rights unless there is some way to determine they are covered by 
other treaties. For example, ICESCR states special protections ‗should be accorded to 
mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such periods working 
mothers should be accorded paid leave, or leave with adequate social security benefits‘140: 
the issue of paid maternity has been politically contentious in Australia. Elsewhere, it lists 
other rights such as the entitlement to participate in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress, and the conservation and diffusion of culture.
141
 The only way Australia 
is held accountable is a periodic review process conducted by a UN treaty council, which can 
report failures to meet obligations under ICESCR, potentially exposing Australia to 
international scrutiny. In December 2008, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This requires state parties 
to recognise the competence of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which, in the case of a failure in domestic remedies, may hear complaints from parties who 
claim their rights have been violated. The committee will then make public and send to the 
state party its report on whether rights protected under ICESCR have been infringed. To date, 
Australia has not indicated whether it will ratify this protocol. 
Globalisation may have led much of the world down the path of economic growth, but this 
has affected ecological sustainability and cultural diversity.
142
 Rapidly expanding in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, Australia took advantage of these changes and its 
development has been formed by these trends. Australia increased its population through the 
immigration of people displaced by war or who sought a better life; it used this opportunity 
to embark on major infrastructure expansion and, somewhat later, revamped the macro 
economy (largely by dismantling the social welfare state and through fiscal, monetary and 
micro-economic reform). Australia continues to rely on net inflows of skilled labour to grow 
the workforce and meet national development needs. It is now part of the international 
financial, labour market, trade, resources, technological, knowledge and cultural sectors: 
Australia‘s prosperity and intellectual and social capital have been built on a progressively 
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open policy of global integration.
143
 This transformation has come with costs and 
consequences. After the war the White Australia policy was retained, despite the arrival of 
increasing numbers of people the policy was intended to restrict. By the early 1970s, the 
British monoculture was under strain and it was realised the public sphere had to be shared 
with people from outside the cultural mainstream, even if hedged by qualifications and 
assumptions.
144
 Multiculturalism was the often-grudging response to these realities. By the 
time multicultural policy had matured in the mid 1980s, Australia was at the forefront of 
addressing issues of diversity (discussed in more detail in Appendix A2.3).  
Since the mid 1990s, this has progressively changed. Despite belated recognition that 
Australia‘s economic future lies in the Asia-Pacific,145 global recognition of the importance 
of culture has overtaken Australia‘s progressive past146 and, since 1996, Australian 
governments have generally sought to excise cultural diversity from public and political 
discourse.
147
 Ambivalence seems to be grounded in fear of the (collective) ‗Other‘ and belief 
that the protection of cultural diversity by cultural rights may lead to social fracturing.
148
 This 
view is countered in the UNDP‘s 2005 World Report, which argues that global conflict and 
declining security have been fuelled more by economic and cultural inequalities than a clash 
of cultures
149
 and the way to address these problems is to build wealth in multicultural 
democracies.
150
 This is an international endorsement of the principles and benefits of 
multiculturalism; it is also an effective way to support cultural rights. Because Australian 
policy and lawmakers largely fail to understand the importance of culture, and are mostly 
disengaged from the human-rights system, claims it is a functional multicultural democracy 
are questionable by many UN standards. 
4.3 DIVERSITY, RIGHTS & ENVIRONMENT: URBAN CHALLENGES IN 
A TRANSFORMING WORLD 
As noted in the Introduction, the methodology of this thesis was partly influenced by case 
studies that are described in Appendices A1.1–4. These studies (several national projects) 
were based on an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to understand and respond to 
radicalisation. The conceptual frame included various principles (such as community 
ownership, participation, human rights and substantive equality), circumstances (social 
marginalisation, alienation, discrimination and intercultural conflict) and strategies (a 
combination of resource and communication infrastructure development, research and direct 
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action). The approach was simple, yet holistic and largely untested. It was based on the 
notion that when settings are fluid, asymmetrical and uncertain, responses should not be crisp 
and linear, but iterative and fuzzy. The methods were grounded, the responses open.  
Managing these projects reinforced two important understandings for me. The first, already 
argued, is that many problems humanity face are complex, fast, new and dangerous. This 
requires responses that are sufficiently flexible and inventive for the circumstances. 
Nevertheless, by their very nature, these responses will often be radical, atypical, and may be 
strongly contested by those who prefer more traditional methods. The second understanding, 
or perhaps reminder, is the importance of cities.
151
 Cities are the crucible of contemporary 
civilization. They are the primary source of threat, but since Homo sapiens have become a 
species more urban than agrarian, they are also the sites where most problems can be 
resolved. Bouma observes, ‗urban life is absolutely dependent on social cohesion grounded 
in interdependence. Without diversity, cities die‘152 and Glaeser, ‗cities enable the 
collaboration that makes humanity shine most brightly.‘153 As humanity urbanises, it 
concentrates within the metropolis all the challenges of resource usage, environmental 
effects, food security, population growth, sustainability, intercultural and interreligious 
coexistence, crime,
154
 struggles over (and for) power and equity between government, 
corporations and civil society, along with denominational issues of rights, responsibilities, 
freedoms and constraints. It is through urban renewal and reinvention that humanity will 
succeed or fail in its efforts to survive in conditions of global dynamic-equilibrium.
155
   
As noted in the introduction, these observations have been thoroughly explored by others;
156
 
my goal is to apply what is known across various disciplines and add to discussions about 
how it may be used creatively, especially by the culture and heritage sector. Based on a 
review of literature, the issues I raise are at least partially covered by many authors, 
theoretically or through situation analyses. However, less material takes a comprehensive 
approach; for example, attempts to systematically integrate principles of social justice and 
cultural liberty into public policies on substantive equality (to support capabilities for social 
inclusion and cohesion) and mediated through forms of deep democracy to support 
sustainable developments.
157
 
Because the lived experiences of change are so rapid and profound, most people struggle to 
conceptualise, adapt and reorient; meanwhile, their efforts are further hampered by meta-
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contextual factors. One such factor is the rigidity of fixed views and existing structures; in 
other words, not only do tangible institutions (such as forms of government) push against 
counter-trends and new formations (such as alternative sources of information or social 
activism) but also intangible constructs (such as ideologies or collective behaviours). Finding 
stability, authority or certainty in this world, where entrenched forms conflict and compete 
with novel ones, is well nigh impossible. 
Another inhibiting factor is language. By ‗language‘ I mean the vector for expressing ideas, 
describing (or enabling descriptions about) reality, where words more-or-less accurately 
represent and convey meaning in ways that are consistent and comprehensible for most 
people. If this seems obscure, some examples may illustrate those fault lines where language, 
meaning and communication rupture. In politics, the Left and Right divides, or archetypal 
socialist–capitalist conflicts, persist. They do on the assumption that one or the other position 
represents a fixed set of beliefs: that one view is progressive and advocates collectivism, 
egalitarianism and resource reallocation (for instance), and the other focuses on 
individualism, enterprise, liberty and social convention.
158
 This binary, with points between 
that demonstrate greater or lesser adherence to the archetype, continues as a conceptual 
norm, despite creative attempts to make the model two-dimensional by introducing a liberal 
versus authoritarian (social) belief scale that intersects the Left–Right (economic) axis.159 
Yet, this model is limited. The political spectrum has dissolved; new, hybridised and 
reconfigured ideologies are emerging exemplified, for example, by the emergence of Red 
Toryism and Blue Labour in the UK.
160
  
Now, progressives can be conservative, liberals may advocate wealth distribution, 
conservatives (when it suits them) will dismantle traditions and assault values. The 
confusions are not confined to the realm of political ideology; rather, being ‗political‘ (or 
motivated by partisan interest) intrudes across most domains of life even as established 
beliefs are disintegrating. Environmental activists may advocate nuclear energy;
161
 religion is 
not synonymous with ignorance nor secularism with enlightenment;
162
 democracy does not 
guarantee freedom; greater choice does not equate to greater happiness; digitally mediated 
networks and omnipresent communications do not necessarily offer real socialisation and 
human connection; and neoliberalism – which promised to make us wealthy and set us free – 
has been exposed as propaganda of a global plutocracy, impoverishing the quality of many 
lives and degrading the environment. 
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The world is splintering and fracturing at the same time it is homogenising and integrating: 
new creative opportunities are appearing, new boundaries are forming, and new norms 
invented. Contemporary events are marked by paradoxical changes: absolutes are dissolving 
into ambiguities, and authorities into ambivalence. Simultaneously, the opposite is occurring: 
information is growing exponentially, but knowledge is increasingly compartmentalised, 
hyper-specialisation and technological sophistication are opening previously unimagined 
opportunities even as they destroy resilience and render communities vulnerable.
163
 Multiple 
diversities (particularity) are necessary to hold together (universal) systems. Yeats‘s 
apocalyptic text is disturbingly redolent: 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world ... 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity.
164
 
This is the context in which humanity must rise to its challenges and, as previously observed, 
the  setting to do so is urban. Outlined below are some ideas and observations relevant to this 
issue, which transition to the themes discussed in Chapter 5.  
In Section 3.3, I presented the notion of how various social-inclusion indicators could 
illustrate the extent of relative exclusion of members of a population sub-group (such as may 
be determined by faith, race, ethnicity, or other forms of identity-markers). Using this 
approach, and broadening it from a sub-population comparison to a whole-of-population 
level, and taking a range of indicators that can be tracked along a spectrum of attainment, can 
help determine the overall extent of a society‘s sustainability (illustrated in Figure 4.1). This 
is a highly simplified model, albeit one that could easily be expanded by detailing categories 
of measurement, (subgroup) indicators, and a scoring system recording a population‘s degree 
of sustainability in terms of its resource usage, effect on the environment, social health and 
extent of human flourishing.
165
 Such a model is vulnerable to the ideological assumptions 
that shape the content and values of each of these categories; this means it could be skewed 
to acquire desired results rather than applied as an objective instrument. This does not 
necessarily invalidate the tool; rather, it makes it flexible, able to serve the purposes of those 
who apply it. Measurement frameworks that can be personalised are not uncommon; for 
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example, the OECD has developed the Better Life Index, which allows users to select topics 
(values) of importance to them. Based on personal preferences, the index measures whether 
an OECD member nation is providing its citizens with ‗a better life‘.166  
The notion behind a sustainability pendulum is to circumvent some of the problems of binary 
thought entrapped by fixed normative meanings that are typically coupled with explanations 
about politics, economics, culture and linguistics. By developing a thorough range of 
sustainability indicators (the model here is only illustrative) that are qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively measurable, it may be possible to audit with greater objectivity whether human 
development is (genuinely) ‗free‘, ‗democratic‘, ‗healthy‘, or whichever other aspirations a 
region or nation determines should be its planning targets. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the evolving thinking about forms of positive social interactions, such as deep democracy, or 
of a reconceptualised understanding of the meaning (and value) of social contractism.
167
  
Discussing these opportunities, Arlene Goldbard argues that humanity is on the cusp between 
cultural eras, where modes of thought, or intellectual transaction, are subject to a form of 
scientific taxonomic processing. By comparison, the next era will be more grounded in 
human narrative, plurality and interaction. In this emergent system: 
culture is the crucible for all positive development. At this transitional moment, many of us 
see the shift happening, but the news hasn‘t yet broken through to people who operate many 
of our social institutions, which is why it is often so easy to describe the new paradigm to 
ordinary people and so hard to get bureaucrats and officials to see it.
 168
 
The premise behind the need for better, universal accountability systems for human and 
natural ecologies is fundamentally moral. As discussed, the five essentials of a global ethic 
are equity (including environmental equity), human rights, democracy (as a principle, not 
necessarily of any fixed form), the protection of minorities (or human diversity) and the 
peaceful resolution of conflict. These are not only internally consistent with each other but 
are also consistent with integrated planning methodologies for sustainable societies and are 
based on negotiating compromises between competing demands over wealth, culture, 
resources, power and values. 
To ‗govern‘ – cities, communities, diversity, and natural capital – humans need not only 
tangible authority and institutions (administrations, laws, and command over resources) but 
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also objective and comparable tools of measurement and acceptable standards of conduct. 
This last requirement is effectively provided by the international human-rights framework 
which incorporates ethical decision-making (such as global ethics and soft laws) and is, as 
much as practicable, based on universal norms. Certainly, UNESCO and other UN agencies 
claim the universality of the human-rights system can be (somewhat) tempered by local 
circumstances or relativism.
169
 How community cohesion is sustained in the metropolis, 
along with its handmaiden concepts of inclusion, harmony and connectedness are challenges 
for effective associative democracy.
170
 The sustainability pendulum could integrate these 
standards into its design premises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Sustainability „pendulum‟ indicating the health of human and natural 
services in any system 
Being and living with fellow humans is a messy business. Deep and participative democracy, 
human rights, negotiation through intercultural and religious dialogue and other forms of 
purposeful interaction are complex and seldom definitive. However, our rapidly 
transforming, interconnected and chaotic world is the setting where human players must strut 
and fret their hour upon the stage. If these subjective and iterative methods are the tools, 
what are the workshops? I attempt to answer this question by offering a strong contender in 
Chapter 5. 
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[5]  RECOGNISING THE POTENTIAL OF CULTURAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
[T]he museum ... is or rather should be one of the most highly perfected tools that society 
has available to prepare and accompany its own transformation 
Hugues De Varine 
1
 
Hitherto, I have discussed a range of disparate concepts and themes. In some ways, this 
follows the path of analysis I previously called ‗synchronous threats scholarship‘, which is 
inspired by a number of issues ranging from fears about global climate change, security 
threats
2
, health and wealth inequalities. In the domain of museology this approach is, for 
example, recognised by Janes in his 2009 book Museums in a Troubled World: renewal, 
irrelevance or collapse? The purpose of this chapter is not to examine museography 
(museum practice), but rather to draw together the ideas already covered and reflect on the 
roles cultural institutions (see 5.4) can play in the future musealisation of societies.
3
 By 
expanding on some of the ideas that appear across the scholarship and linking notions of 
sustainable development, rights, democracy and new museology we can imagine a general 
strategy for future human well-being that incorporates museums. Before proceeding to 
explore these ideas, I briefly return to the trends that set the wider picture in which cultural 
institutions now exist and will be required to function in the future. 
5.1 FLOURISHING HUMAN SOCIETIES: FUTURE CHALLENGES  
Since the 1970s, beyond the fear of species extinction due to nuclear war, there have been 
concerns for human survival due to resource depletion. Following the Club of Rome‘s 
precocious 1972 Limits of Growth, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (Brundtland Commission) released the 1987 report Our Common Future, 
which established the principle of sustainable development. This became a foundation 
concept for understanding human activities in a finite world. The report explains sustainable 
development means the exploitation of natural resources to meet current requirements but 
without denying the ability of future generations to also do so. It recognises that 
development has limitations imposed by technology and society ‗on environmental 
resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities‘.4  
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In planning for sustainability, development is often described as occurring within three 
pillars or under three broad domains of action in economics, the environment and society; 
these are acknowledged in international frameworks as being mutually reinforcing and 
interdependent.
5
 However, this notion has been contested on the basis that sustainable 
development paradigms that fail to include culture as a fourth pillar may create new 
dependencies. Keith Nurse argues peoples‘ identities reflect systems and epistemic 
frameworks that shape how they understand and live in the environment; therefore, culture 
‗shapes what we mean by development and determines how people act in the world‘.6 
If we accept humanity relies on four development pillars, and the viability of our future is 
contingent on the health of these pillars, this is deeply concerning. To recap issues under 
each category: 
Economic sustainability is being undermined by the accepted orthodoxy that 
development is achieved through growth, and growth is driven by material production, 
although exponential expansion (of this type) in a finite world is impossible. Not only is 
the economic model unsustainable but, in recent decades, it has been so ideologically 
driven that disparities in material well-being have been largely ignored. 
Simultaneously, the leadership and imagination needed to escape the existing paradigm 
is lacking, the global financial system faces ongoing instability and uncertainty, and 
transnational corporations dominate national interests and the public good through 
economic manipulation and control over what people know, think, believe and consume 
through their ownership of global media and marketing networks. 
Environmental sustainability, equally, is in a perilous state. Human exploitation of 
the physical world has depleted resources, polluted and destabilised ecosystems and 
resulted in mass extinctions of flora and fauna. This is insignificant compared with the 
global effects of anthropogenic climate change due to the use of fossil fuels and 
industrial-scale agriculture. Production growth, combined with an increasing 
population, is stripping the planet, while atmospheric temperatures are expected to 
increase, at best between 2° and 4 °C by the end of this century. The prognosis is for 
changed ecologies, resulting in mass population movements, starvation, disease and 
conflict. 
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Social sustainability has been eroded by the unrelenting focus on growth and on 
maximising efficiency and technical innovation. Although some of this has been 
beneficial, gains have been offset by considerable negative effects. Social sustainability 
is compromised by population increases, mobilities, new epidemiologies of morbidity, 
privatised and underfunded human-services infrastructure, and failures in both the 
Global North and South to equitably allocate resources to those most in need. Indeed, 
the fundamental model of economic globalisation gouges primary producers and 
manual workers, increasingly impoverishing them while degrading cultural and social 
capital. This is accompanied by the continuing failure to implement the full range of 
human rights in virtually every country. Such challenges highlight the structural flaws 
in many democracies, which have become immobilised by the breadth and speed of 
change, leaving them little capacity or resilience to adapt. 
Cultural sustainability has been undermined by the rapid introduction of Western 
cultural products. Changes in traditional lifestyles have been driven by demography, 
technological developments, communications, environmental degradation, conflict, 
corruption, mobility, and new forms of poverty. Further, economic globalisation has 
been endemic, influencing almost everybody. While some of these trends have been 
positive, generally, they have transformed most societies. Production – in agriculture, 
trades, manufacture – combined with mass transportation, has changed the way most 
people live. For the world‘s poor, this has had particularly destructive consequences. 
Cultural integrity remains one of their few assets; when undermined (by whatever 
means), populations are exposed to social dissolution and increased rates of physical 
and psychological morbidity. 
The four pillars of sustainable development are interconnected. All are affected by the 
negative externalities associated with globalisation. As repeatedly affirmed by scholars 
across a range of disciplines, and international government and non-government agencies, 
new approaches are needed that incorporate the pillars into a holistic system of 
development, underpinned by human rights and democratic participation. This is reflected in 
the Earth Charter, which draws together important domains of action on sustainability and 
describes the values required to ensure a viable human future in balance with the biosphere.
7
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The agenda for transformative change faces three fundamental challenges, some of which 
have already been discussed. First, denial: a refusal to accept threats are real and the 
responses necessary, second, the inability to act because of entrenched, often-competing 
interests, and the momentum of institutional behaviours that prevent altruistic or nimble 
responses, and third, the failure to imagine, plan and act in interdisciplinary and integrated 
ways. The third challenge is perhaps the greatest. While governments often talk about 
‗joined-up solutions‘ or ‗breaking down silos‘, this is largely rhetorical; interdisciplinary 
and collaborative approaches are inherently complicated and seldom realised.
8
  
However, templates exist to do so, and health promotion, urban planning (which sometimes 
work together
9
) and ecomuseology (which should) provide helpful models and share some 
common features. Although there may be other collaborative and interdisciplinary fields of 
professional endeavour, these three (health promotion, urban planning and museology) are 
particularly well developed, provide comprehensive approaches, and have the potential to 
shift existing policy paradigms, although none yet have sufficient traction or authority to 
take the lead. An international conference, Transformations, held in Canberra in 2005, 
explored the intersections between human rights and development, culture, ecological 
sustainability and integrated local-area planning.
10
 This event brought interdisciplinary 
thinkers and practitioners together who found, unsurprisingly, that their approaches and 
interests closely aligned. A tentative start to dialogue in Australia, similar cross-fertilisation 
of ideas and sectors continues in measured steps across the world.
11
Flourishing free 
societies that function in global dynamic-equilibrium and within necessary biospheric 
constraints, is the vision splendid of many writers.
12
 In reality, it is a modest goal, although 
one seemingly impossible given the greed, scepticism and indolence arrayed against it. Best-
practice activities or models of success can help demonstrate what the future world might 
look like, how it may function, and the kinds of practical steps that could help achieve 
positive change. Building healthy, cohesive and sustainable local communities is a large part 
of the urban planning and ecomuseum agenda; an agenda supported by principles of equity, 
civil rights, cultural and heritage values, and which provide theoretical and practical 
frameworks for human development. This locates advocates of integrated urban planning 
and new museology as allies and key agents of change. 
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5.2 WHAT IS A MUSEUM? 
In 1931, Cassell and Company published The Science of Life by H.G. Wells and Julian 
Huxley, two British polymaths of the early twentieth century. In this extraordinary volume, 
divided into nine books and covering 876 illustrated pages, the authors distilled essential 
knowledge of almost everything to do with life on Earth: its origins, appearance, human 
evolution, the achievements of scientific scholars, human ethics and more. It is a work of 
extraordinary ambition and sanguinity, but also hubris. It reflected a belief the ‗common 
man‘ was entitled to understand science and, with knowledge, dispel the dark ages of 
ignorance. Although didacticism of this type persists,
13
 it is recognised that knowledge 
cannot be so easily condensed and classified. In some ways, certainly in the past, museums 
had a similar intent.  
From the nineteenth century until recent decades, museums in the Global North were 
typically housed in grand buildings and packed with eclectic collections: reconstructed 
skeletal remains, melancholy victims of taxidermy, dissected gemstones on crowded 
shelves, well-oiled miniature machine replicas that would spring into life on pressing a 
button or winding a crank. The history of the Western museum over a century or more 
reflects a conscious and unconscious history of Western perceptions about humanity, the 
natural world and the imperial mission. In the early twentieth century, as with Wells and 
Huxley‘s book, these included the optimistic belief that European colonialism would bring 
enlightenment to the rest of the world; a view which embraced (simplified) Christianity, 
(purportedly) benign autocracy and (limited) exposure to the achievements of ‗civilization‘. 
The benefits of such a mission were typically resented by those upon whom it was imposed, 
and it degraded many of the human and natural systems of the conquered.
14
 The museum 
was a type of cultural charnel house as well as a memorial to empire; in Australia, this 
meant a memorial to the virtues of the greatest nineteenth century power, the British 
Empire, and to the settlers who dispossessed Australia‘s First Nation peoples. In the postwar 
era, Western museums remained places of remnant colonial triumphalism although, since 
then, most have attempted to dismantle this legacy.
15
 
If museums served these purposes, even unconsciously, their origins were well intentioned. 
They were places of study, dedicated to storing and exhibiting objects illustrating antiquity 
or natural history. The derivation of the word ‗museum‘ comes from the Muses: classical 
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Greek female deities of intellectual pursuits, such as poetry, music, dance, philosophy and 
astronomy. During the Hellenic and Roman eras, places of learning were commonly 
understood (even metaphorically) as those where the Muses resided. Scholars unsurprisingly 
drew on this concept from the Renaissance; hence the birth of the modern museum as a 
place of learning, research, exhibition, contemplation and amusement.
16
 The relative ‗worth‘ 
of contemporary cultural institutions continues to be typically based on their running costs 
compared with those of competing forms of popular entertainment.
17
  
International peak body the International Council of Museums (ICOM) – while noting that 
museums have evolved in line with social developments – defines a museum as: 
a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to 
the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible 
and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, 
study and enjoyment.
18
 
Such a definition makes the notion of museums highly elastic, in that they can take many 
forms. These forms include the organised management of living systems, such as botanical 
and zoological gardens; galleries, archives and libraries; online repositories; and whole 
communities and their lived environments. A distinctive feature of modern museums is that 
they collect and display things, activities shared with museums of the past. Nevertheless, 
while object-centred museography may serve valuable purposes, and is the activity most 
people associate with museums, it is not the only model. This presents museums with a 
range of philosophical challenges; an issue explored below. 
Mark O‘Neill describes museum diversity, explaining they may be primarily dedicated to 
maintaining a site of cultural or heritage significance; may deal with a specific theme, such 
as natural history, technology, visual arts or geology; or may target a particular audience, 
such as children or people seeking enriching artistic experiences. Museums can be 
‗introverted‘ (focused on preserving and displaying artefacts) or ‗extroverted‘ (focused 
primarily on meeting immediate community or client interests), or they may attempt to 
balance these inward-looking and outward-looking approaches.
19
 O‘Neill‘s explanation 
demonstrates how museums, collectively, are well placed to respond to contemporary 
issues: recording, interpreting, and helping to find meaning, sanctuary and coherent themes 
for audiences in the confusion of current events, as well as envisaging the future. This is a 
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substantial claim, which may seem to be detached from the daily business of museum work. 
Because museums are (at least partially) products of their time, this could be one of 
museology‘s tasks: a self-analysis of how they have historically understood and fulfilled 
their roles.
20
 This may be of most interest to the expert; nevertheless, evolving rationales 
and changes in museum programs and curatorial practices could help illustrate to lay 
audiences the shifts in societal attitudes about nature, cultural and physiological diversity 
over the last century.  
Although some museum roles may be new, many will continue the positive traditions of 
past museography, albeit in new ways. Museum activities today will reflect government 
policies; wider social, political, cultural and other events; public reactions to and 
expectations of museum services; and the museum‘s own decisions about how inclusive it 
will be of topical issues and existential challenges. Furthermore, museums increasingly 
endeavour to engage with communities as spaces of representation, cultural maintenance 
and local significance, including those that relate to intangible heritage and diversities of 
content and expressions.
21
 This means they may be ideological or pedagogical; they may 
explore intersections between local, national and global issues; and they may be sites where 
meaning is found and conflict negotiated. 
Museums, therefore, are often important interpreters of events with human-rights 
dimensions; for example, where there have been histories of racism, colonialism, cultural 
misappropriation or the repression of minorities, such as the poor, anathematised or 
indigenous peoples.
22
 Some museums provide a public platform bearing witness to 
experiences of suffering or injustice. The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh is 
one such institution; it preserves the site of a notorious security prison in which the Khmer 
Rouge tortured and murdered suspected political opponents. The museum maintains the 
prison as it was when the Khmer Rouge were driven from the capital in 1979, though it 
includes rooms filled with photographs of victims, instruments of torture and numerous 
skeletal remains. While it is a disturbing place to visit, the museum serves a valuable 
educational function for contemporary Cambodians and is a site of remembrance.
23
 Another 
example is the Robben Island Museum in South Africa. Like Tuol Sleng, it is a former 
prison site; although not as brutal, it became equally symbolic in a more positive way. 
Nelson Mandela and many other black, Indian or coloured males were incarcerated there 
between 1964 and 1991 for opposing the apartheid regime. This made Robben Island 
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synonymous with the fight for freedom – the decommissioned prison is now preserved as a 
reminder of this struggle.
24
 
Because museums may preserve, explain and present the varieties of human identity, 
experience and dissent; they can occasionally challenge elites, national or political 
ideologies antagonistic to diversity, or competing narratives. Elaine Gurien observed that 
‗museums can be safe places for unsafe ideas‘.25 This can make museums controversial. 
Although some may embrace such a role, other museums may avoid controversy. At other 
times, there may be an expectation of an engagement, but museums may fail to meet the 
challenges they present for themselves.
26
 When this occurs, failure might not be due to a 
lack of professionalism or commitment by staff, but to tensions, invisible to the public, 
which pull the institution in contrary directions. For example, conflict may arise between a 
director and the museum‘s governing body (especially if board members are political 
appointees
27
) or between curators and financial sponsors. Increasing reliance on private 
enterprise, compelled by diminishing government revenues, can homogenise content and 
drive public museums to collaborate with corporate funders, compromising curatorial 
independence and objectivity.
28
 These features of museums raise important questions of 
ethics, culture, community and ‗place‘.  
The ethical questions arise from the first principles of museography. If objects are collected, 
then how, why and what criteria are used? Some may be altruistic; others may be about 
power and authority – as already observed regarding the imperial museum. Other than as a 
repository, what is the fundamental purpose of a museum and its collection, and how is it to 
be used? The logical answer is that objects are interpreted, but this necessarily involves 
biases that will be influenced by a range of factors, particularly cultural interpretations. If, a 
century ago, museum exhibits were chosen to demonstrate the exceptionalism of European 
civilization, man‘s dominance over nature or the barbarism of ‗savages‘, does this imply 
that the choice of museum exhibits in the twenty-first century will also be made on the basis 
of pedagogical or ideological preferences? Moral issues associated with the acquisition and 
retention of misappropriated objects were raised in Section 4.2. The question of legitimacy 
and authority are equally difficult: Who is qualified to interpret objects, through what lenses 
are they viewed, how is value (whether economic, aesthetic or cultural) measured, and what 
does it signify?
29
 Sceptical responses to these questions can be seen to threaten the 
legitimacy, not only of museums, but claims that absolute meaning can be found in 
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anything.
30
 While important issues, I do not interrogate them here; my primary purpose is to 
illustrate that traditional museography (focused on form or objects, rather than content or 
meanings) is challenged by how to relate to, and provide meanings for, audiences. Peter 
Davis ponders the paradox: 
Museums and museum objects may be seen as symbols of solidity in an age of change and 
uncertainty, but can they also be recognized as part of post-modern society with the label 
of permanence that their collections and monumental buildings imply?
31
 
Consideration of objects, and their origins, necessarily involves who, or what, created them. 
Objects will have cultural dimensions (encompassing possible religious, economic and 
political aspects), an ecological provenance (from where they have come and from what 
they are made), and community or group significance (aesthetic, symbolic, esoteric or other 
forms of meaning). Objects and places form complex connections with people, individually 
and collectively. These relationships (between things and locations) are easily overlooked 
and commonly discounted in a world focused on growth and change. Yet the significance of 
place – how people relate to and are nurtured by place, and how place has multiple layers of 
value – is essential to considering how humans might imagine, be reconciled with, and plan 
for the future. Notions of community, identity and place are dynamic; they overlap and, 
although difficult to define, are profoundly important to people. They may take many forms, 
coalesce, shift or evolve. In the way that single identities can be understood to exist, so too 
can group or community identities; and the same way that a place – whether urban, rural, 
heritage, natural, human-made or hybrid – has an identity, it too will be dynamic and 
constantly changing. These fluid relationships between people and nature are existentially 
important and, because of human omnipresence, it could be said virtually every corner of 
the planet is an anthropogenically modified landscape. Brand argues, when we examine 
prehistoric evidence, even when we romanticise notions of wilderness, past and present, 
human fingerprints can be found everywhere.
32
 The symbiosis between human and natural 
ecologies was recognised as early as the World Heritage Convention, in particular, the idea 
of ‗cultural landscapes‘ or the ways humans interact as a dynamic force shaping the natural 
environment over time and where each mirrors the other. This is a phenomenon: 
with a tangible and an intangible identity. The intangible component arises from ideas and 
interactions which have an impact on the perceptions and shaping of a landscape, such as 
sacred beliefs closely linked to the landscape and the way it has been perceived over time.
33
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This notion of landscapes helps reinforce an understanding and respect for place in the 
consciousness and value systems of those societies that have forgotten or dismisses its 
existence. However, it is easily revivified when local communities discover that a 
government agency or a corporation (or both in collusion) ride roughshod over their 
interests and destroy a sense of place. The frenetic pace of coal seam gas (CSG) extraction 
is an example of how community groups have been catapulted into angry coalitions of 
action in the face of environmental devastation and threats to livelihoods, lifestyle, food 
security and heritage.
34
 What many citizens in wealthy nations such as the USA and 
Australia are now experiencing with new generation CSG technologies has long been the 
type of lived experience of people in poor nations. As corporate power and energy demand 
increases, resources become scarcer and the momentum of growth balloons, it is likely the 
privilege of living in the Global North will erode and the lifestyles of inhabitants will begin 
to mirror those of their peers in the South. This is an opportunity cost of the political 
economy that most of its victims reflexively support: the potential sacrifice of their places of 
meaning to the alternative goods of consumption and corporate profit.
35
 
Among the ways a place can be interpreted, Peter Davis argues two are particularly 
important for museums: places are defined by the people and shifting communities who live 
in them, and each will have their unique understanding and relationship to a place. A place 
may gain its distinctiveness by acquiring a certain ‗patina‘, or it will have an ‗elusive 
particularity, so often valued as ―background noise‖ ... the richness we take for granted‘,36 
denoting its special attributes, whether these are a crowded urban landscape or bucolic calm. 
The value of place and its real and symbolic importance is not only recognised by social 
scientists. These bonds transcend formalistic notions of beauty or amenity; a site or region 
may have profound emotional, spiritual and aesthetic attributes, meaningful only to people 
who have deep associations with it. A barren wasteland may be overflowing with markers of 
significance for those who are able to identify with such a place. For example, in her 2011 
Boyer lecture, novelist Geraldine Brooks reflected on her connections to her Australian 
homeplace. She observed how harsh critics of the ‗cultural dead heart‘ of suburbia only saw: 
[a] mean and unaccommodated material existence, but did not grasp the emotional and 
imaginative richness of the lives played out against those frugal backdrops. They deplored 
the conformity, but they did not see that its corollary was a sustaining solidarity. They did 
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not grasp that the bedrock value of that time and place was an enduring and defining 
Australian sense of shared community.
37
 
Many of the qualities to which Davis and Brooks refer are cultural – a symbiosis where 
social norms and culture are shaped by place which, in turn, is adapted to the requirements 
of community identities. Accounts of the inherent relationships between humans and the 
places where they live presents a challenge to museums: how they represent, explain or 
preserve intangible, dynamic and borderless spaces and meanings. The importance of these 
connections has a broader significance than that relating solely to museums, a theme 
continued later; first, however, I return to the question heading this section: what is a 
museum? The bonds between people, culture and place cannot be resolved through the 
traditional, confined museum practices of collecting and displaying, and only in a limited 
way through curatorial interpretation. The response has been a new approach to 
museography that involves revaluing and re-envisaging community, nature and culture (see 
Figure 5.1). This approach has shifted the museum‘s role from the provider of elite 
entertainment, or at least such a perception,
38
 to the enabler of sustainable development and 
social egalitarianism, in short, to an agent of transformative change. 
5.3 NEW MUSEOLOGY AND ECOMUSEUMS 
The ambiguities around whether community, culture, identity and place are absolute 
(universal and fixed) or specific (particular to an innumerable array of circumstances), and 
the tensions these create for museums, have been largely resolved by a new form of cultural 
institution and its practice: the ecomuseum. That stated, ecomuseology remains an evolving 
practice and concept. Some definitions help explain what ecomuseums attempt to achieve 
and why. 
An ICOM description, dating from 1978, states an ecomuseum uses science, education, 
active public participation, and any other means available to solve community problems, 
while managing and studying the total heritage of a community including its natural 
environment and cultural milieu. Essentially, ‗the ecomuseum uses the language of the 
artefact, the reality of everyday life and concrete situations in order to achieve desired 
changes‘.39 In France, being the first country to embrace and develop the notion, 
commentators focused on community involvement and direction. Pierre Mayrand argued the 
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ecomuseum is not ‗an end to itself, it is defined as an objective to be met‘. Rene Rivard 
distinguished ecomuseums from traditional institutions, where museum=building+ 
collections+experts+public, whereas the ecomuseum=territory+heritage+memory+ 
populations.
40
 More succinctly, and highlighting collective approaches to conserving 
traditional human activities integrated with their associated ecosystems, the ecomuseum is 
‗a dynamic way in which communities preserve, interpret, and manage their heritage for 
sustainable development. An ecomuseum is based on a community agreement‘.41 Mark 
Stokrocki focuses on the intergenerational and equity aspects, and defines an ecomuseum as 
a learning centre where a community‘s past, present and future association with its 
environment helps to mediate ‗transitions in a culture at a time of rapid change … [the 
ecomuseum‘s] mission is to protect human dignity and to link generations‘.42 
Ecomuseography did not spontaneously appear. It was a product of social changes in the 
1960s and had a variety of antecedents. A review of these helps place their context in 
museology.  
The rapid growth in museums in the late nineteenth century was largely due to generous 
philanthropy, civic pride and a genuine desire to provide opportunities for moral and 
cultural enrichment for the communities where local museums were founded.
43
 These 
museums tended to promote the disciplines of classical archaeology, natural science and the 
fine arts. However, they declined in the early twentieth century due to rapidly changing 
cultural, political and economic conditions. Enthusiasm for museums was transferred to new 
institutional forms, especially those focusing on ‗folk‘ culture including the hembygdrörelse 
movement in Sweden and heimatmuseums in Germany. 
From the late 1800s, the Swedes exerted considerable efforts to conserve their national 
culture and natural heritage. Particularly influential was Artur Hazelius, who began 
collecting information about traditional dance, music, stories and costumes. He presented 
much of this material in an ethnographic exhibition which used wax figures to portray 
Swedish culture to audiences. Subsequently, he helped establish Skansen, an open-air 
museum presenting the nation‘s architectural heritage, along with furnishings and garden 
designs. Once established in 1891, Skansen became a living site for festivals, performances 
and practical demonstrations. As Karin Norman observes,
44
 these approaches to folkloric 
culture anticipated the ecomuseum and reflected the wish to identify and celebrate the roots 
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of national ethnicities – an interest shared and explored widely across Europe at the time.45 
Unfortunately, some developed sinister overtones. During the 1930s in Germany, the Nazis 
used the heimatmuseum (what had started as an innovative approach where small local 
museums celebrated regional cultures) as a tool of nationalist and racist propaganda and 
Aryan mythology; these have been described as the perverted forerunners of ecomuseums.
46
  
The popularity of folk museums that began between the wars has continued in a different 
form with an interest in regional cultures. Loïc Vadelorge observes that the nationalistic 
trends in large European museums tended to decline after the Second World War due to 
increasing internationalism. Vadelorge argues the ‗mounting importance of the regions is a 
turning point in European history, which the museums reflect‘ and the ‗globalisation of 
cultural exchange‘, combined with a reassertion of local distinctiveness, has driven these 
trends.
47
 Although the two differ, the local-history museum does share much in common 
with the folk museum, but neither is modelled on forms of radical community participation 
typical of ecomuseology.
48
   
The 1960s and early 1970s – a time of social and political questioning and upheaval – 
provided the impetus to radically reappraise the whole idea of museums. This led to changes 
in the discipline and emergence of what is still referred to as ‗new museology‘. As with 
ecomuseology, new museology is a somewhat amorphous concept. In the same way many 
people questioned existing perceived wisdoms (such as the arms race, gender and racial 
inequality, civil rights and nascent concerns about environmental protection) museums also 
reflected on their purpose. ICOM‘s tenth general assembly, held at Grenoble in 1971, issued 
a statement calling on the world‘s museums to reassess the needs of the public they served, 
to focus on the social environments where they operated, and to take advantage of the 
expertise residing in communities.
49
 This challenged well-established values in many 
museums. ICOM further extended these principles in the following year (in Santiago, Chile) 
with a resolution stating that a museum is an institution serving the society: 
of which it forms an inseparable part and … contains the elements which enable it to help 
in moulding the consciousness of the communities it serves, through which it can stimulate 
those communities to action … by linking together past and present, identifying itself with 
indispensable structural challenges and calling forth others.
50
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The Santiago resolutions link the work of ICOM with UNESCO and the latter‘s concerns 
about global disparities in development and justice. Davis observes that these radical ideas 
were the turning point in museological thought, despite largely being overlooked at first, 
particularly by museums in English-speaking nations. After Santiago, a critical role of 
museums was to ‗mirror‘ societies – to reflect the good, bad and unique of a nation‘s or 
region‘s history, culture and environment – and to debate these in engaging and honest 
ways. However, a subsidiary issue remained unresolved: who museums represent or serve.
51
 
New museology is not synonymous with ecomuseology; however, the ecomuseum is very 
much a product of new museology, as are community, folk, and other forms of active 
museography.
52
 Lorena San Roman argues that museums must ‗play a role in the polemics 
of the country and in its socio-economic development‘ because, if they do not, they run the 
risk of disappearing.
53
 San Roman‘s perspective, a museum manager from Costa Rica, is 
noteworthy because that nation has been remarkably successful in taking a holistic approach 
to its environmental, economic and social development and sustainability. Not only does 
Costa Rica consider itself a national park
54
 but also, according to nef, a planned approach to 
the four pillars of development, combined with a rigorous defence of human rights, has 
resulted in the world‘s happiest (and a relatively healthy) nation.55 In many ways, these 
integrated, citizen-focused and environmentally sensitive approaches to planning share 
values and methods with ecomuseology. 
The ecomuseum community and site where this form of activism occurs may be any 
community or site. Such an approach decouples the museum from high art, or the selective 
preservation of objects based on subjective and culturally determined preferences. This goes 
to the fundamental issue of culture: what it is, its importance to humans, and its relationship 
with the natural world. As discussed in Section 4.1, UNESCO (although, arguably, with 
embedded cultural biases
56
) incrementally separated the concept of culture from art and, 
while respecting the essential and replenishing connections between them, focused on the 
sources of creativity: culture as various forms of tangible and intangible knowledge and 
practice. Based on the principle that most places have unique qualities – certainly qualities 
meaningful to their inhabitants – a vast diversity of sites are legitimate settings for 
ecomuseums. These can range from degraded urban slums and industrial ‗rust-belts‘57 to 
rural regions and ancient and historically significant townships. The potential, commitment, 
capacity, willingness and determination of a community to make their place (as joint human 
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and natural ecologies) a site of living heritage preservation and maintenance can set in 
motion the creation of an ecomuseum. 
One of the early ecomuseum experiments was based in Le Creusot, a commune of Saône et 
Loire in Burgundy. This region had industrialised during the early nineteenth century and 
was a centre of metallurgy, coal mining, ceramics and glass manufacturing. In the postwar 
period, the area went into slow decline; this became acute by the early 1970s with tensions 
emerging between workers and factory owners over concerns about the viability of 
continued production and decreasing output. The radical new notions of community-based 
museology were mobilised to assist the community through its period of transition and 
regeneration and, in 1973, the first Creusot-Montceau Ecomuseum was established. It 
opened in its early form while several factories continued production and, in this iteration, 
the museum became involved in the cultural appropriation of history, advocacy for workers‘ 
rights, and preservation of industrial heritage and practices. This meant the ecomuseum was 
quickly politicised.
58
 In what became an often-fraught project, the first attempt failed, to be 
resurrected in 1985 by another museum, which also failed. More recently it was renamed 
and continues as an ecomuseum, albeit one focused more on industrial archaeology and 
preserving a past than on maintaining living heritage. 
As a pioneering ecomuseum, Creusot-Montceau‘s chequered history is perhaps less 
significant than its effect on the region‘s population. For three decades the museum helped 
communities deal with their traumas, memories, and reconciled past achievements with the 
present.
59
 In many countries, the de-industrialisation of large, formerly flourishing regions is 
a common and often deeply unsettling experience for those displaced by change. These 
issues are not solely economic or technological; they also have psychic effects on those 
communities that have forged intergenerational associations with place, lifestyle and culture. 
In such settings, the new museum can be transformative, it may be of a ‗radically new kind 
[with] revolutionary pretensions ... [having] ambition to provide a framework of local and 
even national regeneration‘.60 
Another example helps illustrate the way principles of ecomuseology are delivered in 
practice along with genuine transformations. Ha Long Bay forms part of the Gulf of Tonkin 
to the east of Hanoi in northern Vietnam. The bay consists of approximately 1,600 small 
(typically uninhabited) limestone islands that rise precipitously from the water and were 
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shaped by changing sea levels. It is a complex waterscape, rich in marine life and endemic 
flora; so famed for its natural beauty, Ha Long Bay was listed by as a World Heritage Site in 
1994.
61
 Because humans have lived there for thousands of years, much valuable heritage 
resides in the bay. However, due to years of warfare, mining in the hinterland and poorly 
regulated industrialisation and development, the region‘s environment severely eroded, the 
physical health of communities declined, and the continuation of cultural traditions were 
threatened. Urgent measures were required to remediate these problems. This was seen as 
more than a local need. Due to its significance, Ha Long Bay is an iconic Vietnamese site 
and its reclamation became a matter of national pride. Established progressively from 2000, 
the Ha Long Bay Ecomuseum was eventually recognised as Vietnam‘s first national 
ecomuseum in 2006, and it began operating under this title from 2008.
62
 The ecomuseum 
takes a holistic and sustainable approach to the region‘s social, cultural and economic 
development and to its ecological protection.
63
 Although the long-term effects of the 
museum are yet to be determined, the indicators suggest the health and well-being of 
communities is improving in measurable ways (for example, reduced rates of HIV 
infection), unique cultures are protected (such as through a ‗floating museum‘ where the 
traditional lifestyles of the fishing communities are preserved), levels of pollution are 
decreasing, and ecological and cultural tourism (and hence the economy) are thriving.
64
 
Much of the drive and commitment to make these changes have not come from the centralist 
communist government, but from the local level where models of community participation 
and empowerment have been used. This demonstrates that even in undemocratic nations, 
models of effective local decision-making that determines people‘s quality of life (deep 
democracy) can be employed to genuine effect.
65
 
To some extent, these examples illustrate the three main characteristics of ecomuseums: (1) 
flexibility around settings and need, (2) community participation and democratic 
involvement, and (3) a commitment to place, encompassing holistic management of heritage 
resources in their environments. This means ecomuseums are unlikely to be confined to a 
single monolithic site; rather, they range across spatial and conceptual territories in a ‗hub 
and spoke‘ model – a major departure from past museum design. Their essential ‗anarchy‘ 
(where power is devolved and structure created through collective consensus) is a contrast 
to the order and implied authority in traditional museology – although this does not mean 
there is less rigor or conceptual energy driving ecomuseum establishment and maintenance. 
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As well as contesting institutional authorities, community empowerment reorients the notion 
of value, generates alternative interpretations of history or social relations, re-positions the 
importance of oral history, and emphasises the relationships between people, and between 
people and place.
66
 Gerard Corsane developed 21 principles of ecomuseums and community 
museology. Among these, he identifies the equal importance of immovable, movable and 
intangible cultural heritage; the focus on sustainable development and responsible resource 
use; the promotion of multi- and interdisciplinary approaches to research; interconnections 
between nature and culture, past and present; and benefits for local communities, such as 
regeneration and strengthened social capital.
67
 Ecomuseums provide valuable insights into 
the role museology may play in a future where culture, people and their environments 
function within a sustainable-development model.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Cultural institutions as places of memory and change at the              
intersections between the political economy, culture (including society), creativity 
(including the arts and technology) and the total environment  
There are now many such socially engaged museums across the world, especially in Europe 
where, in 2007, they numbered 287.
68
 Other issues and methods integral to the ecomuseum 
approach include social cohesion and inclusion, human development and respect for human 
and cultural rights. Deep, local democracy and equity are also necessary to the process, and 
tend to work because the methodology draws on fundamental strengths and capacities of 
humans and societal structures. O‘Neill argues museums need to integrate their purpose and 
functions into current circumstances. Their best hope for survival is not about understanding 
what they are for, but – based on community relationships – who they are for. If museums 
move in this direction: 
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they may cease to be the more or less helpless victims of change, and choose their own 
direction … The future of museums depends on the depth and authenticity of this 
relationship, which is as important, morally and intellectually, as the authenticity of the 
objects [they house] themselves.
69
 
Although not all museums can or should be ecomuseums – and their normative roles of 
collecting, interpreting and displaying objects are a valuable and continuing role – the 
ecomuseum model broadens the conceptual frame of cultural institutions and their potential 
association with civil society. 
5.4 CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS, INDUSTRIES AND INDICATORS 
The term ‗cultural institution‘ (which includes museums and their variants) is a generic 
descriptor for public spaces and publicly accessible services that negotiate, maintain or 
present culture and cultural activities in their many forms. This broad understanding, which 
reflects the definitions of cultural heritage found in the UNESCO conventions, includes 
cultures linked to the society, political economy, environment, media, faith, ethnicity, 
industry, science and the multiplicity of human diversity. Although cultural institutions 
cannot be described as core creative arts, they can certainly nurture and have strong 
relationships with the arts; this makes them core creative industries.
70
 For example, in 
Australia, the ABC and SBS are well-established government-funded cultural institutions. 
Although much of their output is not ‗creative‘ product per se (such as news, current affairs 
and sport broadcasting), they do support a range of creative industries, creative artists, and 
produce and promote cultural works and, occasionally, works of art. 
Although cultural institutions should be sensitive to the ebb and flow of contemporary 
events, they are also potentially vulnerable to them. They cannot be solely dispassionate 
repositories and display sites of human and natural products, even if artefact-based heritage 
preservation is a valuable function some fulfil. Cultural institution studies, especially in 
Europe, regard the cultural sector as ‗historically evolved societal forms of organising the 
conception, production, distribution, propagation, interpretation, reception, conservation and 
maintenance of specific cultural goods‘.71 This approach is not so rigorously promoted in 
Australia with many cultural institutions yet to envision themselves as egalitarian civic 
spaces, as independent network hubs (bridging and interpreting the past, present and future, 
the local with the global), and as places to reflect and reconcile contemporary social 
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realities, contested ideas and the marginalised. The creative and democratic potential of 
cultural institutions (such as ecomuseums) have also been inadequately addressed, where 
they struggle to transform themselves into dynamic places where citizens can actively 
participate in social, economic, political and cultural life.
72
 
Creative industries work across the spectrum of arts and culture but do so for profit (even if 
on a socially entrepreneurial basis) and contribute to economies through either domestic or 
international sales. They are associated with activities such as architecture, fashion and 
design, music production and distribution, other performing arts, book production, and the 
media (television, radio, film, advertising and graphic arts).
73
 One definition is ‗those 
industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a 
potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual 
property‘.74 The creative industries are also creative ‗in the sense of employing artists‘75 
and, historically, have contributed to artistic and cultural heritage, both of ephemera and 
more substantial works. Creative industries do present a counterpoint to many cultural 
institutions, and the boundaries between the sectors understandably blur and overlap. 
Because they are typically based on business models, creative industries rely on the 
production of cultural goods for which there is substantial public demand.
76
 The issues of 
mass production, commodification and marketing mean these goods may promote and 
reinforce conformity and compliance with norms. Cultural products released by commercial 
media – such as most films, sitcoms, radio, popular music, fashion magazines and computer 
games – are likely to take these forms. Given the synchronicity of production, economies of 
scale add further to this trend. For example, the fashion industry, film distributors and media 
outlets (many with integrated and co-dependent business investments) collaborate to 
maximise potential sales through cross-promotion and advertising. 
It has long been recognised this challenges the heritage arts as well as cultural productions 
that are complex, individualistic or do not conform to standardised cultural norms. In the 
middle of the last century, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued that the market 
place, especially through the influence of the media and centralised power, encouraged a 
limited but dominant popular culture. They assumed this trend would ensure subaltern or 
subcultures would progressively diminish due to majority preferences and demand. This was 
seen as a cyclic process where, the more culture is mass-produced, the more that dissent and 
diversity is restricted. In turn, this progressively limits the range of available cultural 
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experiences, narrowing consumer preferences, tastes, and further guaranteeing ready and 
predictable markets for the cultural products invented by corporate interests.
77
 Considerable 
evidence validates the fears of those who hold this pessimistic view, such as Fromm, Toby 
Miller, Clive Hamilton, Dines and Levande, quoted previously. 
Although (at a global level) these are justified concerns, dystopian visions have not yet born 
fruit with a sufficiently large proportion of humans continuing to seek expressive and 
creative forms, and the means to satisfy spiritual or aesthetic needs, that sit outside a 
populist norm. The Marxist interpretation of how capital will recruit cultural product to 
maximise power, surprisingly, has omitted one of the bases of Marxist dialectic: the very 
structures created by the market economy have also born its antithesis. This includes, as a 
reaction to the universalism of globalised culture, a reassertion of cultural (and often 
religious) identity and an exploration of cultural origins and expressions which, in turn, are 
reshaping culture and the arts. The reassertion of regionalism and local distinctiveness is a 
symptom of this trend. UNESCO‘s concern to maintain the diversity of cultural expressions 
reflects an awareness that, through globalisation, cultural product increasingly conforms to a 
largely Western materialist paradigm. Nevertheless, UNESCO also takes a more positive 
approach to creative industries as a means to achieve economic development in parallel with 
free cultural expression.
78
 
The relationship between these sectors: the creative industries (largely business and 
demand-driven) and cultural institutions (based on aesthetic, social and heritage values) is 
symbiotic, yet distinct. Although both sectors have valuable functions and exert 
considerable influence, debates about culture and cultural policy can result in a conflation of 
the two. This is misleading. Although creative industries may produce cultural goods in high 
demand and that fetch high prices, this does not mean they are of high quality, provide high 
levels of public good or long-term satisfaction. Indeed, they may do the opposite, 
particularly with gratuitous resource wastage, such as mass-produced ephemera. However, 
creative industries can largely protect their own interests. They ride the dynamics of a 
mercurial market, responding to elasticity in price demands, product inventiveness and 
preference signalling; indeed, this immediacy encourages forms of ‗creative destruction‘, 
which work in the producers‘ interests.79 Cultural institutions have far less potential to do 
so. This means that cultural Darwinism – where only the appropriately fit and trait-
displaying cultural forms survive – may be a recipe for disaster. 
   284 | Page  
 
In the same way biodiversity is necessary for ecological health, arts diversity is necessary 
for social and cultural health. In the long term, if cultural institutions suffer at the expense of 
a majority‘s cultural whimsy, the wellsprings of creative industries may be undermined. 
This will damage a system of cultural replenishment and re-creation as well as deprive those 
wanting continued access to a variety of cultural experience. It also poses significant risks 
for human rights and political liberty. The arts are only occasionally subversive but, when 
they are, this may be beneficial, as when they question or satirise authority.
80
 All countries 
evaluate their financial status – current accounts, GDP, comparative standards of living, 
taxation revenue and the like – however, human need should not be subservient to the 
demands of economics, which provides only one (often-unreliable) indicator of performance 
in one aspect of activity. Conversely, the social health of nations requires greater attention 
than it has received, including investments in human and cultural rights, ends in themselves. 
When these rights are achieved societies are more productive and people live more 
satisfying lives which, in turn, provides economic benefits.
81
 This raises further questions: 
what instruments help measure the status and performance of culture, both at population and 
institutional levels? How can performance of cultural institutions be measured and to what 
standards? Difficult questions to answer, one approach is through the evolving concept of 
cultural indicators.  
The Urban Institute, using what it calls ‗cultural vitality indicators‘, makes a helpful attempt 
at a definition, saying cultural indicators: 
measure the practice of creating, disseminating, validating and supporting arts and culture 
as a dimension of everyday community life and conditions. These indicators are 
comparable across communities around the nation and recurrent over time ... [domains of 
measurement include] presence of opportunities for cultural participation, cultural 
participation itself, and support for cultural activities.
82
 
Interest in indicators has grown since 2001, the year the UDCD and its associated action 
plan were adopted, although several years earlier UNESCO had started exploring how 
indicators could better integrate culture in human development models.
83
 The UDCD plan 
does not directly call on state parties to develop indicators, but it lists domains of action. 
These include supporting diversified media content (12), developing policies to preserve 
cultural and natural heritage, intangible heritage, and to combat illicit trade in cultural 
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products (13), fostering international research (15), and assisting with the emergence of new 
cultural industries (17). In Australia, the UDCD and its action plan are not well known. This 
is unfortunate given they can assist with the task of developing cultural policies: the 
principles stated, and the actions outlined, provide a framework for most of the attributes 
that should be incorporated into policies addressing culture, heritage and artistic creation, 
while taking account of globalisation and sustainable development. UNESCO says the 
purpose of cultural indicators is to provide information about a society, even if there is no 
intent to evaluate the cultures within it.
84
 
Indicators clearly have functions at national and local levels, but some work has examined 
their use as a tool for local governments. Agenda21, an international program established 
following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, argues 
that cultural indicators are critical for ensuring culture is embedded as a pillar of sustainable 
development. This is recognised by the International Federation of Arts Councils and 
Culture Agencies (IFACCA) and Eurocult21 (Urban Cultural Profiles Exchange Project), 
which analysed qualitative and quantitative culture-related data (such as cultural policies) 
from several centres across Europe.
85
 
On cultural-indicator design, an Agenda21 working-group commented, it is ‗a fragmented 
field and lacks consensus‘,86 and IFACCA, that it is ‗still largely under development, 
particularly in their relevance to policymaking and program delivery. There are, therefore, 
reasons to be wary of cultural indicator frameworks … developed to date.‘87 This has meant 
indicators have been seldom utilised. IFACCA notes that some of the problems include 
definitions, difficulties with data collection, overly vague objectives, and a lack of 
international consistency. Nevertheless, countries may take a range of approaches and 
produce varying ideas based on differing circumstances and needs, although improvements 
in indicators are not solely matters of statistical collection and manipulation, but of gaining 
clearer understandings about the web of relationships between the arts, arts policy, policy 
analysis, and their effects on cultural sectors.
88
 The Agenda21 paper notes that the ways 
cultural indicators are defined varies, based on requirements and context. As such, if 
policymakers can evaluate local cultural needs within the context of other issues (e.g. urban 
planning, environmental management, economic context and human ecology), indicators 
can be developed that are based on relatively generic criteria. They include examples of 
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social inclusion, public space and cultural projects, culture and the economy, governance, 
and the extent of cultural rights available to communities within planning parameters.
89
  
Cultural-indicator design and application may be an emerging practice, but this does not 
preclude its use; dynamism and flexibility make it a useful tool to audit change in 
transforming societies. A first-consultation draft of cultural indicators for Australia, released 
in mid 2011 for the Culture Ministers Council, loosely clusters indicators into three themes: 
economic development, cultural value, and engagement and social effect.
90
 Although the 
draft paper mentions pertinent issues – such as intangible heritage (although misleadingly91) 
and assets such as community knowledge – it maintains a division between arts and culture 
as a broad ‗sector‘ and with others that are statistically measurable. In relation to this thesis, 
the draft model demonstrates two deficiencies: first, the primacy of economics to measure 
cultural value and strength, and second, segmentation from the issues of environmental 
maintenance and community empowerment. Given concerns associated with the reliance of 
economic growth on resource exploitation, and its frequent effects on human rights, it could 
be argued this goes beyond the mandate of cultural policy and its measurement tools. If so, 
this is an example of the persisting failures of interdisciplinary and intersectoral planning. 
Although sustainable development requires such approaches, it remains beyond the capacity 
of public policy to deliver, whether due to political intransigence or a failure of knowledge 
or imagination. It is also restricted (in Australia) by three tiers of government and the 
disconnection between centralised planning and local government where some of the most 
inventive cultural management occurs.
92
 
These dilemmas are repeated in other countries. For example, John Holden has reported on 
the culture sector in the UK and identified how cultural institutions have been progressively 
shaped into platforms to deliver government social and economic policy objectives. He says 
this trend began in the 1980s when the British conservatives ‗decided that culture should be 
the handmaiden of the economy ... and cultural institutions justified their existence by 
showing that they increased tourism, regenerated cities and helped businesses to succeed‘.93 
This trend continued under New Labour, which, although more sympathetic to culture for its 
own sake, worked hard to ensure expenditure could be justified and maintained tight control 
over outlays. The paradox of this situation (it will be different for other sectors) is that 
government assumes it requires tangible evidence that funding has quantitatively achieved 
its intention, but the measurement tools that report on outcomes enforce compliances that 
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are inconsistent with the rationale and purpose of creative endeavours. In this sense, general 
policy or fiscal objectives dictate the specific requirements of the cultural sector; it is also 
discriminatory.
94
 Holden argues that the system requires an overhaul of the relationship 
between government, community and cultural institutions. This would require a new 
understanding of public ‗values‘ that are shaped by anthropological, environmental and 
intangible accounting.
95
 
For cultural institutions to achieve the goals of new museology, several conditions are 
needed. As well as a methodological commitment among museum professionals and 
community support, is preparedness on the part of governments to reliably resource museum 
practice, without interference. In particular, there needs to be a sympathetic body of policy 
settings. If not, many of the approaches of new museology will be stymied. As Holden‘s 
analysis of culture-sector funding illustrates, there are models that demonstrate more 
constructive government approaches; the challenge is to persuade them these models 
‗work‘. One way to do so is to provide evidence that arts funding has positive secondary 
effects, such as improving health and well-being. Although contrary to the principle that art 
and culture exist for their own sake, it could be argued that a pragmatic approach is 
necessary given this is an insufficient rationale to garner government support.  
Research conducted by Martin Mulligan, Christopher Scanlon and Nicky Welch provides 
evidence of dividends from cultural investment. Based on community arts projects in 
Victoria, Australia, they explore alternative ways of understanding the links between the arts 
and well-being. The authors claim that repeated attempts to demonstrate measurable 
improvements to health, based on arts interventions, continues to be unconvincing because 
too much research uses loose concepts (e.g. social capital) and there has been excessive 
reliance on the association between inputs (e.g. arts projects) and outcomes (social change 
or better health). They posit that, although relationships and effects are indirect and diffuse, 
arts-based activities can improve well-being by enabling ‗narratives of action‘ around 
disturbing social changes. They argue: 
the open-ended nature of the arts can help to generate and sustain webs of meaning at a 
time when shared narratives of meaning of community are being challenged by the 
disruptive effects of the intersecting social processes of ‗globalisation‘.96 
   288 | Page  
 
This understanding of the effects of globalisation on individuals and communities is 
paralleled in Aslan‘s book about the causes of religious radicalism and international 
terrorism. If this seems an unlikely comparison, it should be noted there is increasing 
evidence that social alienation has many causes and effects that are profound, rapid, 
systemic and unavoidable. This is putting stress on people, communities and institutions. In 
such conditions, when many identity-markers are eroded (e.g. a sense of class, gender or 
nationality), others (e.g. ethnicity or faith) may replace them. Aslan argues globalisation is 
an issue not only of technology and transnational relations, but also of a human ‗sense of 
self in a world that is increasingly being viewed as a single space‘.97 Globalisation, he says, 
has changed the idea of self and the way individuals interact with society: 
[How] we conceive of our public spaces, how we interact with like-minded individuals, 
how we determine our religious and political leaders, how we think even about categories 
of religion and politics – everything about how we define ourselves as individuals and as 
members of a larger society is transformed in a globalised world because our sense of self 
is not constrained by territorial boundaries.
98
 
Aslan does not dismiss the importance of local distinctiveness, associations with shared 
values and places. He argues generically that responses to modernity and uncertainty are 
added stressors on individuation, identity, and these internal and external resources are 
compromised by intersecting and overlapping changes and effects. 
Given this sense of uncertainty, Mulligan, Scanlon and Welch reveal three main issues 
emerging from their study. First, the enormous community changes occurring due to 
globalisation, which, in turn, confronts personal identity and sense of belonging. Second, 
community arts help create an individual or collective awareness that action in local settings 
is possible. Third, community-arts participation helps to foster local engagement.
99
 The 
authors argue that, for communities experiencing prolonged buffeting and reconstitution due 
to globalisation, cultural activities can play an important role by ‗providing a sense of 
narrative and purpose, and so facilitate a sense of agency, offering people the means of 
piecing together the fragments of life and a coherent sense of self‘.100 The critical concept 
here is ‗agency‘. The authors conclude this is the key notion to draw from their work: the 
arts help build agency for individuals and groups in an age of confusion and change, this, in 
turn, strengthens community capacity and improves population-level health. Religiosity may 
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have a similar effect.
101
 Clearly, the same applies to the human experience of cultural 
identity: the loss, theft or dilution of cultures has resulted in fractured, scattered, 
disempowered and sick peoples. The reverse is equally true, and the work of some cultural 
institutions, such as facilitating the repatriation, reconnection and rebuilding of cultures, has 
empowered and rehabilitated communities.
102
 Cultural revivification has been accompanied 
by improving physical and psycho-social health. Cultural loss often results in ‗sick‘ people; 
therefore, cultural replenishment can make them ‗well‘ again.103 The role of museums in 
strengthening community cultural vitality, as the Urban Institute describes it, has real value. 
In many research settings, a discovery that may seem novel often affirms trends that are 
largely predictable because they concern what it is to be human and to function in a complex 
web of social interactions, culturally shaped behaviours, together with needs for self-
expression and self-determination. The evidence – drawn from history, ethics, and data 
across many disciplines – is clear about the material, civil and political conditions humans 
require to flourish and, similarly, the complementary environmental, social and cultural 
conditions. None of this is remarkable. What is, are the impediments to its realisation. 
Contesting the status quo and promoting sustainability, liberty and human development 
against opposing interests therefore becomes ideological: a decision to act based on a 
commitment to ideals, beliefs and expectations. Activism may come from many sources – 
from individuals, civil society institutions, businesses, not-for-profits – and it often becomes 
a political statement accompanied by consequences. As advocated by several scholars of 
museology, cultural institutions that step beyond a cautious framework of conservation and 
collection may become social, cultural and environmental activists for change, even anti-
authoritarian.
104
 This has been integral to the whole notion of new museology. 
The belief among many cultural institution professionals: that ‗authoritative neutrality‘ 
provides some distance from uncomfortable contemporary trends, almost certainly does 
not.
105
 One of the challenges arising from new museology is the choice museums will be 
required to make on a particularly wicked issue. If their future is to be embedded in 
communities – helping to mould the consciousness of the societies they serve – where does 
this leave the role and representation of business and neoliberal values, especially given 
their influence over many popular cultural forms? If museums choose egalitarianism, 
equality and democracy over corporate interests, they will be normatively positioned on the 
political Left. In contrast, if they accept the participation and values of neoliberalism and its 
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advocates, will this entail endorsing interests that are contrary to those of communities, 
collective decision-making and conservation? Can museums equivocate between almost 
mutually exclusive value systems? These questions represent a form of political wedge. 
When San Roman argues ‗using a museum as a political instrument must be avoided‘, she 
refers to party politics.
106
 Politics, understood as internally conflicting interrelationships 
between people involving power and authority,
107
 may relate to civil government, more 
often, however, they are distinct from them. The choices cultural institutions make in this 
political setting will inevitably locate them with a particular ideological stance. Ultimately, 
this is a choice between new and old museology: between community, heritage and ecology 
and market interests which, by their very definition, are self-interested and exclusive. Once 
a cultural institution has made its choice, what will be the consequences? This may range 
from withdrawal of corporate sponsorship (upon which many rely) to conflict with 
governments (also funders) as well as alienated community groups. 
5.5 MUSEUMS AND OTHER CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS: THEIR PLACE 
IN A NEW WORLD 
In the fields of urban planning and micro-economic reform, there are scant but intriguing 
references to the role of cultural institutions in a dynamic-equilibrium world. For example, 
Gleeson and Tim Jackson each refer to the opportunities for culture as a means of 
supporting prosperity, or human flourishing, without the social, environmental and human-
rights costs of the neoliberal growth  paradigm.
108
 In planning frameworks, cultural services 
and human services tend to be referred to as separate notions, rather than as associated. 
However, cultural activities have numerous and important effects. They have low 
environmental consequences, can provide meaningful employment, and skills and sector 
development; but they also provide many social benefits. These activities should be 
conceptualised broadly – culture is not necessarily or solely the creative arts but collective 
memories, beliefs, practices and communication forms. As such, human services may 
encompass a range of acquired technical skills, knowledge and behaviours (as in 
manufacturing and production, animal or plant husbandry, or mentoring and teaching), 
which includes many cultural elements. Figure 5.2 depicts how the transfer of 
intergenerational knowledge will benefit multiple human generations and bring direct and 
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measurable gains at macro levels as well as indirect gains (human well-being benefits) at the 
community level. 
Jacobs is particularly concerned about a risk of contemporary civilization falling into a new 
‗dark age‘; this has repeatedly occurred in the past whenever memories are forgotten from 
one generation to the next. She argues that traditional human fears – often represented as the 
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: famine, war, pestilence and death – were never joined by 
a fifth demonic rider, forgetfulness.
109
 Jacobs does not identify memory with intangible 
heritage, but it is an important aspect of her argument, for example, in the way she discusses 
the people of Ireland and their stubborn, collective remembrance of values and experiences, 
especially how song and narrative helped the Irish to hold fast, miraculously and 
persistently, to what truly mattered to them collectively. Jacobs says this is evidence of the 
‗emotional powers of the arts – authentic arts, not official propaganda – (which) are 
obviously central to every culture‘.110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Direct and indirect benefits of                                                                                              
intergenerational skills and knowledge transfers 
Jacobs says the Japanese follow a similar path, ‗vigorously maintain[ing] a program of 
supporting living national treasures: people who are living masters of Japanese arts‘, she 
argues these are examples of the way a culture can avoid falling into a dark age despite it 
appearing ‗objectively, to be its destiny‘.111 Many other examples of sustainable heritage 
development can readily be added to those Jacobs mentions; as described in Section 4.2, this 
is a leading preoccupation of UNESCO.
112
 Jacobs is also concerned that withdrawal of 
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support for the arts, along with many other ‗non-essential‘ human services, is not only a 
false economy but a folly that risks damaging quality of life and amenity. Applying 
economic-efficiency principles to intergenerational transfer of cultural knowledge is 
particularly problematic, and Jacob observes: 
[When] a culture is rich enough and inherently complex enough to afford redundancy of 
nurturers, but eliminates them as an extravagance or loses their cultural services through 
heedlessness of what is being lost, the consequence is self-inflicted cultural genocide.
113
 
This relates to concerns about the effect of a frictionless society. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the relentless drive for efficiency (primarily for economic benefits) necessarily deletes what 
is deemed redundant, especially processes that do not appear to yield immediate benefits, 
and may be substituted by a cheaper or multipurpose alternative, or that may have intangible 
qualities. This view, argues Roeder, is premised on the assumption that the only determinant 
of value is financial, but those things – institutions, traditions, habits, processes, people – 
deemed surfeit on efficiency grounds may have real values which cannot be, nor should be, 
solely determined by their profit-making potential.
114
 As Holden points out, not all values 
are captured by the marketplace and, in the culture and heritage sectors, there are ‗non-use‘ 
values, which include existence, option and bequest values; these accrue quantifiably in less 
tangible ways because they are not part of a conventional market.
115
 The effects of extreme 
efficiency on people, organisations and practices have included the loss of skills, 
knowledge, and communal quality of life. The potential to rediscover what has been lost is 
important for many reasons, not only for cultural or heritage preservation but also for social 
resiliency and future creativity. This potential may be retained in various ways, the expertise 
residing in educational and cultural institutions being one example. 
Education takes many forms; it includes not only scholarship but a wide range of training, 
and formal and informal experiential learning, such as through trades and manual work. 
Learning can be achieved in an array of settings. This is typically thought to be primary, 
secondary and tertiary schooling, the vocational education and training sector and on-the-job 
learning. While this is true, much cultural learning is gained through families, social 
networks and participation;
116
 this may be the case for all people but the more traditional a 
society (less industrialised or commercialised) the more likely it is learning will occur 
through less formal, institutionalised or accredited training. Museums have the potential to 
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straddle these different forms of knowledge transfer; although they are institutional and 
structured, museums can simultaneously be repositories, advocates and patrons of valuable 
cultural and community knowledge. Kjell Engström has described this role, in particular 
referring to the potential of ecomuseums as experiential hubs, where learning can be gained 
through participation and contact with living cultural traditions independent of the formal 
education system.
117
 Some museums with artisans on site can help to serve as a collective 
memory. For example, the Cobb & Co Museum in Toowoomba, Australia, which houses the 
national horse-drawn carriage collection, has set aside part of the museum for workshops 
that maintain a range of otherwise obsolete heritage trades associated with the pre-
automobile era, such as black- and silver-smithing, stone masonry, leather plaiting and 
millinery. Members of the public can view artisans at work or participate in a class.
118
 The 
availability of such resources and opportunities is consistent with the idea that a museum 
should ‗function as an instrument for local development and identity forming … [helping 
people to be] aware of their own situation, as well as show them their history through the 
presentation of culture relics‘.119 
Because museums help preserve heritage and memory – they conserve – this can create a 
perception of conservatism. However, museums that actively interpret ICOM‘s lead since 
the Santiago principles can be effective sites of participation, interrogation and (potentially) 
social activism. Increasingly, this activism is likely to centre on events affecting 
communities that museums serve. Humanity survives by functioning within the biosphere, 
this survival is largely based on our capacity to utilize available renewable and non-
renewable resources, such as arable land, water, lumber, minerals, fish stocks, and sources 
of energy such as fossil fuels. Without these resources, our ways of being and doing, as they 
now exist, would be impossible. Many processes are counter cyclical, such as a growing 
population impeding chances to lift billions of people out of poverty, or global corporatism 
undermining many aspirations for democracy and choice. These contrary trends represent 
forms of conflict; the zones in which they violently pull apart or abut are where changes 
need to occur. 
At these conflict zones – points of environmental, political, social, cultural and economic 
pressures – the transformative agenda will either succeed or fail. Although this may occur in 
many ways, it is believed it will almost certainly be by coalitions of civil society activists 
and community groups as opportunities, shared concerns, or impetus-forming events 
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occur.
120
 Arrayed against reforming trends will be conservative or cautionary influences in 
politics, community, corporate interests and the extensive, independent structures that 
support the current system, such as well-funded NGOs, think tanks and media networks.
121
 
Those who attempt to shift the momentum of attitudes and behaviours away from the 
interests of those who benefit most and hold much of the world‘s power, wealth and 
influence (the new form of imperium as Korten describes it
122
) are commonly scorned as 
being utopian, socialist, recalcitrant or unable to work in the ‗real‘ world. For example, 
when Keynesian economists questioned the viability of the global financial system and 
proposed alternative models to neoliberalism, pro-market critics responded with diatribes, 
for example claiming people ‗have no desire to live in a yurt under a workers‘ soviet‘.123 
Any questioning of neoliberalism is still reflexively viewed as a retreat to socialism, not as 
an alternative free-market system aiming to shift the focus of decision-making and benefits 
to the long-term interests of a majority of citizens. 
Many cultural institutions and museums will have critical roles to play at zones of contact 
and conflict. These roles are not the sole responsibility of any person, organisation or sector, 
or for any pre-determined ideological stance. Rather, it is a matter of reflection on what each 
is willing and able to contribute to public discussions or actions. Many ways of being, doing 
and creating are required if there is to be systemic and genuine change. Receptive and 
rational voices need to join, be heard and respected, in conversations about sustainable and 
equitable planning and development. The history and role of museums, combined with the 
potential of musealisation, infers what, how, when and where museums might become part 
of events that reorient life over coming decades.  
The future may be uncertain, but its shape will be largely determined by actions taken today. 
These actions should be many and various. One argument is that the only way humans can 
continue to live sustainably is by radically restructuring society, technology, the economy, 
and by pursuing ‗a simpler way‘. Ted Trainer, for example, advocates this approach, 
arguing it will involve refocusing from a lived internationalism (unless this can be 
maintained through new low-footprint technologies) to a largely imagined one and, 
therefore, a new localism. In these circumstances, communities would become highly 
dependent on regional ecosystems and social cohesion. In many ways, this represents a 
return to the conditions under which humans existed for most of our species‘ history and 
where people have strong incentives to behave collectively, accepting cooperation for the 
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greater good. This system ‗is very different from that in consumer capitalist societies. It 
would transform politics from a conflict-ridden pursuit of self-interest‘.124 
Trainer‘s view is echoed by Gleeson, who believes that if anything like the conditions we 
experience in the Global North are to continue, it is inevitable governments will form 
‗guardian states‘ to oversee the transition of economics, production, public policy, 
infrastructure and ecological stewardship. He regards this as a temporary measure, required 
only until a point of dynamic-equilibrium is reached between human activities and the 
biosphere, at which time many constraints may be lifted. However, Gleeson emphasises that 
because such guardianship will require prohibition on some conduct (which may encroach 
on derogable human rights as well as the freedom to participate in behaviours with harmful 
secondary effects), this is a public good that must be restricted by duration and mandate. His 
argument is that although a prolonged period of transition and limitation will be compulsory 
(hence constraining some individual freedoms), these essentially relate to spending 
preferences (consumption rights), not civil, political, cultural and social rights, inner 
freedom, and non-derogable rights. Indeed, Gleeson conjectures this phase may provide 
many opportunities for new creativity, invention and expression.
125
 It may also be a period 
where community, caring and compassion will supplant other more socially and 
environmentally destructive behaviours.
126
 He believes care ‗is the antithesis of 
complacency and, ultimately, of narcissism. It demands that we see ourselves as needy, at 
best temporarily capable, and bound indissolubly in networks of interdependency with 
humans and nature‘.127 True human freedom he argues (agreeing with Fromm) is not found 
in isolated and selfish individualism but in ‗spontaneous activity, love and work‘.128 A 
caring society is likely to be healthier, not only because compassion and reciprocity are 
certain to have beneficial health effects, but because it will be safer, fitter and more 
appropriately nourished.
129
 These observations, which are compatible with the value placed 
on cultural rights and cultural liberty (from sociological and international normative stances) 
and opportunities for human flourishing (from sustainable economic perspectives), are the 
means to revalue and reassert freedom, deep democratic participation and those ‗things that 
matter‘130 (from the perspective of political philosophy).  
In one of its reports on sustainability, nef speculates on what future society may look like if 
things ‗turn out right‘.131 Its vision is of human development that focuses on the principal 
conditions for genuine flourishing and prosperity. This necessarily entails discussion on how 
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urban living will be substantively changed, requiring a range of transitions across the realms 
of economics, governance, energy, food production and security, a refocus on localism and 
reconnection with community, and genuine reform around issues of equality and distributive 
equity. nef also advocates the need for vast re-skilling, arguing that, from making clothes to 
growing, preparing and preserving food, and repairing household goods: 
[and even] the making of music and art – simple skills that were taken for granted by 
countless generations have withered. A wide range of activities, goods and services was 
incorporated into the market as it expanded, like a cuckoo in the nest, displacing other 
ways of organising life. They were then commodified and sold back to the people from 
whom they were taken. The subtle knife of the market severed individuals, families and 
communities from their abilities to do things for themselves.
132
 
An economics-based NGO, nef raises this culturally-grounded argument on the basis it is 
self-evident. Although connection with notions of heritage values and conservation are not 
made directly, this is what nef means: the intangible cultural heritage that has been largely 
forgotten or diluted since the mid twentieth century and needs to be reclaimed and revalued. 
nef calls for a renaissance in the arts and artisanship, and argues that cultural flourishing 
will be an integral process of a great transition. This will need to inspire creativity, be 
reflected in mass media, and position culture as a productive activity. In particular, the 
transition must ‗embrace a great democratisation of the arts, turning us from passive 
spectators in our own lives back into active participants in it‘.133 These issues are also raised 
in a UN-Habitat report on the world‘s cities that notes the importance of quality of life 
factors – largely shaped by cultural life, creativity and social vitality – which help determine 
a city‘s productivity.134 
Even government documents are cautiously beginning to reflect many of these principles. 
For example, a public health checklist used in New South Wales to help assess the effects of 
urban development applications on community well-being meticulously describes the 
multiple, complementary and intersecting physical requirements for healthy living.
135 
These 
requirements include decent housing, physical activity, nutritious foods, good transport 
availability and connectivity, reasonable employment options (preferably close to place of 
residence), a pleasant environment including adequate levels of open public space and 
amenity, social cohesion, capital and safety. Research conducted by the City Futures Centre 
at the University of New South Wales, to strengthen the knowledge of how urban 
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infrastructure complements public health, indicates there are three domains that support 
well-being. These are (1) the quality of the built environment (the totality of urban 
infrastructure planning), which helps people to be active, (2) the availability of healthy food 
options, and (3) the strength and connections within communities.
136
 The public health 
checklist also explains there are common elements between health and sustainability. These 
include environmental, economic, social and cultural issues, a focus on people, quality of 
life, equity, and commitment to public participation. Sustainability is now the dominant 
paradigm in urban planning and development, and health is seen increasingly as a core 
component.
137 
Additionally, the checklist explains that inclusion of public art helps to: 
reflect local character in public space. Importantly, artistic and cultural representation 
cannot be imposed on a community but should be a product of a process of community 
engagement where local people have had an opportunity to be involved in the design and 
development of public art, space design and cultural interpretation.
138
 
This health checklist, linked to sustainable urban planning and based on a plethora of peer-
reviewed evidence, has not triggered a furore of criticism claiming it advocates ‗socialist-
style yurt-living‘. Yet, its standards for urban development mirrors much of the (apparently) 
radical work of Sen, Jackson, Gleeson, Jacobs and other scholars who have envisioned freer, 
more equitable and sustainable settings where human flourishing can occur.
139
 Their 
arguments are also based on urban planning, environmental, technological, economic, 
sustainability and related issues.
140
 However, if such visions of future societies are accurate, 
even partially so, this makes them relevant to cultural maintenance and revitalisation. In an 
era of anxiety and rapid change, cultural agency and self-determination are also means of 
preserving memory, of healing injured people and places, and of strengthening civil society. 
It is increasingly recognised that culture, including the arts, has a role ‗in tackling complex 
social, environmental and economic problems affecting community well-being‘, and 
integrated, whole-of-government approaches are required to do so.
141
 
It is a relatively straightforward task to interpret how the role of the new museum is 
compatible with the transitions to more equitable, sustainable and prosperous futures; in 
these scenarios, cultural institutions gain a resonant purpose and function.
142
 Douglas Worts 
has used the mirror metaphor to explain how museums can support self-reflection and 
learning by helping populations understand their cultural pasts, and so enable them to live 
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consciously in the present while working to a more desirable future.
143
 In questioning how 
well museums currently fulfil this potential, Worts says that fundamental shifts in how we 
conceive ‗urban and pluralist cultures are needed if we are to adequately address the 
complex sustainability challenges already on our collective doorstep‘.144 
Janes agrees, quoting Wackernagel and Rees‘s assertion that local communities are 
fundamental to adaptation: ‗[T]he most critical social condition for sustainability is a shared 
commitment to community cohesion (both local and global) and a sense of collective 
responsibility for the future‘.145 Museums, especially those with close associations with 
local communities, are well positioned to strengthen both bonding and bridging social 
capital. Janes argues that, as public institutions, museums have moral and intellectual 
obligations to interrogate the status quo. Few other social or cultural institutions have the 
trust and credibility to fulfil this role. Therefore, it is time to act by broadening ‗the purpose 
of museums to encompass critical thinking, mindfulness and social responsibility. Human 
adaptation lies at the heart of the current global challenges and mindful museums can 
help‘.146 
This advocacy is consistent with the call made 40 years ago, at the ICOM Santiago Round 
Table, that museums are well-placed and enabled to shape community consciousness and 
stimulate actions to help resolve contemporary problems. This is ‗the most rational and 
logical course of development for museums, so that they may best serve society‘s needs‘.147 
Such a course also offers one of humanity‘s best opportunities to manage change within 
complex adaptive systems: methodically, inclusively and with equity. The reason again 
relates to the importance of place. Place is the locus amoenus, the site where people, culture 
and communities can coalesce around collective and deep democratic processes of 
sustainable development, inclusion and cohesion. Localism (particularism) provides a site 
where people can contribute small actions to larger projects. Localism allows for 
experimentation: those fuzzy, creative trials that, being less constrained by the logic or 
domination of exogenous or self-interested authorities, gain clearer understandings of, and 
commitment to, global (universal) issues.
148
 
As noted previously, if cultural institutions choose to step beyond a cautious framework of 
conservation and collection, they may become environmental, political, cultural or social 
activists for change. Such a role involves risk, to which many large institutions are 
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understandably averse or constrained. As Helly observes, risks are rarely objective and are 
unequally distributed. Although the underprivileged are especially vulnerable, the world is 
not divided into victims and decision-makers; events are caused by multiple agents, which, 
in turn, are affected by other decisions and trends. There is no absolute group that ‗makes 
decisions and holds the power to change the situation; there is no conspiracy, but simply a 
chain of events, trends and plans‘.149 
In a recent opinion piece, Ann Moyal quoted several scientific authorities who have 
lamented the persistence of ‗two cultures‘ – the sciences and humanities – described by 
Snow in his 1959 Rede Lecture.
150
 Moyal argues that, today, when the threat of climate 
change poses the greatest problem in human history, maintaining opposition between these 
disciplines is a waste of energy and time. Humanity needs ‗everything in the Enlightenment 
toolbox, science and arts included, to undo the destructive practices of modernity‘.151 
Although successful re-partnering between science and the humanities is more an aspiration 
than reality, the way cultural institutions, particularly ecomuseums, can achieve an 
integrated approach to the four pillars – culture, environment, economics and society – are a 
best-practice sustainable development model. Janes goes so far as to suggest museums, if 
they meet their potential, may create a collaborative third culture. Museums are ‗particularly 
suited for this renewal [and] the troubled world and its citizens are crying out for this 
leadership‘.152 
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[6]   CONCLUSION:  ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE 
Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, I can hear her 
  
breathing. 
– Arundhati Roy 
Our planetary home is changing – fast. As change escalates, the coming decades are likely to 
be some of the most challenging in human history: different, but equally as fraught as the 
precipitous Cold War era and its threat of nuclear Armageddon. Now, there are multiple 
impending risks. Each, on its own, would represent a significant challenge; taken together, 
they may be sufficient to trigger a systemic failure of contemporary global civilization in 
much the same way as spatially-constrained civilizations failed in the past. One way of 
considering these risks is by assessing whether humans are able to navigate such treacherous 
waters. Some threats are the result of human activity, while others are natural; neither type 
can be accurately predicted because knowledge is limited and the trajectories of change are 
often unclear. Any predictions will be largely based on probability and risks; these can be 
reduced to three general themes. 
First, as of October 2011, the human population was 7 billion. Estimates indicate it will be 
more than 9 billion by 2050 and could reach 15 billion by 2100.
1
 If these estimates are 
accurate, population growth will seriously threaten the planet‘s carrying capacity. If the 
population slowly decreases after a circa-2050 peak, as some have proposed,
2
 hopefully, it 
will be a managed decline, not one induced by violent shocks such as wars, droughts or 
worldwide famine. The main uncertainty is whether the population will continue to increase 
or will stabilise and, if it returns to sustainable numbers whether this is possible without 
triggering synchronous collapse before it occurs. 
Second, in June 2011, there were 393.7 parts per million (ppm) of carbon in the Earth‘s 
atmosphere.
3
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control reports, to avoid dangerous 
climate change, global temperatures must not exceed the safe ‗guard-rail‘ of 2 ºC. This will 
require stabilising atmospheric carbon at 450 ppm.
4
 All indications are this cannot happen. 
The momenta of economic expansion, energy demand and production mean we will exceed 
these targets.
5
 This may lead to increases of 4 ºC (substantially higher over land), triggering 
tipping-points and leading to run-away temperature rises: the unknown territory of human-
induced climate change.
6
 The critical issue is whether humanity can collectively change its 
habits and choose survival by shifting lifestyle expectations.
7
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Third, there are limits to growth. The 30-year update of the Club of Rome‘s report notes, by 
the early 1980s, the human footprint was more than the Earth‘s capacity and exceeded it by 
20% in 1999.
8
 Ten years later, the Global Footprint Network estimated this had reached 
44%: the equivalent of almost 18 months for the world to absorb the pollutants and replenish 
stocks that humanity uses each year.
9
 EET analysis
10
 also indicates many mineral reserves, 
critical in the manufacture of new technologies, will be exhausted by mid century.
11
 
Struggling to meet the voracious global demand for commodities, production relies on 
energy reserves to make and transport goods; currently, this energy source is finite and its 
effects toxic.
12
 Given that the edifice of contemporary global civilization is falsely premised 
on the infinite availability of raw materials and energy, its future is in doubt. 
Economics, corporate greed, available resources and ecological carrying capacity are in 
conflict, as are politics, ideologies, religions and cultures. It has always been so; the 
difference in the twenty-first century is that these forces are enacted at an international level, 
systems are globally integrated and vulnerable at a time when they have lost much of their 
resilience, and there are no unspoilt new lands to which people can retreat and start afresh.
13
 
Among those who contemplate these issues is the commonly expressed belief that risks can 
be managed.
14
 Given events are occurring on a planetary scale and over many decades, this is 
a comforting, superficially rational delusion to maintain. An optimist could argue that 
humanity, through a combination of extraordinary and atypical leadership, collective 
intelligence, unprecedented collaboration and luck, will ameliorate these threats. In this 
optimistic scenario, the human population will stabilise, new low-carbon technologies will 
keep atmospheric conditions at ‗safe‘ levels, geo-engineering will mitigate lethal residual 
effects, science will invent a new green revolution to feed more people and meet energy 
demands, growth will be decoupled from material production, developed nations will (at 
least partially) redistribute their wealth and, inspired by a spirit of reciprocity, there will be a 
‗great turning‘ from models of domination to ‗earth communities‘.15 Alternatively (as has 
repeatedly occurred in the past), the momenta of existing systems, behaviours and enmities 
will guarantee that imminent threats are ignored or denied and, consequently, the existing 
global system and many of the vulnerable environments that support it will fail. Nobody 
knows what might unfold; all predictions are speculative. We can, however, imagine possible 
futures and attempt to construct them. Although the evidence of history suggests a grimmer 
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outlook, humans are surprisingly adaptable and resourceful: transformative change can never 
be ruled out. 
Because the state of play suggests our species‘ survival options are shrinking, many voices 
articulate alternative visions to the existing norms. Some come from international agencies 
who argue for rights-based approaches to culture and development; others, from international 
collaborations of experts explaining the steps required to prevent disasters; and still others 
from think tanks outlining feasible but alternative economic models under which humanity 
could continue to flourish. Many opinions – regarded as rational by some, subversive by 
others – propose holistic responses; they advocate for cosmopolitan, distributive and rights-
based changes. This suggests there may be use for an often-overlooked tool in humanity‘s 
survival kit: ethics.
16
 Common among calls for change is the support for human-centred (or 
values-based) approaches to guide how reformative choices are made. 
In this thesis I looked at four big and inter-related questions, suggesting some answers may 
be found in musealisation and museography which offer constructive methods and settings to 
resolve many social, cultural, economic and environmental challenges. The first three 
questions – what is happening to our world, why is it happening, and how can we think about 
these issues? – I have attempted to answer across the first four chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
argued the dominant model of the global political economy is driving population increases, 
resource depletion, anthropogenic geoengineering, and intercultural conflict. This has placed 
contemporary civilization in a position of vulnerability, where risks are often underestimated 
or unrecognised.  
In Chapter 3, I discussed some factors that shape civil societies. Acknowledging these – even 
elemental issues such as what it is to be human, the ways we live in society and how we 
respond to notions of freedom, the alien, or our place in the world – is often forgotten, 
assumed or accepted without question. Self-reflection is easily substituted with self-
obsession. Exaltation of the individual over the group, validated by media–corporate 
coalitions, has weakened democracy as an ideal and an institution. Simultaneously, it has 
homogenised culture and eroded individuals‘ sense of agency, creating new dependencies. 
In Chapter 4, I explored culture, including its relationship with the natural world and the 
largely neglected association between culture and governance (of societies, the conditions 
that make society possible and environmental husbandry). There is insufficient attention on 
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the imminent (experiences of people, place, well-being, their agency and freedom) and a 
hyper-focus on the liminal or theoretical (perfecting economic modelling, production micro-
efficiencies, or niche innovations). Effort could be more fruitfully directed to managing the 
challenges of modernity in jointly human and nature-centred ways. 
Chapter 5 aimed to answer the fourth question – what are some solutions to the challenges 
posed by the first three – by arguing cultural institutions can be vectors for transformative 
change in a world in crisis. New museology as a principle and the ecomuseum as a site, share 
much in common with other interdisciplinary approaches such as urban planning. I do not 
wish to imply that the existing infrastructure of museums should be radically changed – 
many of their roles continue to be valid – nor should their future be restricted to the existing 
stock of institutions. Rather, the future may be one in which the relevance of museums 
increases as their number, scope, diversity, roles and responsibilities expand. It may be a new 
era for museology, an area of the musealisation of human societies as they strive for 
dynamic-equilibrium. 
In the future – a world increasingly urban, crowded, conflicted, resource poor, and where 
cultures, peoples and faiths encounter each other as never before – museums can be sites of 
collective, democratic decision-making, where information is sublimated into knowledge, 
global problems are faced at the local level, and the dehumanised is re-humanised. 
 
Notes
                                                     
1
  UNFPA, op.cit., p. 4. 
2
  Pearce, op.cit., Part 3, ‗Implosion‘, 107 ff; and Brand, op.cit., 58 ff. 
3
  Recorded at the Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii, viewed 4 August 2011, <http://co2now.org/> 
4
   Garnaut, op.cit., 29ff; World Bank, Turn Down the Heat, xiii ff. 
5
  There are many analyses of these concerns, for example, nef, Growth Isn‟t Possible, 52ff; T 
Jackson, op.cit., pp. 49–86; Garnaut, op.cit., 29 ff; C Hamilton, Requiem for a Species, 190 ff. 
6
  Again, a much-reported concern, for example, see Climate Commission, op.cit., 48 ff; Homer-
Dixon, Up Side of Down, 16 7ff; nef, Growth Isn‟t Possible, 31 ff. 
7
  A question continually tested through UN processes. For example, the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Durban Conference (November/December 2011) agreed to establish a new 
global treaty by 2012 under which all member states will agree to binding carbon reductions, see 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 
March 2012, viewed 14 May 2012, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf>. 
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8
  D Meadows and J Randers, Limits of Growth, the 30-year update, Chelsea Green, 2004, p. 5. 
9
  Known as ‗global footprint accounting‘. See Global Footprint Network, D Pollard (ed.), Living 
Planet Report 2010, WWF Report, London, Oakland and Gland, 2010, pp. 32–49. 
10
  EET (exponential expiration time analysis) measures, given exponentially increasing demand for 
a finite natural resource, when a given commodity will be extracted to exhaustion. 
11
  Al Bartlett, http://www.albartlett.org/articles/art_forgotten_fundamentals_part_5.html (on EET); 
GM Mudd‘s analysis, The Sustainability of Mining in Australia, Research Report No. RR5, 
Department of Civil Engineering, Monash University and Mineral Policy Institute, 2009, states 
that for ‗commodities, such as gold, lead and zinc, present economic resources will last for 
approximately three decades or less … The critical underlying issue which remains poorly 
recognised and understood in the mining industry is the environmental costs associated with the 
continually increasing scale of the mining industry. Considering the perpetual decline in ore 
grades and increasing waste rock produced, this points to potentially increasing environmental 
costs in the future in terms of energy, water, greenhouse emissions and the like – especially if 
these aspects are analysed with respect to unit mineral production and not ore throughput … 
Ultimately, the sustainability of the mining industry continues to hang in the balance‘, p. 127. 
12
  nef, Growth Isn‟t Possible, see the chapter, ‗Peak Oil, Gas and Coal? pp. 69–84. 
13
   Brand, op.cit., pp. 246–7, ‗Humans invade new places, wreak destruction, then eventually settle 
down ... Lately we‘ve run out of unpopulated places to invade, and we say we‘d like to stop 
invading each other. If we can keep climate change from forcing us back into the invasion game, 
how would settling down once and for all work? The encouraging lesson from prehistory is that 
settling down means inhabiting a place with such close attention that the practices of ―tending the 
wild‖ and agriculture blur into one.‘ 
14
  C Hamilton, Requiem for a Species, 128 ff. 
15
  As described by Korten in the title of his book, op.cit. For speculation about the most optimistic 
scenario for global development by the late 21
st
 century, see Neva Goodwin, ‗An Overview of 
Climate Change: What does it mean for our way of life?‘ Global Development and Environment 
Institute Working Paper No.08.01, Tufts University, 2008. 
16
  Homer-Dixon, The Great Transformation, Essen, 2009, summarises many of these synchronous 
risks but presents the challenges as existential and moral issues. 
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APPENDICES 
 
The appendices provide supplementary information about some of the issues discussed in this 
thesis as well as a description of the case studies that were a methodological influence. The 
appendices‘ contents page is reproduced below. They can be accessed on-line by going to the 
following URL: 
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B1fjqNpm0Oo9VjNudWZveTJmbVU 
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